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Abstract 
 The Second Congress established the Continental Army, the first national 
fighting force, in the European style, to encounter Britain in the American 
Revolutionary War. The army was inspired by its British opponent and affected by its 
French counterpart and allies. All these influences were demonstrated in several 
attempts that Congress and the commanding officers made to create a professional 
army, and how the army was shaped over time. The lack of most war essentials 
obligated the Americans to seek any possible way to handle these struggles. 
 Without a central government, the revolutionaries formed themselves as a 
team and used private networks to gain what they wanted for the army. In the first 
phase of the war the Americans adopted the practices of the British army. The 
Continental regiments were organized after the British model, the officers used British 
reading lists to educate themselves, and when they were faced with a shortage of men, 
they persuaded other ethnicities and races to enlist, like the British had done. The 
approaches worked, but did not completely solve the problems. The American envoys, 
therefore, were present in Paris to plead with the King of France for assistance, and 
later on the army was aided with money, supplies, fleet, and military technicians. 
French officers and their allies thus participated in most of the Continental units and 
helped to improve the army’s performance and other war aspects. They also supported 
the thought of establishing the first American military school.  
 The thesis explores the influences of eighteen-century European warfare on 
the Continental Army, which was pushed to grow as a credible and honourable force. 
It analyzes how the army was based on European military tradition, and how it was 
sculpted by war-resource deficiencies. In doing so, it bolsters understanding of the 
first American army, which combined European culture with an American way of 
fighting.
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Introduction 
 
The characteristics of the first American fighting force in the Revolutionary 
War—the Continental Army—have been perceived in many different ways. 
Historians have debated whether it was a distinctively American institution or if it 
resembled the European armies of its day. Contemporaries and historians have argued 
over the nature of the American military system whether it was militia force or regular 
army. Nevertheless, the European influences at the genesis of the Continental Army 
have not yet been carefully examined. No consensus has emerged on what aspects of 
the army were affected by European military tradition and practices. Moreover, it has 
not been clarified how the army was exactly established and run, what the army was 
expected to be like, and what the army finally became. Beyond that, there is still the 
question of what were the factors that made the army develop that way.  
 Despite this contemporary debate, some historians have concluded that the 
Continental Army copied European military rules and styles of fighting. Caroline Cox 
explains that the Continental Army considered the regulars’ rules more important than 
the cause of fighting.1 This idea explains how the Americans could create an army so 
quickly to fight in the war. Moreover, she argues, the senior American officers had 
also fought alongside the British army during the Imperial Wars and thus were 
familiar with the administrative and operational structure of the European armies. 
Russell Weigley, however, disagrees and in his The American Way of War claims that 
armies such as Continental Army succeeded in finding support and equipping 
themselves, but that they were never able to match the British consistently in the 
discipline that required standing up to the open-field exchanges of volleys and bayonet 
                                                 
1 Caroline Cox, ‘The Continental Army’, in The Oxford Handbook of The American Revolution, ed. by 
Edward Gray (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), p.163.  
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fighting that characterized eighteenth-century warfare. They could not match the well-
drilled British in battlefield manoeuvrability or the tactical articulation of their 
battalions.2  
 Tal Tovy makes a crucial point about the characteristics of the American army 
during the American Revolutionary War. His Militia or Regular Army3 questions that 
if the militia was as effective as many had claimed and that it brought about the victory 
of this war, then why did the Americans still need to establish an army? Tovy mentions 
the importance of the European military tradition of the eighteenth century as well, 
but he does not discuss what kinds of European practices the Americans adopted. 
Tovy instead uses as his theme the strategies of George Washington, commander in 
chief, and Nathanael Greene, commander of the American forces in the South. The 
essay discusses that both of them agreed that only a well-organized and trained army 
in the modern style of warfare could lead the Americans to win the war.  
 Those on both sides of the American Revolutionary War have written many 
great works of history about the war in general as well as specific army. Some of these 
studies are devoted to the study of different aspects of the war and warfare beyond 
military operations. A few explore the British military endeavour in the American 
Revolutionary War, such as Stephen Conway’s The War of American Independence 
1775-1783,4 Sylvia R. Frey’s The British Soldier in America,5 R. Arthur Bowler’s 
Logistics and the Failure of the British Army in America,6 Franklin and Marry 
                                                 
2 Russell Weigley, The American Way of War, A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy 
(New York: Macmillan Publishing, 1974) p.4. 
3 Tal Tovy, ‘Militia or Regular Army’, European Journal of American Studies, 5-1 (2010), < 
http://journals.openedition.org/ejas/7814> [accessed September 23, 2017]. 
4 Stephen Conway, The War of American Independence, 1775-1783 (London: Edward Arnold, 1995). 
5 Sylvia Frey, The British Soldier in America (Austin Texas: University of Texas Press, 1981). 
6 R. Arthur Bowler, Logistics and the Failure of the British Army in America 1775-1783 (Princeton 
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1975). 
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Wickwire’s Cornwallis and the War of Independence,7 and George Billias’s George 
Washington’s Opponents.8 These works can be situated alongside other studies which 
have explored the armed forces in America during the eighteenth century, such as 
Stephen Brumwell’s Redcoats,9 John Houlding’s Fit for Service10 and Ira D. Gruber’s 
Books and the British Army.11 Similarly, the American military effort during the 
Revolutionary period has been widely investigated in terms of military attitudes, 
politics and practice in texts such as Don Higginbotham’s The War of American 
Independence,12 Mark Edward Lender’s A Respectable Army: The Military Origins 
of the Republic, 1763–1789,13 and Donald Stroker’s Strategy in the American War of 
Independence: A Global Approach.14  And so many works have been written in the 
styles of battle narration and generals’ bibliographies. 
  But not so many have made arguments about the culture of the Continental 
Army. Among those, Charles Royster’s classic study of American characteristics 
during the Revolutionary War reveals the attitudes of the American people toward 
their first army. The root problem of the army was that the officers expected men to 
be mechanical and disciplined while men considered themselves free. The book, A 
Revolutionary People at War: The Continental Army and American Character15 
                                                 
7 Franklin and Marry Wickwire, Cornwallis and the War of Independence, (London: Faber and Faber, 
1971). 
8 George Athan Billaias, George Washington’s Opponents: British Generals and Admirals in the 
American Revolution (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1969).  
9 Stephen Brumwell, Redcoats: The British Soldier and War in the Americas, 1775-1763 (Cambridge 
United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
10 J.A. Houlding, Fit for Service: The Training of the British Army, 1715-1795 (New York: Clarendon 
Press, 1981). 
11 Ira D. Gruber, Books and the British Army in the Age of the American Revolution (Chapel Hill North 
Carolina: The University of North Carolina Press, 2010). 
12 Don Higginbotham, The War of American Independence: Military Attitudes, Politics, and Practice 
1763-1789 (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1983). 
13 James Kirby Martin and Mark Edward Lender, A respectable Army: The Military Origins of the 
Republic, 1763-1789 (Arlington Heights, Illinois: Harlan Davidson, 1982). 
14 Donald Stroker, Kennet J. Hagan and Michael T. McMaster, Strategy in the American War of 
Independence: A Global Approach (New York: Routledge, 2010). 
15 Charles Royster, A Revolutionary People at War: The Continental Army and American Character, 
1775-1783 (London: W.W.Norton & Company Ltd., 1981). 
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questions why Congress failed to run their army, and the truth is that the army almost 
fell apart. Royster focuses on the importance of public virtue to support the army and 
men, which was civilian governments’ responsibility. He emphasizes its broad social 
composition and argues that public virtue was an important factor in the war’s 
successful outcome, rather dismissing professionalization as a factor in the 
Revolutions military victories. However, the ambiguous administrative system in 
America that greatly affected the army has not been clearly discussed. American 
institutions at that time were forged in a legal sense. The connections formed in the 
army between powerful Revolutionists have not been carefully examined. 
Robert K. Wright’s The Continental Army16 is a unique work that deals with 
the army’s organization and development step by step. It shows how the American 
officers perceived the situation they were fighting, and that played a part in 
transforming the troops. Caroline Cox’s A Proper Sense of Honor: Service and 
sacrifice in George Washington’s Army also examines the fundamental organizational 
pattern of the Continental Army, which was modelled by European army influences 
especially regarding notions of honour. Cox argues that social hierarchy supported 
military hierarchy, and military hierarchy was supported by harsh military law.17   
Wright also mentions the professionalism that European officers brought to 
America from 1776 to 1778. He touches on the idea that the army benefitted from 
France and their allies’ military experts. Those contributed to artillery, engineering, 
and infantry corps and helped to develop and add supportive units during that time. 
However, the root of foreign employment, the army reorganization caused by 
                                                 
16 Robert K. Wright, Jr., The Continental Army (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 
2006).   
17 Caroline Cox, A Proper Sense of Honor: Service and Sacrifice in George Washington’s Army 
(Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2004), p. 22. 
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European participation, and the actual roles of those foreign officers have not been 
completely discussed. Wright’s book together with Fred Anderson Berg’s attempt to 
gather the Continental units into his Encyclopaedia of Continental Army Units,18 
should be appreciated. They give great detail of how the army’s organization 
developed over time, and the readers can take it from there for more specific study. 
However, these two books are outdated; the references and analysis should be revised. 
There are also books on specific aspects of the army. Charles Neimeyer’s 
America Goes to War: A Social History of the Continental Army19 presents how 
joining the army became an opportunity for non-white races and ethnicities. Congress 
offered them various things, including a bounty, and in exchange Congress could 
recruit more men.  Neimeyer shows who actually served in the army and reveals that 
the American Revolutionary War was not a purely patriotic war—it was partly about 
business. But the way Congress enlisted these groups of men has not been compared 
to the British approaches, which were similar.  
 Recently, in 2015, Phillip Tucker publishes a book presenting an interesting 
aspect of the Continental Army. His book, How the Irish Won the American 
Revolution20, discusses how the Irish soldiers participated in the Continental Army 
and fought in some important battles. This is actually what Neimeyer investigates in 
his book. Tucker, outstandingly, ignores the upper-class figures and focuses more on 
the neglected Irish soldiers who, in fact, filled the colony and state quotas and fought 
in American battles. They made a great contribution to the war’s outcome. Tucker’s 
                                                 
18 Fred Anderson Berg, Encyclopaedia of Continental Army Units (Pennsylvania: Stackpole Books, 
1972). 
19 Charles Patrick Neimeyer, America Goes to War: A Social History of the Continental Army (New 
York: New York University Press, 1996). 
20 Phillip Tomas Tucker, How the Irish won the American Revolution: Anew Look at the Forgotten 
Heroes of America’s War of Independence (New York: Skyhorse Publishing, 2015). 
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work also tallies up more characteristics of the Continental Army in the ongoing 
debates. His argument is also based on the Continental Army’s struggle to survive, as 
demonstrated by their enlisting of any able-bodied man. 
 Other factors, like how the American officers at that time educated themselves 
is also an interesting point which has not been examined evidently. When a military 
school was not available, the officers turned to military literature they could acquire. 
American military reading choice has not been discussed clearly. Steuben’s 
Regulation is the most famous and seems to be well known to historians, but it 
demonstrates only one of many genres of military literature at that time. In addition, 
before Steuben produced his work, the army and its officers actually had possessed 
many other useful books. Some of these books even went in-depth regarding military 
theory like those read by British officers.    
Reneé Critcher Lyons’s Foreign-Born American Patriots21 is the only book 
available on the market that gathers as many as 16 outstanding foreign officers and 
Revolutionists who participated in the war. While the book gives interesting profiles 
and the reasons each individual joined the cause, it does not analyze their specific 
roles that contributed to the development of the army. Some informative works have 
been composed on foreign officers who participated in the Revolutionary War, 
especially those famous ones like Harlow Giles Unger’s Lafayette22, Alex 
Storozynski’s The Peasant Prince: Thaddeus Kosciuszko23, and Paul Lockhart’s The 
Drillmaster of Valley Forge: The Baron de Steuben and the Making of the American 
                                                 
21 Reneé Critcher Lyons, Foreign-Born American Patriots (North Carolina: McFarland & Company, 
Inc., Publishers, 2012). 
22 Harlow Giles Unger, Lafayette (New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, Inc, 2002). 
23 Alex Storozynski, The Peasant Prince: Thaddeus Kosciuszko and the Age of Revolution (New York: 
Thomas Dunne Books, 2009). 
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Army 24. These books give these men’s overall private and military lives as a starting 
point for further analysis.  
There have also been challenges to the conventional belief that the training 
provided by foreign officers at Valley Forge served as the turning point of the 
Revolution. In chapter 11 of Wayne Bodle’s book, The Valley Forge Winter: Civilians 
and Soldiers in War, he asserts that the training efforts of Baron von Steuben, a 
Prussian drillmaster, were not significant enough to transform the army. Their effect 
was actually to give the soldiers more pride, confidence, and familiarity with the 
military routine.25 
Overall, the literature gives an idea of what the first American army looks like 
and touches on European integration during specific times of the war. Different 
aspects of the Continental Army are discussed, but none of those primarily and 
directly discuss the American army through European influences: what those 
influences are, why the Americans accepted them, and how the American force was 
affected in such way. My study, therefore, will investigate these influences and try to 
find out if they promoted the Europeanization of the Continental Army and intends to 
offer a contribution to this ongoing debate. 
Background of the Problem 
The failing of the troops around Boston to present themselves properly foreshadowed 
the problems of the Continental Army, when George Washington arrived at 
Cambridge, Massachusetts, on July 2, 1775. The commander-in-chief did not delight 
in seeing his troops. The camps were unorganized, unclean, and only a few units had 
                                                 
24 Paul Lockhart, The Drillmaster of Valley Forge: The Baron de Steuben and the Making of the 
American Army (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2008). 
25 Wayne Bodle, The Valley Forge Winter: Civilians and Soldiers in War (University Park: The 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002). 
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uniforms. Washington received information on the size of the army eight days later.26 
The numbers of the forces also disturbed him, but not as much as their manner. 
Comparing his men to the British regulars, he found that his troops were too weak and 
too poorly disciplined to begin to fight or even carry out defensive operations, 
reporting that out of 18-20,000 men, only 14,000 were fit for duty.27 Furthermore, 
Washington expressed his low opinion of the military ability of his troops, and 
particularly wanted qualified men to be commissioned, ‘The Skill of those we have, 
being very imperfect and confined to the mere manual Exercise of cannon: Whereas—
the War in which we are engaged requires a Knowledge comprehending the Duties of 
the Field and Fortifications’.28 
 Raising the amateur army would indeed take patience. Washington recognized 
that this unorganized and undisciplined army could be led into a catastrophe, 
particularly when the enemy was not a long way from their camp. He wrote, ‘I found 
a mixed multitude of People here, under very little discipline, order, or Government. 
I found the enemy in possession of a place called Bunker’s Hill, on Charles Town 
Neck, strongly Intrenched, and Fortifying themselves’.29 
 From Washington’s initial reaction to taking command, we can see that in the 
beginning the American armed forces appeared distinctly different from the 
professional armies of Europe.30 The Continental Army was started from scratch, 
formed by some experienced officers, who recruited male citizens to perform military 
                                                 
26 George Washington, ‘To Richard Henry Lee, Camp at Cambridge, 10 July 1775,’ in the Writings of 
Washington, from the Original Manuscript Sources, 1775-1799, vol.3, ed. by John C. Fitzpatrick 
(Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1931), pp. 329-331. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Fitzpatrick, ed., ‘To the President of Congress, Camp at Cambridge, 10 July 1775,’ vol.3, p. 325. 
29 Fitzpatrick, ed., ‘To John Augustine Washington, Camp at Cambridge, about 5 miles from Boston, 
27 July 1775,’ vol.3, p. 371. 
30 In an occupational sense, professionalism means that a person is paid for a period of time for his or 
her services that require some combination of special skills, training and education. See William C. 
Pruett, A History of the Organizational Development of the Continental Artillery during the War 
(Tennessee: Columbia University, 1998) p.3. 
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operations in an actual war. The men who participated in the Continental Army were 
drawn from all sections of society.31 The British Army, on the other hand, was led by 
members of the aristocracy. However, by the end of the American War of 
Independence, the Americans had improved their troops toward the profession of 
arms.32  
 The thought of creating a professional army did not stem only from 
Washington’s admiration of British discipline. Military professionalism was present 
in the Continental Army as many of Washington’s senior officers served as both 
militia and regular British soldiers and gained battlefield experience during the French 
and Indian War.33 Many other officers agreed that it was still necessary to create a 
disciplined army since the militiamen were unlikely to fulfil the respectable 
aspirations of the military. Irregular warfare was considered an uncivilized practice, 
and any group that participated would be unable to earn a place among European 
nations.34 The law of nations also guided America toward an understanding of 
statecraft and encouraged Europeans to take the United States seriously.35 Creating an 
army from its very foundations, however, has never been an easy task, especially 
when it must be as disciplined as and equivalent to the professional European ones.  
                                                 
31 Stephen Conway, ‘The British Army and the War of Independence’, in The Oxford Handbook of the 
American Revolution, ed. By Edward G. Gray and Jane Kamensky (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2013), p. 178. 
32 Historians have found the criteria of development professions before the Industrial Revolution. There 
are seven features that should be included: hierarchical organization; emphasis on service; internal 
control of recruitment, training and placement; internal enforcement of standards and discipline; 
possession of specific expertise; a well-developed career structure; and a strong esprit de corps. See Ira 
D. Gruber, Books and the British Army in the Age of the American Revolution (North Carolina: The 
University of North Carolina Press, 2010), pp. 23 and 58-60.  
33 George Athan Billias, George Washington’s Generals and Opponents: Their Exploits and 
Leadership (New York: Da Capo, 1994), pp. viii-ix. 
34 John Whiteclay Chambers II, ‘Continental Army’, in The Oxford Companion to American Military 
History (New York: Oxford University Press), p. 186. 
35 J.M Opal, ‘The Republic in the World, 1783-1803’, in The Continental Army, The Oxford Handbook 
of The American Revolution, ed. by Edward Gray (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 599. 
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 Washington believed that the Americans needed to know how to fight in a 
standard pattern, not only to compete effectively in the battlefield but also to gain 
honour as a national army so that the United States would be viewed by other civilized 
nations as being able to fight on regular terms. He wrote to the president of Congress:  
 Regular troops alone are equal to the exigencies of modern war, as well for 
 defence as offence; and whenever a substitute is attempted, it must prove 
 illusory and ruinous.—No Militia will ever acquire the habits necessary to 
 resist a regular force.36  
This is why modern war style that Washington mentioned was so important to follow. 
Otherwise, even if they won the fight, they could not prove their honour. However, it 
seemed impossible to create a professional army in such a short time to European 
standards. Training the unorganized colonial troops required an intensive selection of 
military procedure and practice. General Nathanael Greene also agreed that the 
European military ideas should be carefully chosen for adoption by the army. He 
wrote to a council of war in December 1777. This statement predicted the future of 
the Continental Army—learn from pattern and know by experience: 
 [E]xperience is the best of schools and the safest guide in human affairs; yet 
 I am no advocate for blindly following all the maxims of European policy, 
 but where reason corresponds with what custom has long sanctified, we may 
 safely copy their Example.37  
                                                 
36 Fitzpatrick, ed., ‘To the President of Congress, 15 September 1780,’ vol. 20 (1937), pp. 49-50.  
37 Nathanael Greene, ‘To George Washington from Major General Nathanael Greene, 3 December 
1777,’ed. by Frank E. Grizzard, Jr. and David R. Hoth, in Founders Online, National Archives 
<http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/03-12-02-0486, ver. 2014-05-09> [accessed 9 
August 2014]. 
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But even if it was clear from the start that Congress made the decision to create a full-
time army, the real question was how the Americans would achieve that level of 
European professionalism. Washington and many Revolutionaries led this idea and 
made a great attempt to do so, but to build a professional army took time and effort. 
It was not only the American people’s job; this work employed a great deal of foreign 
service support from France, which included giving advice and performing some 
special duties. But before the help came, the Americans had already followed some 
of the British army’s plans and action.   
Aims and Themes 
This study will investigate European influences on the Continental Army and the 
United States land forces during its genesis in the late eighteenth to early nineteenth 
centuries, mainly 1775-1802.  The analysis will start with the Continental Army 
during the Revolutionary War and continue on to the more professional army that 
developed during the war. Moreover, it will look closely at the founding of the United 
States Military Academy West Point in 1802, which further professionalized the US 
Army. I will also discuss the factors that affected the development of troop discipline 
and professionalism. Looking at its development during this transitional period, I will 
attempt to determine whether the US Army represented a distinct fighting force.  
 This study will also utilize materials from the Eighteenth-Century Collections 
Online (ECCO); the National Archives Washington D.C., Fold 3, Revolutionary War 
Records; Washington’s writings; Washington and his officers’ correspondence, 
journals, and diaries; the Journals of Continental Congress; letters of members of the 
Continental Congress, letters of delegates to Congress; manuscript orderly books; 
published papers and memoirs. Secondary sources in the form of books, journals, and 
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theses will be used to gather general ideas, define guidelines and timelines, add 
historical arguments, and develop the overall research plan. 
 The research begins by examining the attempts of Congress and military 
commanders, in the first year of the war, to create a full-time army modeled after the 
British army’s organization and composition. However, the troops were adjusted 
several times due to the shortage of men, current situation, and poor administration of 
Congress. The following chapter then looks at the social composition of the 
Continental Army. It explores the function of related institutions: Congress, the 
provincial government, and the Continental Army and its commander-in-chief, which 
were responsible for war matters. It will analyze the attempts they made together, 
formally and privately, to keep the army in existence and avoid its collapse before the 
war ended.  
 During the War of Independence, the US Armed Forces appeared different 
from professional European armies. In the eighteenth century, British Army officers 
were usually members of the upper class, and the rank and file were recruited from 
the bottom of the social hierarchy. The men in the Continental Army were volunteers 
with no professional training. They expected to serve for a single campaign and 
viewed their enlistment as a contract. Americans of the Revolution harboured a strong 
mistrust of permanent armies.  This was reflected in the disbanding of the Continental 
Army following the War’s end. General George Washington prevented a potential 
crisis by resigning as commander-in-chief after the war, which established a tradition 
of civil control over the US military. These first two chapters will examine social 
composition, army organization and the command structure as a way of analyzing its 
ethos.  
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 The third chapter tracks the British impact on the Americans’ reading choices. 
Since at that time there was no military school in America, the American officers had 
to educate themselves, and find a way to train the men. It will investigate military 
literature and reading of American officers during the war, especially material that 
was published in America. The military literature that was available and utilized 
during the Revolutionary War has been divided into two categories: books used by 
both British and Continental armies, plus what was not taken up in America, and 
books used by only the Americans. As well as exploring the content of these works, 
and their intellectual debts, this chapter will indicate how well the material was used 
and whether these military textbooks made a significant contribution to the 
Continental Army. It also looks for reviews of the books, advertisements, and the 
people’s thought about them to explore how they were received and used.  
 The fourth chapter will determine how the Continental Army filled in military 
quotas, since many American men declined to reenlist, and Congress struggled to 
recruit new men into the army. It will also examine how the British and American 
armies were using the same groups of other ethnicities and races—the American 
Natives, Germans, and black slaves—to fight for them, and whether the Americans 
followed the British methods. It will look at the specific ways both armies persuaded 
those men to join their troops.  
 The fifth chapter then will shift the focus away from the British influence to 
the French, since the Americans were supported by the French king with funds, 
ammunition, war supplies, and military officers. The Continental Army relied on 
European assistance and foreign staff officers’ instruction. The new Continental Army 
needed engineers, and experienced artillerymen, so Congress requested that Silas 
Deane and Benjamin Franklin secure professional European officers for the 
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Continental Army. Several military leaders of the Continental Army were European. 
This chapter aims to describe European officers’ roles and contribution to the army.  
 The last factor to be considered will be the thought of the military academy 
establishment. American officers and legislators agreed that they relied too much on 
foreign engineers and artillerists during the war. Domestic training was required, so 
they supported the creation of a national military academy in order to teach the arts 
and sciences of warfare. In 1802, Congress authorized the establishment and funding 
of the US Military Academy as a way to promote the study of engineering and 
sciences in the growing nation. This chapter will focus closely on the inspiration of 
creating the military school supported by American and French officers.  
Whether or not the Continental Army mimicked all the practice, training, and 
discipline of the European armies during the eighteenth century will be examined 
later. However, it is clear that the American army was influenced by European 
military culture. The British army during the eighteenth century focused on firepower. 
The soldiers stood in lines, facing the enemy, ready to be attacked. Their best weapon 
was the musket; although its accuracy was less than a 100-yard fire range, it was the 
most effective weapon when firing in volleys. The French, however, were still 
debating the importance of firepower and shock of either muskets and cannon, or 
bayonets and sabres.38 But both the armies focused on intense training, along with 
repetitive exercise in set movements and working as a team. During the eighteenth 
century a military enlightenment developed by which the Europeans tested the 
effectiveness of the new weaponry and simplified organization as well as improving 
on the marching step, system of drill and fixed manoeuvres.39 During this time, the 
                                                 
38 Ira D. Gruber, Books and the British Army in the Age of the American Revolution (North Carolina: 
The University of North Carolina Press, 2010), p.35. 
39 Wright, p. 51. 
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European nations were frequently at war so they preserved large permanent and 
standing armies to fight in open areas, and men made military careers and devoted 
their efforts to building specialized skills.40 To become like the Europeans, the 
Continental Army needed to follow the Europeans’ method.
                                                 
40 Ibid. 
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Chapter 1 Making an Army 
 
Introduction 
The first European influence on the genesis of the Continental Army was in fact into 
fostering of the need to create one. The idea of making a full-time army would not 
have happened if an agreement could have been made between the British parliament 
and the colonists. After long conflicts over taxes between the British government and 
the Americans, the first Continental Congress, with the delegates from each colony, 
was established on September 5, 1774 to protest a series of Coercive Acts and find 
the common ground between the colonies and its mother country. The Americans 
disapproved of the way that the English government kept soldiers in America and 
found it ‘quite unreasonable, that the mother country should be at the expense of 
maintaining standing armies in North America’.1 They insisted that this action of 
‘keeping a Standing army in these colonies, in times of peace without the consent of 
the legislature of that colony, in which such army is kept is against the law’.2 Feeling 
threatened by the British garrison in Boston, the Americans formed a security guard 
to protect themselves. They decided to use their militia as their main force for this 
purpose, ‘the militia, if put upon a proper footing, would be amply sufficient for their 
defence in time of peace; that they are desirous to put it on such a footing 
immediately’.3 At this time the colonists did not have a permanent army—they used 
the militia as their main force.   
                                                 
1 Richard Henry Lee, ‘first draft in, Wednesday, October 5, 1774,’in the Journals of the Continental 
Congress, vol. 1, ed. by Worthington Chauncey Ford (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1904-37) p. 54. 
2 Ford, eds., ‘Friday, October 14, 1774,’ Vol. 1, p. 70. 
3 Ford, eds., ‘Monday, October 3, 1774,’ Vol. 1, p. 54.  
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 One of the main reasons Congress did not create the army at first was because 
the conflict was not expected to last long, and the Americans hoped to compromise in 
order ‘to restore between Great Britain and the Colonies that harmony so necessary to 
the happiness of the British Empire, and so ardently desired by all America’.4 In 
October 1774, Congress delegates drafted a petition to the king to request the removal 
of the British army out of Boston, ‘A standing army has been kept in these colonies, 
ever since the conclusion of the late war, without the consent of our assemblies; and 
this army with a considerable naval armament has been employed to enforce the 
collection of taxtes’.5 The attempt of the First Continental Congress had no effect as 
John Adams concluded in his diaries, ‘all Petitions, Remonstrances and Negotiations, 
for the future would be fruitless and only occasion a Loss of time and give Opportunity 
to the Ennemy to sow divisions among the States and the People’.6 
 By then, the distrust and hostile feelings toward the standing army were rooted 
in the Americans’ minds, because the British army was seen as threatening. 
Discussions on creating a national army were not taken seriously until the first fighting 
at the battle of Lexington and Concord on April 19, 1775, between the British regulars 
and the American militia. People realized that the long conflict had now turned into 
an actual war. Many of the delegates of the first Continental Congress were 
determined that America have an able force to defend itself. Massachusetts delegates 
like John Adams planned to pursue a national force and acquire foreign assistance: 
 We were free but if the War should be continued, We were determined to 
 seek Alliances with France, Spain and any other Power of Europe, that 
                                                 
4 Ford, eds., ‘Saturday, October 1, 1774,’ Vol. 1, p. 53. 
5 Ford, eds., ‘The Petition of Congress,’ vol. 1, p. 116. 
6 John Adams, ‘In Congress, May 1775,’ in The Adams Papers, Diary and Autobiography of John 
Adams, vol. 3, ed. by L. H. Butterfield (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1961), pp. 314–
321. 
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 would  contract with Us. That We ought immediately to adopt the Army in 
 Cambridge as a Continental Army to Appoint a General and all other 
 Officers, take upon ourselves the Pay, Subsistence, Cloathing, Armour and 
 Munitions of the Troops.7 
Soon after, the Second Continental Congress was formed on May 10, 1775, and the 
creation of an army was considered. The Massachusetts Provincial Congress promptly 
responded to this clash with the decision to establish a national fighting force. The 
army was expected to contain 13,600 men from the colonies. The letter of 
Massachusetts delegates was dispatched to London, and a part of it showed their 
offense: 
The sanguinary Zeal of the Ministerial Army, to ruin and destroy the 
Inhabitants of this Colony, in the Opinion of Congress, hath rendered the 
Establishment of an Army indispensably necessary […] we are now reduced 
to the sad alternative of defending ourselves by arms, or submitting to be 
slaughtered.8  
The Americans were reluctant to begin open war with the British redcoats, knowing 
well how superior the British army was, since they witnessed the British victory over 
the French in the previous war. It was hard to digest that they were about to fight with 
this powerful army. But at this moment, there was no other option: they needed to 
create their own force—at least for a symbol of this determination to resist to the 
public. Without having an actual army, they had no hope in this war. And this implied 
their desire to create one as similar as possible to their mother country’s troops. The 
Massachusetts provincial government was the most radical one on this matter: 
                                                 
7 Butterfield, ed., pp. 314–321. 
8 Ford, eds., ‘In Provincial Congress, Watertown, May 3, 1775,’ vol.2, pp. 24-25.  
- 4 - 
 
 With the greatest deference, we beg leave to suggest, that a powerful Army, 
 as the only mean left to stem the rapid Progress of a tyrannical Ministry. 
 Without a force, superior to our Enemies, we must reasonably expect to 
 become the Victims of their relentless fury: With such a force, we may still 
 have hopes of  seeing an immediate End put to the inhuman Ravages of 
 mercenary Troops in America, and the wicked authors of our Miseries, 
 brought to condign punishment, by the just Indignation of out Brethren in 
 Great Britain.9 
Massachusetts delegates again encouraged Congress to pursue the creation of army, 
but even if an army was vital, the idea of using citizens as soldiers still appeared. The 
most open supporters for a Continental Army, still harboured doubts about its 
potential threat to liberty: 
 We are now compelled to raise an Army, which with the assistance of the 
 other colonies. We hope under the smiles of heaven, will be able to defend is 
 and all  America from the further butcheries and devastations of our 
 implacable enemies.—But as the sword should in all free states be 
 subservient to the civil powers and as it is the duty of the Magistrates to 
 support it for the peoples necessary defense, we tremble at having an army 
 (although consisting of our countrymen) established here without a civil 
 power to provide for and control them.10 
The colonies, however, already had a militia in each province, and the men proved 
themselves effective in the Battle of Lexington and Concord. This increased the 
delegates’ reluctance to create a regular army. The militia was not a new thing. It was 
                                                 
9 Ford, eds., ‘In Provincial Congress, Watertown, May 3, 1775,’ vol.2, pp. 24-25. 
10 Ford, eds., ‘Friday, June 2, 1775,’ vol. 2, p. 77. 
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the system that the Americans inherited from the English in 1691. The Massachusetts 
charter stated that the regiments of militia were organized to empower the royal 
governor and to protect themselves from the Indian and the French: 
 The Governor of our said Province or Territory for the time being shall have 
 full Power by himselfe or by any Cheif Comander or other Officer or 
 Officers to be  appointed by him from time to time to traine instruct Exercise 
 and Governe the Militia there and for the speciall Denfence and Safety of 
 Our said Province or Territory to assemble in Martiall Array and put in 
 Warlike posture the Inhabitants of Our said Province or Territory and to lead 
 and Conduct them and with them to Encounter Expulse Repell Resist and 
 pursue by force of Armes aswell by Sea as by Land.11  
Before the army was established, on March 25, 1775, the Committee of Safety 
proposed a plan for embodying, arming and disciplining a militia for putting the 
colonies into an immediate posture of defence. The committee recommended that the 
colonies put in execution the Militia Law passed in the year 1738 because, ‘the legal 
and necessary disciplining of the militia has been much neglected and a proper 
provision of arms and ammunition has not been made, to the evident danger of the 
community in case of invasion or insurrection’.12 It was advised that the colonies form 
one or more volunteer companies of infantry and troops of horse in each county and 
be in constant training and readiness to act on any emergency. The drill book Military 
                                                 
11 The Charter of Massachusetts Bay – 1691, The Federal and State Constitutions Colonial Charters, 
and Other Organic Laws of the States, Territories, and Colonies Now or Heretofore Forming the United 
States of America, compiled and edited under the Act of Congress of June 30, 1906 by Francis Newton 
Thorpe (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1909). 
12 Thomas Jefferson, ‘Report of Committee to Prepare a Plan for a Militia, March 25, 1775,’ in The 
Papers of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 1, 1760–1776, ed. By Julian P. Boyd (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1950), pp. 160–162. 
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Exercise for Infantry established in 1764 refers to The Manual Exercise, and was 
recommended to use to train the men.  
 Therefore, the Continental Army at the beginning was a New England army, 
initially using a high percentage of militia along with the soldiers. The Continental 
Army in 1775 was made up of a large number volunteers—those who represented 
citizen force—gathering around Boston.  
Table 1: Number of men in arms during 1775-1783 
Year Regulars/continentals Militia Total 
1775 
1776 
1777 
1778 
1779 
1780* 
1781** 
1782 
1783 
27,443 (72.9%) 
46,891 (73.74%) 
34,820 (77.5%) 
32,889 (88.3%) 
27,699 (84.4%) 
21,015 (73.8%) 
13,292 (64.6%) 
14,256 
13,476 
10,180 
16,700 
10,100 
4,353 
5,135 
5,811 
7,298 
 
 
37,623 
63,591 
44,920 
37,252 
32,834 
26,826 
20,590 
Notes:*None of South Carolina and Georgia’s troops were on the roll; **Congress removed 
Georgia’s quota.   
Sources: Numbers from 1775-1781 see Beach, p. 466; 1782-1783 see Berg, p.143. 
 
 
Table 2: British, Loyalists, and German troops present in the American theatre of 
operations during the Revolutionary War 
 
Year Number of Men 
June, 1777 
March, 1778 
August, 1778 
November, 1778 
February, 1779 
May, 1779 
December, 1779 
May, 1780 
August, 1780 
December, 1780 
September, 1781 
November 1, 1781 
28,000 
33,750 
34,000 
22,550 
26,750 
25,600 
29,600 
31,600 
35,000 
38,200 
36,600 
29,400 
Source: Berg, p. 144. 
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Since the Continental Army was established under the Continental Congress, 
which theoretically acted as a national government but had no power to enact the law 
practically, to understand the organization of the Continental Army, one needs to look 
at its founders and background problems it faced. The Continental Congress 
encouraged its members, who were the delegates of the colonies’ to execute any 
resolution that the Congress developed. However, this practice hindered the 
effectiveness of the operations, particularly with the army. Congress could not force 
men to enlist so they distributed the quotas to each colony to fill along with using 
militia service. For the Continental Congress, this was a convenient and economical 
method.  
 It is rare to find literature on the Continental Army organization. This is 
probably because the evidence is difficult to access, and it deals with numeric and 
quantitative information. The most useful studies of the organization of the 
Continental Army are The Continental Army by Robert K. Wright, Jr, and Fred 
Anderson Berg’s Encyclopaedia of Continental Army Units. However, these two 
books are old and do not provide adequate referencing and must be read carefully in 
order to make an analysis. Charles Royster’s Revolutionary at War touched on how 
the military organization changed its style from that based on public virtue in 1775 to 
become a more professional under the European influence of the drill master Baron 
von Steuben and the French officers, as well as the emulation of the European tradition 
that the Continental officers adopted like uniforms, badges, honour and gentility.13 
However, the book does not explore how the organization developed. This chapter 
does not examine every unit of the Continental Army throughout the eight years of 
                                                 
13 Charles Royster, A Revolutionary People at War: The Continental Army and American Character, 
1775-1783 (London: W.W.Norton & Company Ltd., 1981). 
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the War, but rather discusses how the army was organized initially, how it changed 
over time, and the reasons for these changes.   
 Congress expected army organization to be modelled on European armies. 
However, the colonists were most familiar with the militia system. Moreover, it was 
easier to urge the colonial delegates to support the fighting force with their troops 
rather than enlisting a new group of men to be trained all over again. In fact, Congress 
at that time could not afford a professional army, which required large sums of 
funds—at least to pay officers and men.   
 A national army, however, was inevitable because the practice of the 
eighteenth-century warfare required that the war needed to be in pitched style and 
operate in open field, which ultimately required professional armies. Smaller battles 
could be fought in different ways—as looking at the battles in the War closely many 
tactics and techniques were used widely, such as hit and run raids and ambushes. In 
the Southern campaign Nathanael Greene kept retreating of weaken Lord Cornwallis’ 
troops, or Lafayette lured General Howe’s troops closer and fired at them behind trees 
when he reconnoitred near Barren Hill, Pennsylvania.  Even if an unconventional 
warfare approaches were used, both sides of the army needed to perform 
professionally and honourably to reach a decisive battle. Besides, the Americans had 
to prove that they were capable of fighting and winning the war. In order to be 
acknowledged this way, they needed to create an effective force to meet the European 
standard. Not only did the Americans need to be able to defend themselves, they must 
also be honourable and professional, so the first task that Congress did was to create 
its national army, ‘The present dangerous and alarming situation of our publick 
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affairs, renders it necessary for this Colony to make preparations for their security and 
defence by raising and establishing and Army’.14  
 The force started with employing a large percentage of the militia gathering 
around Boston in 1775. At this time, the war was idealistic and was the way that many 
people perceived the Revolutionary War. Washington, however, knew that this 
patriotic spirit was not going to work in the long run.  Actually, he saw the flaw of 
public spirit since the first year of the war when his army found itself in shortage of 
men, ‘the egregious want of publick Spirit which reigns here, instead of pressing to 
be engaged in the Cause of their Country which I vainly flattered myselfe woud be 
the Case, I find we are likely to be deserted, at a Most Critical time’.15 The war that 
they were engaging in had just begun and would not be a short one. Men could not 
sacrifice their personal lives to become ready to fight all the time. They needed to get 
paid to live and support their family. Congress needed to create the role of a 
professional military employee in order to keep the men in arms. This was a standard 
for European armies as well. The Revolutionary War was different and special in its 
sense and cause, but it was not different in the terms that soldiering was as an 
employee that needed pay and training to perform effectively.     
 During the war Washington and his subordinates made several attempts to 
encourage Congress to fully support a professional army instead of relying on militia. 
John Shy discusses the situation that Washington nearly lost his position to Charles 
Lee, his second major general, for Lee envisioned the American Revolution as a 
                                                 
14 ‘Provincial Congress, Concord, April 8, 1775,’ in American archives: fourth series: containing a 
documentary history of the English colonies in North America from the King's message to Parliament 
of March 7, 1774 to the Declaration of Independence of the United States, ed. by Perter Force 
(Washington: M. St. Clair Clarke and Peter Force, 1837-1846), p. 1358.  
15 George Washington, ‘From George Washington to John Hancock, 28 November 1775,’ in The 
Papers of George Washington, Revolutionary War Series, vol. 2, 16 September 1775 – 31 December 
1775, ed. By Philander D. Chase (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1987), pp. 444–448. 
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popular war of mass resistance based on military service as an obligation for 
citizenship.16 Shy examined Washington’s and Lee’s conflicting ideas regarding 
appropriate American military strategy.17 Lee believed that militia system was more 
in keeping with American concepts of individuality. He valued simplicity, ‘If the 
Americans are servilely kept to the European Plan, they will make an awkward Figure, 
be laugh’d at as bad Army by their Enemy, and defeated in every Rencontre which 
depends on Manoeuvres.’18 But, Washington supported warfare rooted in traditional 
British linear tactics, declaring that the militia would destroy colonial society.  
 The idea of creating a regular army, however, was usually compromised. A 
standing army was not popular among the members of Congress and American people 
alike. This deprecation stemmed from the fact that the British government had used 
this very policy to create an armed force stationed in the colonies and taxed the 
colonists in order to pay for it. In the eyes of the British, this force would be used to 
protect newly obtained land in Canada and Florida from French and Spanish attack. 
Moreover, they could protect the colonists from the Indians. But the Americans 
disagreed—the troops were no use, and to have armed forces in peaceful time fostered 
threats to accept the acts. The Americans feared that their army could stand against its 
own people when they had power and weapons in their hands: 
 Whereas his majesty’s most faithful subjects in these Colonies are reduced to 
 a dangerous and critical situation, by attempts of the British Ministry, to 
 carry into execution, by force of arms, several unconditional and oppressive 
 acts of the British Parliament for laying taxes in America, to enforce the 
                                                 
16 John Shy, A People Numerous and Armed: Reflection on the Military Struggle for American 
Independence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976), p. 161. 
17 Ibid, p. 150. 
18 Ibid, p. 154. 
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 collection of these taxes, and for altering and changing the constitution and 
 internal police of some of these Colonies, in violation of the natural and civil 
 rights of the Colonies.19  
To combine the militia with the army was a challenging task as militiamen were under 
the pay and direction of the colony and commanded by a local military commander. 
So, they could not be ordered by Continental officers, and even Washington felt that 
way, ‘it will not be proper for me to give any Orders respecting them’.20 Using militia 
also had some major defects. First, the men did not have proper training. They were 
trained by their local commanders with whatever drilling the commanders thought 
was effective. This meant that men from different colonies had their own way of 
manoeuvring. They had never been trained together—and this caused a problem when 
they were called to fight together. Second, militiamen still felt a sense of belonging as 
citizens when they were fighting. Their lack of discipline was disapproved of from 
the very first days that Washington took command of the Continental Army that was 
based on the Massachusetts militia, ‘all the General Officers agree that no Dependance 
can be put on the Militia for a Continuance in Camp, or Regularity and Discipline 
during the short Time they may stay’.21 This problem needed to be eliminated. Men 
needed to be trained until they could act and cope with the situation almost without 
ever thinking. Additionally, this situation required men who could stay for long 
enough to be trained as an actual soldier—or at least make them feel like they were 
one, so the idea of using a large number of militia could not be an option in this war.  
                                                 
19 Ford, eds., ‘Friday, June 30, 1775, Rules and Regulations,’ vol.2, p. 111. 
20 Chase, ed., ‘From George Washington to Major General Philip Schuyler, 20 August 1775,’ vol.1, 
pp. 331–334. 
21 Chase, ed., ‘II. Letter Sent, 10–11 July 1775,’ in The Papers of George Washington, Revolutionary 
War Series, vol. 1, pp. 85–97. 
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 But the lack of enlisted men forced Washington to use militia service even if 
he disagreed with this idea, ‘I fear I Shall be under the necessity of Calling in the 
Militia and minute men of the Country to my assistance’.22 As the militia belonged to 
the colonies, it was almost impossible to keep them disciplined and in control. 
Moreover, the men thought of themselves as a free man who could leave their service 
whenever they wanted. Washington’s dissatisfaction with the militia was well known 
by other officers. It led Timothy Pickering, a colonel in the Essex County militia, to 
initiate writing a drill manual for the militia which was called An Easy Plan of 
Discipline for a Militia, published in Salem, Massachusetts in 1775. The book was 
presented as ‘a diligent application to the military art’ in which Pickering aimed to 
write the plain rudiments of the military art.23 
The first phase of the war, year 1775 
The army in 1775 is sometimes were referred to as a New England army since New 
England men from four colonies were called to form the troops immediately after the 
first battle. The battle at Lexington and Concord in April triggered the Americans to 
be prepared for the next potential clash with the British regulars. Massachusetts was 
the first and most forward colony that immediately responded against the British 
action. The Massachusetts delegates asked for support from other colonies but only 
three other colonies—New Hampshire, Rhode Island and Connecticut—responded to 
this call by sending their militia to Boston. Massachusetts then requested Congress to 
create a provincial force by using these men.  
                                                 
22 ‘From George Washington to John Hancock, 28 November 1775,’ in The Papers of George 
Washington, Revolutionary War Series, vol. 2, 16 September 1775 – 31 December 1775, ed. by 
Philander D. Chase (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1987), pp. 444–448. 
23 Chase, ed., ‘To George Washington from Timothy Pickering, 1775,’ vol. 2, pp. 627–628. 
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 The military policies and execution of the first phase of the Continental Army 
in 1775 was highly influenced by the delegates. Congress still insisted on their self-
defence—the direction to the commander-in-chief to keep the army not exceeding 
double that of the enemy implied Congress’ disagreement on creating a large standing 
army. The resolution of one-year enlistment, which was too short to create an effective 
army for defensive action, hinted that the Americans had thought that the conflict 
would be short, and the reconciliation with the British government would be made.  
 Richard Henry Lee proposed to raise an army on May 16, and Congress 
created the Continental Army on June 14. The term Continental Army was used 
because Congress hoped to persuade Canada to join and support this army.24 Congress 
entered Canada under ‘the most positive orders [from Congress] to Cherish Every 
Canadian and Every friend to the Cause of Liberty, and Sacredly to guard their 
property’.25 John Brown, a Massachusetts delegate went to Montreal as an emissary 
from Boston in October 1774 and March 1775 to encourage support from sympathetic 
Canadians.26 The Canadians were unwilling to join the revolution, and ‘there is no 
prospect of Canada sending Delegates to the Continental Congress’.27  
 Congress approved the idea of creating the Continental Army with the 
expectation of 9,000-10,000 men around Boston for defensive action. Immediately 
following this, it established a recognizably European army. Ten companies of 
riflemen were raised as the first Continental unit—six in Pennsylvania, two in 
                                                 
24 Frederick Converse Beach ed., The Encyclopaedia Americana, fifth volume (New York: The 
Americana Company, 1904), p. 466. 
25 Chase, ed., ‘To George Washington from Major General Philip Schuyler, 20 September 1775,’ vol. 
2, pp. 17–23. 
26 Chase ed., ‘To George Washington from Jonathan Trumbull, Sr., 21 August 1775,’ vol. 1, pp. 344–
346. 
27 James Brown, ‘Letter from J’ Brown to the Committee of Correspondence in Boston, March 29, 
1775,’ <http://amarch.lib.niu.edu/islandora/object/niu-amarch%3A102247> [accessed 10 March 
2017]. 
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Maryland, and two in Virginia.28 The expert riflemen were the first units of the 
Continentals to serve as a light infantry force for the Boston siege.  
 Each company consisted of:  
 1 captain,  
 3 lieutenants,  
 4 sergeants,  
 4 corporals,  
 1 drummer or trumpeter, and  
 68 privates.29  
 
After they had completed their quotas, men from each colony would march to join the 
army near Boston. The officers and privates would receive the pay as follows: a 
captain 20 dollars per month, a lieutenant 13 ⅓ dollars, a sergeant 8 dollars, a 
corporals 7⅓ dollars, drummer or trumpeter 7⅓ dollars, privates 6⅔ dollars, and they 
would have to find their own arms and clothes.30 Congress also created a standard 
form of the enlistment for one year as follows: 
  I   have, this day, voluntarily enlisted myself, as a 
 soldier, in the American continental army, for one year, unless sooner 
 discharged: And I do bind myself to conform, in all instances, to such rules 
 and regulations, as are, or shall be, established for the government of the 
 Army.31     
Congress then appointed the committee to draft rules and regulations for the 
government of the army consisting of George Washington, Philip Schuyler, Silas 
Deane, Thomas Cushing, and Joseph Hewes. 
                                                 
28 Ford, eds., ‘Wednesday, June 14, 1775’, in Journals of the Continental Congress 1774-1789, vol.2 
May 10-Septemeber 20 1775 (Washington Government Printing Office, 1905), p. 89. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid., p. 90. 
31 Ibid. 
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 On June 15, Congress was unanimously elected George Washington as an 
army commander with five hundred dollars per month to ‘command all the continental 
forces, raised, or to be raised, for the defence of American liberty’.32 Like the British 
army commander, Washington was given full power to control his troops, but he was 
still directed by civilian leaders: 
 You are hereby vested with full power and authority to act as you shall think 
 for the good and welfare of the service. And we do hereby strictly charge and 
 require all Officers and Soldiers, under your command, to be obedient to 
 your orders, and diligent in the exercise of their several duties. And we do 
 also enjoin and require you, to be careful in executing the great trust reposed 
 in you, by causing strict discipline and order to be observed in the army, and 
 that soldiers be duly exercised, and provide with all convenient necessaries. 
 And you are to regulate your conduct in every respect by the rules and 
 discipline of war, (as here with given you,) and punctually to observe and 
 follow such orders and directions, from time to time, as you shall receive 
 from this, or a future Congress of these United Colonies, or committee of 
 Congress.33    
On 16 June Congress determined to acquire 21 staff officers: 
 2 major generals  
  8 brigadiers general 
 1 adjutant general 
 1 commissary general of stores and provisions 
 1 quarter master general  
 1 paymaster general and 1 deputy after him 
 1 chief engineer at the grand army and two assistants under him 
 3 aids de camps  
 1 secretary to the general 
 1 secretary to the Major general 
                                                 
32 Ibid., p. 91.  
33 Ford, eds., vol.2, ‘Saturday, June 17, 1775’, p. 96. 
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 1 commissary of the musters34  
 
Congress then proceeded to the choice of the officers in the army by ballot. Artemas 
Ward was chosen first major-general; Horatio Gates was adjutant general; Charles 
Lee was second major general.35 After the senior staff election Congress made a 
decision to add two more major generals and eight more brigadiers, and this was not 
by election but by choosing. On June 19 Congress resolved to appoint two more major 
generals—Philip Schuyler of New York and Israel Putnam of Massachusetts.36 Six 
other brigadiers were from Massachusetts and Connecticut, and the other two were 
from New Hampshire and Rhode Island as follows: 
 Seth Pomeroy of Massachusetts, first 
 Richard Montgomery, an Irish-born officer who had served in the British 
 army,  of New York, second 
 David Wooster of Connecticut, third 
 William Heath of Massachusetts, fourth 
 Joseph Spencer of Connecticut, fifth 
 John Thomas of Massachusetts, sixth 
 John Sullivan of New Hampshire, seventh 
 Nathanael Greene of Rhode Island, eighth37 
 
This shows that some colonial delegates were more influential, and some colonies 
participated more in the war’s cause than others. Congress had their own way to elect 
appropriate staff officers, but it had to retain the patronage system. Congress itself 
worked on the delegate action—it did not have real power. It was the colonial/state 
delegates who executed the Congress resolutions. 
                                                 
34 Ford, eds., vol.2, ’Friday, June 16, 1775’, pp. 93-94. 
35 Ford, eds., vol.2, ‘Saturday, June 17, 1775’, p. 97.  
36 Ford, eds., vol.2, ‘Monday, June 19, 1775’, p. 99. 
37 Ford, eds., vol.2, ‘Thursday, June 22, 1775’, p. 103. 
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 In order to manage men in Boston, Washington appointed his generals to take 
control over the army divisions and brigades based on geography. Washington saw 
that he alone could not watch over all the troops in the colonies. He would control the 
headquarters, but other army divisions and six brigades would be commanded by his 
senior staff officers. Washington took Cambridge, Massachusetts as his headquarters 
located at the house of the president of Harvard College, Samuel Langdon, located on 
Harvard Square.38 He managed to form the army into three grand Divisions ‘under the 
Command of the Generals Ward, Lee & Puttnam’.39 Each division had two Brigades 
which contained six regiments. Artemas Ward commanded over Roxbury, Boston 
(later the Eastern Division). The Northern Department or the Canadian theatre of 
operations was taken control by Major General Philip Schuyler.40 New York would 
be the borderline of the northern and southern colonies. So was the army, ‘As New 
York is the most importt object they can have in view on Acct of its commanding 
Hudsons River leading towards Canada & seperating the Northern & Southern 
Colonies it appeard necessary for me to take measures for its Security’.41 And, Charles 
Lee was appointed as a commander of the Southern Department. The army authority 
was divided into three departments: northern, middle and southern. The number of 
sums for commissioners would be disseminated to each unequally based on the 
military theatre since at the first phase of the war the British and American armies 
remained in the North. The Southern Department received from the Continental 
                                                 
38 William Lincoln, ed., The Journals of Each Provincial Congress of Massachusetts in 1774 and 1775, 
and of the Committee of Safety. Boston, 1838 (Microfilm Collection of Early State Records), pp. 398–
99, 460, 593. 
39 George Washington, ‘From George Washington to John Hancock, 4–5 August 1775,’ in The Papers 
of George Washington, Revolutionary War Series, vol. 1, 16 June 1775 – 15 September 1775, ed. by 
Philander D. Chase (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1985), pp. 223–239. 
40 George Washington, ‘Instructions to Major General Philip Schuyler, 25 June 1775,’ in The Papers 
of George Washington, Revolutionary War Series, vol. 1, 16 June 1775 – 15 September 1775, ed. by 
Philander D. Chase (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1985), pp. 36–40. 
41 Chase, ed., ‘From George Washington to Landon Carter, 27 March 1776,’ vol. 3, pp. 544–547. 
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Treasury the sum of ten thousand dollars; the Middle six thousand dollars and the 
Northern sixty-six thousand dollars.42  
 Among all Washington’s generals, the most important position for army 
organization was an adjutant general held by brigadier general Horatio Gates. His 
main duty was to advise and principally assist the commander-in-chief. This adjutant 
general was modelled after the British staff adjutant for administrative duties to be 
responsible for guards, details, paperwork, and make a formation of the infantry into 
the line of battle. More importantly Gates was assigned to compile the first strength 
returns—a crucial task that was required since the army was established because the 
number of men and other information were essential for making a plan for military 
action: 
 A Question was proposed what Number of Troops may be necessary for the 
 present Service in & near Boston to defend the Posts now occupied against 
 the Force supposed to be employed against us. Upon which it was agreed 
 that the Army for the above Purpose ought to consist of at least 20,000 
 Men… As by the Returns now made the Number of effective Men is far 
 short of the above Estimate a Question was made in what Manner the 
 Deficiency shall be supplied’.43  
From the first returns reported that the army outside Boston consisted of around 
16,000 men, of whom about 14,000 were fit for service.44 
 Other administrative staff were also important. The details were drawn from 
the letter Washington wrote to President John Hancock.45 The Paymaster general was 
                                                 
42 Ford, eds., ‘Wednesday, July 12, 1775,’ vol. 2, p. 175. 
43 Chase, ed., ‘Council of War, 9 July 1775’, vol. 1, pp. 79–82. 
44 Chase, ed., ‘From George Washington to Richard Henry Lee, 10 July 1775,’ vol. 1, pp. 98–100. 
45 Chase, ed., ‘From George Washington to John Hancock, 21 September 1775’, vol. 2, pp. 24–30. 
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assigned to take control over finances. The position was elected and given to civilian 
politicians James Warren of Massachusetts and Jonathan Trumbull, Jr. of Connecticut 
as the deputy Paymaster General. This agent was different from the British system in 
which the American Paymaster General only dealt with spending funds for salaries, 
but the British Paymaster General acted as the means which funds were transmitted 
to the regiment’s commercial agent to purchase necessary items. 
 The Commissary General of Musters was responsible for documents that listed 
all the officers and men in a company. A company commander would report this 
information in a roll and the Mustermaster’s department would performed formal 
inspection of the troops’ dates of enlistment, rank, promotion, length of enlistment, 
and their status on a daily basis. This task was useful to check back on men if the 
number was consistent with the pay and supplies that each unit claimed. Washington 
chose Stephen Moylan to do this duty.  
 Secretaries and aides de camps were a part of administrative sector. The 
commander-in-chief and major generals were allowed to select their own personnel. 
Aides acted as messengers and secretaries. Washington chose young capable men 
from influential families to be his personal staff or ‘Washington’s military family’. 
Some of them were Thomas Mifflin, Joseph Reed, John Trumbull, Edmund Randolph, 
George Baylor, and Robert Hanson Harrison.46 
 The next sector of staff took care of supplying. The American procurement as 
structured after the British army supply system. Congress created the Quartermaster 
General and Commissary General to be responsible for supplying the army, and these 
                                                 
46 Worthington Chauncey Ford, ‘List and Writing of Washington's Aides-de-Camp and Secretaries’, 
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- 20 - 
 
tasks were crucial to keep the troops in field. The Quartermaster General at the 
beginning was responsible for troop movement, reconnaissance, and maintenance 
while the Commissary General dealt with food and general supplies. These positions 
were much criticized for their ineffectiveness. Throughout the war there were a 
number of reports complaining on lack of money, food, uniform, and other war 
supplies.   
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Table 3: Senior staff departments  
 
Congress also followed the British regimental structure by creating the regimental 
surgeon and a hospital organization and medical supply system. On July 27, 1775 
Congress appointed Dr Benjamin Church as the first Director and Chief Physician. 
 The military engineer department was the most difficult part to fill in because 
of the lack of experts. Even if the Americans could not find qualified staff, the unit 
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still existed at the beginning. The Americans were familiar with civil construction, but 
their skills were not qualified for standard European engineering fieldwork. The staff 
that the army had could make a blockade but could not perform a formal siege.47 At 
the beginning Washington chose to use the service of Colonel Richard Gridley and 
Lieutenant Colonel William Burbeck from Artillery Regiment.  
 As mentioned the army at this time was primarily depend on the militia as their 
supportive force, Congress then requested all the colonies to form ‘regular companies 
of Militia’ made up of all able bodied effective men between sixteen and fifty years 
of age.48 The companies of the militia look very similar to the army company—
consisting of one captain, two lieutenants, one ensign, four sergeants, four corporals, 
one clerk, one drummer, one fifer, and about 68 privates.49 One fourth part of the 
militia in each colony would select minute men ‘to be ready on the shortest notice, to 
march to any place where their assistance may be required,’ and more importantly to 
reinforce necessary service with regular companies and battalions.50 In November 
1775, Congress empowered the commander-in-chief to call forth the minutemen or 
militia in case the necessary of the service required it.51 The minutemen or militia 
while on service would be maintained and paid at the same rate as the rest of the 
Continental forces.52 The militiamen also were recommended to take proper care to 
acquire military skill, and be prepared for defence.  
 Even if Congress approved the establishment of the Continental Army in 1775, 
in practice the American troops were not an actual army until 1776 with Washington’s 
proposals for reformation. In 1775 the American ‘army’ was not separated from the 
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militia—the force consisted of 27,443 men which 10,180 were militia.53 And in 1776 
there were 46,891 continentals and 16,700 militia.54 Before the Continental Army was 
created, each colony raised its own troops based on its own experience in the French 
and Indian War. By April 1775, the colonial army had raised 26 company regiments. 
In October it constituted 38 regiments of infantry and one regiment and one company 
of artillery. In addition, Congress ordered Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia to 
arrange 10 companies of riflemen. Commanded by the colonels, the infantry 
regiments consisted of 3 regiments of the New Hampshire Line, 27 regiments of the 
Massachusetts Line, 3 regiments of the Rhode Island Line, 5 regiments of the 
Connecticut Line. 
 Even if the army structure of command and staff were created after the British 
regimental organization, the Continental Army structure was much less complicated, 
and they selected only necessary positions. Some senior staff were elected based on 
their notable military experience, but a lot of officers were elected and appointed 
politically depending on how influential they were. Some technical positions in 
engineering and artillery were still being searched for. At this moment Congress and 
Washington were still debating on the idea of creating professional army. The 
commander-in-chief could not do that much with this issue since at this stage his main 
duty was to create practical staff officers and unity among those troops from different 
colonies.  
Washington’s army reorganization in 1776  
The Continental Army was reorganized in the following year after Washington found 
the troops of 1775 too weak and poorly disciplined not only to fight but also to conduct 
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defensive operations. Washington was also frustrated with the incapable officers who 
were appointed for political purposes. He insisted to Congress that only qualified men 
be commissioned.55 Washington wrote a proposal to Congress regarding the 
reorganization of the army. Congress then arranged meetings with a committee to 
discuss costs, pay rates, allowances, regulations, uniforms and other plans. At this 
time, Washington took part in reorganizing the army and added more areas from 
which to recruit men, aiming for the states in the Northeast since Massachusetts was 
responsible for raising more than a half of the quotas.56 The Congress agreed to 
approve the new army, which consisted of twenty-six infantry regiments, one rifle and 
artillery regiment, and nine infantry regiments for the Canada—New York army. The 
headquarters of the artillery regiment in 1776 consisted of one colonel, two lieutenant 
colonels and two majors commanding staff, and twelve companies.  
 The army around Boston in 1775 actually had caused some serious problems. 
Apart from the army being in disunited, the other major problem was that this initial 
army would expire at the end of the year even if the riflemen remained, since their 
expiration date was July 1, 1776. The majority of the force’s contracts would end on 
December 31, 1775, and men refused to remain in the army. They were ‘going home 
by hundreds and by thousands’.57  The troops of Massachusetts, New Hampshire and 
Rhode Island would be released from their military engagement and not reenlist. 
Washington made a complaint of their departure from the lines, ‘before the New Army 
gets greater Strength, they not only fix eternal disgrace upon themselves as Soldiers, 
but inevitable Ruin perhaps upon their Country & families’.58  
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 To solve this problem, Washington insisted that the new enlistment of three 
years needed to be enforced. If the one-year enlistment still continued, the enemy 
might exploit this condition to attack the American lines during this confusion and 
vulnerability. Washington reported to Hancock that after the enlistment of 1775 
expired, ‘our Inlistments now amount to 9650’.59 The new army was less than half of 
20,000 men of the year 1775 troops, and this was considered a dangerous situation.  
 Washington disagreed with the idea of filling the army with the militiamen. 
The men needed to be recruited separately and directly enlisted to the army itself. He 
suggested Congress to enlist men outside New England. On January 1, 1776 
Washington took his authority as a commander-in-chief generated the first General 
Order of the new year stressing the importance of the professional army, ‘This day 
giving commencement to the new-army, which, in every point of View is entirely 
Continental; The General flatters himself, that a laudable Spirit of emulation, will now 
take place, and pervade the whole of it, without such a Spirit, few Officers have ever 
arrived to any degree of Reputation, nor did any Army ever become formidable’.60 
 In order to fix this issue quickly Washington nevertheless called upon the 
militia for reinforcements. However, militia from the old regiments would join for a 
month only. About 3,000 Massachusetts and 2,000 New Hampshire served the 
Continental Army from December 10, 1775 to January 15, 1776 as replacements.61  
The American lines were very weak during early January. Nathanael Greene 
mentioned this problem to Samuel Ward, ‘We have no part of the Militia here […] 
and the Night after the old Troops went of[f] I could not have mustered seven hundred 
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Men […] I am now strong enough to defend myself against all the Force in Boston’.62 
The recruiting process took time and it was not until March that the Continental Army 
was able to fill the number of men comparable to the old one.63 
 The commander-in-chief prepared his proposal of the reorganization of the 
army. He decreased the number of the infantry regiments from 38 to 26. The quotas 
of the new 26 regiments were as follows: 
 Massachusetts had 16 regiments,  
 Connecticut 5,  
 New Hampshire 3, and 
 Rhode Island 264  
 
Washington specified the strength of officers and men of 728. Each regiment would 
reduce their companies from 10 to 8 companies. Each company would contain: 
 1 captain 
 2 lieutenants 
 1 ensign 
 4 sergeants 
 4 corporals 
 1 fifer   
 1 drummer, and  
 76 privates 
 
The new army would also include the newly reorganized artillery regiment of Henry 
Knox as well as a rifle regiment of Colonel William Thompson’s Pennsylvania and 
the independent companies from Maryland and Virginia. 65 
Throughout the war, the British Army obtained artillery, cavalry and infantry 
units, along with marine forces. In 1775, the British Infantry regiment consisted of 
headquarters: one colonel, one lieutenant colonel, and one major commanding five 
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staff (one chaplain, one surgeon, one surgeon’s mate, one adjutant, and one 
quartermaster); one light infantry company (one captain, two lieutenants, three 
sergeants, three corporals, two drummers, and fifty-six privates); one grenadier 
company (one captain, two lieutenants, three sergeants, three corporals, two 
drummers, two fifers, and fifty-six privates); three field officer’s companies (each 
containing one lieutenant, one ensign, three sergeants, three corporals, two drummers, 
and fifty-six privates); and seven battalion and replacement companies (each 
containing one captain, one lieutenant, one ensign, three sergeants, three corporals, 
two drummers, and fifty-six privates). In total, each British regiment had 811 men. In 
addition, the British also had many subsidiary forces such as American Establishment, 
provincial units, militia, local volunteer corps, West Indian forces, and German 
auxiliaries. All of these forces fought on the side of the Loyalists. The Americans used 
the same regimental pattern but with different details.  
 The organization of the Continental infantry regiment was much less 
complicated. For example the organization in 1776, the regiments’ headquarters 
contained one colonel, one lieutenant colonel and one major commanding ten staff 
(one surgeon, one surgeon’s mate, one adjutant, one quartermaster, one pay master, 
one sergeant major, one quartermaster’s sergeant, one drum major, one fife major, and 
one chaplain) and eight companies (each containing one captain, one first lieutenant, 
one second lieutenant, one ensign, four sergeants, four corporals, one drummer, one 
fife major, and seventy-six privates. In total, the regiment had 728 personnel.66 As the 
war went on the army organization was adjusted and developed almost year by year 
to fit its limited resources and the problems at hand. 
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Table 4: British Infantry 1775 and Continental Infantry 1776 
British Infantry Regiment, 1775 Continental Infantry Regiment, 1776 
Each headquarter contained: 
1 colonel 
1 lieutenant colonel  
5 staff (1 chaplain, 1 surgeon, 1 
surgeon’s mate, 1 adjutant, and 1 
quartermaster) 
Each headquarter contained:  
1 colonel 
1 lieutenant colonel  
10 staff (1 chaplain, 1 surgeon, 1 
surgeon’s mate, 1 adjutant, 1 
quartermaster, 1 pay master, 1 sergeant 
major, 1 quartermaster’s sergeant, 1 
drum major, and 1 fife major) 
 
1 light infantry company: 
1 captain, 
2 lieutenants, 
3 sergeants, 
3 corporals, 
2 drummers, and 
56 privates 
8 companies, each contained: 
1 captain, 
1 1st lieutenant, 
1 2nd lieutenant,  
1 ensign,  
4 sergeants,  
4 corporals, 
1 drummer, 
1 fife major, and  
76 privates 
1 grenadier company: 
1 captain, 
2 lieutenants 
3 sergeants 
3 corporals, 
2 drummers 
2 fifers, and  
56 privates 
 
7 battalion and replacement companies 
Each contained 
1 captain, 
1 lieutenant, 
1 ensign, 
3 sergeants, 
3 corporals, 
2 drummers, and 56 privates 
 
Total 811 men Total 728 men 
 
 Washington also had intended to create a true Continental Army by mixing 
officers from different colonies in the regiments after he had failed to do so in 
November 1775, ‘I should, in a day or two, be able to acquaint them of the disposition 
of the Soldiery towards a new Inlistment—I have been in consultation with the 
Generals of this Army ever since thursday last, endeavouring to establish new Corps 
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of Officers; but find so many doubts, & difficulties to reconcile, I cannot say when 
they are to end or what may be the Consequences, as there appears to be such an 
unwillingness in the Officers of one Government mixing in the same Regimt with 
those of another; & without it, many must be dismissed, who are willing to serve, 
notwithstanding we are difficient on the whole’.67   
 Moreover, he also insisted that the significance of being disciplined and 
obedient was key to their becoming professional soldiers. He required officers and 
men to be aware of the orderly books and obey them, otherwise they would be 
punished. Washington used the general orders principally as a medium of instruction 
for the officers and men of the new army much as he had done for the old army during 
the previous summer. Washington stressed the importance of orderly books to this 
newly reorganized army. These books were disseminated not only to every regiment 
but also every company. They were expected to be regularly read and carefully 
explained to the men. Washington aimed that men would obey his order to avoid 
punishment: 
 the first wish of the General to have the business of the Army conducted 
 without punishment, to accomplish which, he assures every Officer, & 
 Soldier, that as far as it is in his power, he will reward such as particularly 
 distinguish themselves; at the same time, he declares that he will punish 
 every kind of neglect, or misbehaviour, in an exemplary mannor.68 
After the British evacuated from Boston in March 1776, the committee of conference 
and Washington on May 29 recommended a flying camp in the middle colonies to 
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defend the area between New York and Philadelphia.69 In June Congress called for an 
additional 10,000 militia reinforcement for the flying camp.70 Men would be drawn 
from Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Delaware. Washington appointed General Hugh 
Mercer commander of the unit. However, this unit lasted fewer than six months and 
had fewer than 5,000 men in arms which performed security in New York.71  
 In January 1776 Britain decided to send seven regiments of foot of 4,000 men 
and 10,000 German troops for the American Service to the southern colonies.72 In 
response to this, on June 27, 1776 Congress authorized the German battalion in 
Pennsylvania and Maryland.73 John David Wœlpper, a French and Indian veteran and 
‘a German by birth—was a Soldier in his own Country—Served many years as an 
Officer in the Regiment’ a lieutenant in the 3rd Pennsylvania Regiment was highly 
recommended by Washington to be appointed as a captain in the German Regiment.74  
 The turning point and significant event in 1776 was the heavy losses at the 
Battle of Long Island in New York on August 27, 1776 which gave Washington and 
Congress the lesson that militia could not stand up to the British and German regulars 
on open field in terms of both performance and discipline, ‘The Militia, instead of 
calling forth their utmost efforts to a brave and manly opposition, in order to repair 
our Losses, are dismayed, Intractable and Impatient to return. Great numbers of them 
have gone off, in some instances almost by whole Regiments, by half ones and by 
Companies at a Time’. The army needed to be reformed in order to withstand those 
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professional regulars especially when ‘a well appointed Enemy, superior in number 
to our whole collected force’. He expressed his concern that the force that he had at 
the moment had ‘an entire disregard of that order and Subordination necessary to the 
well doing of an Army’. Washington wrote to the President of Congress to request for 
‘the generality of the Troops’. 75 
  Washington summarized this loss in his letter to the President of Congress, 
and this changed the way Congress adjusted the new enlistments for a new army in 
the following year. He no longer wanted to put in the militia or other troops except 
for ‘those enlisted and embodied for a longer period than our regulations heretofore 
have prescribed’. Washington considered it ‘greatly hazard’ if the Americans relied 
on the militia for national defence. He insisted on a permanent, standing Army during 
the war. He knew that the militiamen would fight like citizens when the professional 
troops were required which would not work in an actual war because, ‘Men who have 
been free and subject to no controul cannot be reduced to order in an Instant, and the 
privileges & exemptions they claim and will have Influence the conduct of others and 
the aid derived from them is nearly counterbalanced by the disorder, Irregularity and 
confusion they occasion’.76 
 The evidence proved that America needed to create a proficient army as soon 
as possible because ‘the longer they delayed raising a standing army, the more 
difficult and chargeable would they find it to get one, and that, at the same time that 
the militia would answer no valuable purpose’.77 Washington also complained one of 
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the major problem of the militia that many of them did not show up for the service. In 
the return of brigades of September 1776, 14,759 rank and file were fit for duty but 
only 3,479 rank and file were on command.78 Washington summarized the situation 
that, ‘It is true a body of militia are again ordered out, but they come without any 
conveniences and soon return’.79  
 1776 was the year that made change with men in the army. With the heavy 
loss in New York, the arrival of the British and German reinforcement, and 
Washington’s insistence on professionalism combined, Congress finally consented 
with the idea of regular army. The Continental Army was able to recruit its largest of 
men so far at the end of the year—46,891 Continentals and 16,700 militiamen for the 
next campaign. The Americans were getting closer to obtain a large professional 
force.   
The change of 1777  
The battlefield losses in 1776 changed the perception that the Americans and their 
leaders had of the regular army. They now believed that they needed a large army of 
well-trained and disciplined men to win this war. The news that the British parliament 
would send Hessian soldiers to America not only hastened Congress to create a 
standing army but also to expand it.  John Adams who had long protested the idea of 
creating a standing army, expressed his adapted attitude that the nation needed ‘a 
regular army, and the most masterly Discipline, because […] without these We cannot 
reasonably hope to be a powerful, a prosperous, or a free People’.80 In September 1776 
Congress finally approved a full-scale regular army prepared for the year to come: 
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 Without a well disciplined Army we cannot rationally expect Success 
 against veteran Troops; and that it is totally impossible we should ever have 
 a well disciplined Army, unless our Troops are engaged to serve during the 
 War. The Congress therefore, impressed with these, & other Reasons, and 
 fully convinced, that our Militia is inadequate to the Duty expected of them 
 have adopted the enclosed Resolves, which I am persuaded will afford you 
 Pleasure, as the only Means left to defend our Country in its present critical 
 Situation.81 
Congress made a new plan for a campaign in the year 1777. The size of the army 
would be expanded, and on November 12, 1776, Congress passed a resolution 
encouraging men to extend their length stay in the army to be a three-year term, ‘That 
all non-commissioned and soldiers who do not incline to engage their service during 
the continuance of the present war, and shall inlist to serve three years…shall be 
entitled to, and receive all such bounty (twenty dollars)’.82 Congress also was 
convinced to reenlist the men during the war in order to prevent the frequent calls for 
bounty upon new enlistments and men from leaving the army when the services were 
essential, and more importantly to ‘have an army ensured to service and discipline’.83 
 Moreover, Congress then devised a whole ‘Plan of an Army of Eighty Eight 
Battalions, to be inlisted as soon as possible, to serve during the War’.84 The delegates 
agreed to give besides a bounty of twenty dollars, and a hundred acres of land to each 
soldier.85 At this time, Congress managed to enlist men outside New England—in fact 
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from all the thirteen states. State governments were made responsible for appointing 
officers and filling up vacancies—except for general officers. Every state provided 
arms, clothing (deducted from pay of the soldiers), and every necessary item for its 
quota of troops.  The states were also responsible for enlisting their quotas; however, 
the money for bounties would be given to and paid by the paymaster in the department 
where the soldier was enlisted.86 The distribution of Regiments of 1777 was as 
follows: 
 Massachusetts   15 
 Virginia    15 
 Pennsylvania   12 
 North Carolina   9 
 Connecticut   8 
 Maryland   8 
 South Carolina  6 
 New Jersey   4 
 New York    4 
 New Hampshire  3 
 Rhode Island   2 
 Delaware    1 
 Georgia   1 
 Total    8887 
 
In order to compete with General Howe’s strength after the retreat from New York, 
Washington and his generals requested more men, and Henry Knox also proposed to 
raise five more artillery regiments. On December 27, 1776 Congress gave Washington 
the authority to raise 16 more battalions of infantry and appoint officers to those 
battalions; 3,000 light horse; 3 regiments of artillery; and a corps of engineers.88 His 
troops were made of all available Continental troops from North Carolina, Virginia, 
Maryland, Delaware, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey.89 In January 1777 a company of 
Artificers was raised to be attached to the Artillery in the field. Its task was to suggest 
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the size of the cannon and to make spare carriage for the wheels, cheeks, limbers, etc. 
to be ready to put together for immediate use. The unit consisted of one master 
carpenter as a director, one master wheelwright, one master blacksmith, two tinmen, 
two turners, two copers, four harness makers, tow nailers, two farriers, six wheel 
wrights, twenty-five carpenters and fifteen smiths.90  
 The Corps of Engineer was also improved and reinforced. The lack of 
engineering staff made the staff prompted the decision to move some of the 
infantrymen to work for the time being. In October each infantry battalion was 
authorized to give 50 men for the works of miners and sappers. The carpenters 
oversaw making Cheveaux-De-Frize to guard ordinance stores and barracks within 
the fortifications.  A document entitled ‘An Establishment for Corps of Engineers’ 
stated that each battalion had 10 field and staff officers, and each company consisted 
of 4 commissioned officers, 10 non-commissioned officers, 30 carpenters or 
wheelwrights, 5 smiths, 6 masons, 25 miners and sappers, and 20 labours.91  
 Congress still maintained the same pattern of infantry and artillery regimental 
organization as in 1776, but all these new regiments were different from the 88 
battalions because they were not under control of the states but commanded directly 
by the commander-in-chief. At this moment Congress also authorized Washington 
numerous emergency powers: 
To use every Endeavour, by giving Bounties and otherwise, to prevail upon 
the Troops, whose Time of Enlistment shall expire at the End of the Month, to 
stay with the Army so long after that Period as its Situation shall render their 
                                                 
90 Grizzard, ed., George Washington, ‘Orders to Lieutenant Colonel Benjamin Flower, 16 January 
1777,’ vol. 8, pp. 81–83. 
91 Chase and Frank E. Grizzard, eds., Rufus Putnam, ‘To George Washington from Colonel Rufus 
Putnam, 3 October 1776,’ vol. 6, pp. 461–462. 
- 36 - 
 
Stay necessary […] to appoint a commissary of prisoners and a clothier 
general and establish their salaries […] to fix upon that System of Promotion 
in the Continental Army which in his Opinion, and that of the general Officers 
with him, will produce most general  Satisfaction.92  
And, as Washington requested, Knox was promoted to be a brigadier general. Knox 
began to recruit his quota of additional artillery regiments and improve his corps. He 
managed and supervised the Springfield laboratory, led by a master carpenter with 
skilled workers for the reception and preparation of military stores of every species at 
Hartford in Connecticut, and York in Pennsylvania.93 Moreover, Knox had 
encouraged Congress to publish artillery literature since the middle of the year 1776, 
since he saw that it was difficult to find texts on military art in America. Some books 
were published in Philadelphia but did not circulate widely enough. He recommended 
some other books that would be useful for the services such as Maurice de Saxe’s 
Reveries, Francis Holliday’s An Easy Introduction to Practical Gunnery or the Art of 
Engineering, Muller’s Artillery, Hollidays’ principles of Gunnery, Clariac, Mullers 
and Pleydells’ Field Fortification as well as other translated books of Vauban 
Coehorn, Blondell, Count Pagan, and Belidor’s which treat on fortification and 
military mathematics.94 But Knox mostly emphasized mostly on, John Muller (a 
professor of artillery and fortification)’s Elements of Fortification, and his Practical 
Fortification should be printed to for artillery men to read. These two books were used 
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in the Royal Academy of Artillery at Woolwich. However, the request was postponed 
since Congress reasoned that they could not afford it at that moment.95  
  The 3,000-light horse authorized by Congress to be controlled under the 
commander-in-chief was a new element of the Continental Army. Previously this unit 
was usually used as mobile infantry for patrolling, serving as messengers and scouts.96 
However, after the siege of Boston Washington insisted that horsemen would be 
useful for reconnaissance and patrolling along the coastline for the enemy’s landing 
as well as using as messengers. For his request on July 11, 1776, the Connecticut 
governor Jonathan Trumbull created three regiments of light horse to be attached to 
the main army, but the troops did not come with proper encampment equipment for 
the animals, so Washington decided to send them back to Connecticut.  
 But, the battle of White Plains on October 1776 proved the need of cavalry 
service when the British Dragoons launched a cavalry attack to charge the American 
lines, and the American could not withstand the attack with their only 200 cavalrymen. 
So, Governor Trumbull sent 125 horsemen from the 5th Regiment of Connecticut led 
by Major Elisha Sheldon to aid the situation along with Virginia cavalry troops under 
the command of Major Theodoric Bland. This cavalry was crucial to help Washington 
to retreat. He wrote to Congress praising the capability of the horsemen, and he also 
recommended the establishment of one or more corps in addition to those already 
raised in Virginia because ‘there is no carrying on the War without them [cavalry],’ 
and Major Sheldon should undertake the Command of a Regiment of Horse.97 
Therefore, on March 14, 1777 Congress approved Washington’s regiment of horse. 
Each regiment would contain 1 colonel, 1 lieutenant colonel, 1 major, a chaplain, 
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1regimental quartermaster, 1 surgeon, 1 surgeon’s mate, 1 pay master, 1 riding master, 
1 saddler, 1 trumpet major 1 adjutant, 4 supernumeraries armed only with swords and 
pistols. Six troops each contained 1 captain, 1 lieutenant, 1 cornet, 1 quartermaster 
sergeant, 1 orderly (drill) sergeant, 1 trumpeter, 1 farrier, 4 corporals, 32 privates, and 
1 armorer.98  
 On January 8, 1777, Congress authorized the Virginia State to form two extra 
companies since two regiments of Virginian battalions were ordered to immediately 
reinforce Washington’s main army in New Jersey. The Virginian government then 
established their own independent companies in order to defend the western frontiers 
against Indian attacks and protect Fort Pitt and Fort Randolph. Each would be 
garrisoned with a company of 100 men commanded by 1 captain, 2 lieutenants, 
1ensign, and 1 usual inferior non-commissioned officer.99 Congress let the Virginian 
governors appoint their own officers and recruit the men during the war.  
 Washington also tried to get rid of the problem of men’s informal wear in 
1777, ‘half compleat and of a thousand different Colours as to uniform, which has not 
only an ill Appearance, but it creates much irregularity’. He wanted men to be 
formally and neatly uniformed, ‘for when a Soldier is convinced that it will be known 
by his dress, to what Corps he belongs, he is hindered from committing many faults, 
for fear of detection’.100 He wrote to James Mease, ordering him to make a clothing 
purchase for the army. Mease was directed to purchase and forward to the Quarter 
master general in New York ‘as much cloth for tents as he can procure’.101 But 
Congress was not much concerned with this matter, so the problem with clothing still 
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continued. Washington was furious, ‘I am perfectly satisfied, that unless this very 
important and interesting Office [of Clothier General] is put under better regulations 
and under a different Head, than it now is, the Army will never be cloathed. Mr Mease 
is by no means fit for the business’.102 Congress postponed his recommendation until 
March 23, 1779 when the clothing department was established. But still no action was 
taken since Washington wrote to the Board of War in April expressing, ‘Regrets that 
the clothing department is not yet reorganized’.103 
 On June 20, 1777 Congress formed the corps of invalids containing eight 
companies. Each company had one captain, two lieutenants, two ensigns, five 
sergeants, six corporals, two drummers, two fifers, and one hundred men. Colonel 
Lewis Nicola was elected as a colonel of the corps. The tasks of the corps were 
garrisons, guards in cities and other places where magazines or arsenals or hospitals 
were placed. Moreover, it served as a military school for young gentlemen when off 
duty to study geometry, arithmetic, vulgar and decimal fractions. It was a special 
practice of this corps that the officers were obliged to contribute one day’s pay on 
every month for purchasing books of tactics and the petite guerre for a regimental 
library.104 It was discussed that the Invalid Corps actually was established in order to 
follow the European practice and sometimes were useless for performing security 
guard since limping men were taken to this corps.105  
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 Thus, the army of year 1777 had been majorly reformed in many aspects. The 
army now contained 88 battalions plus more extra infantry and an artillery regiment. 
The light horse units were in active service. The attempt to get men clothed uniformly 
was also made. Washington was empowered and able to pursue his intention to 
nourish his army to become a professional one. In addition, all the states could manage 
to participate in this war by sending their men to join the army. 
The arrangement of the army in 1778 
The victory of Saratoga commanded by Gates and Washington’s loss of the battle of 
Brandywine at nearly the same time not only made an obvious comparison between 
the two commanders but also affected the authority and command of the army. The 
new format of the Board of War was approved by Congress on October 17, 1777. The 
Board of War which had been in the sole control of Congress now was modified to be 
controlled under Gates and his men, including Thomas Conway, and Thomas Mifflin. 
This new Board of War was given many responsibilities, such as keeping accounts of 
officers, their ranks and fates of commissions; tracking and estimating accounts of 
artillery, weapons, clothes, and war supplies that would be needed for the army.106 
Moreover, the Board of War was taking care of the duties and powers which once 
belonged to Washington, such as filling up military commissions, overseeing raising, 
recruiting, and dispatching of the land forces, directing the prisoners of war as well as 
advising all military matters.107 
 On December 13, 1777, The Board of War generated a new important position, 
an inspector general. This seat was granted to Thomas Conway as the first inspector 
general of the Continental Army with the expectation of promoting discipline to meet 
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the standard of European armies. This position also was responsible for many 
administrative tasks, which would contribute to the following reformation of the 
military organization. Some of the main tasks included reviewing the troops to see 
that every officer and soldier be instructed in the exercise and manoeuvres, observing 
their discipline, giving the commander-in-chief advice if any of the troops should be 
fixed based on the reviews, preparing for the returns of clothing, arms and 
accoutrements, recruits, number of officers and men who were unfit for service, death, 
desertion, or loss. The inspector general also would review officers’ and men’s 
complaints and transmit to Congress what petition he thought worthy of notice.108 
Conway now was at the centre of troop training. 
 In January 1778, the committee visited Washington’s main army at Valley 
Forge in Philadelphia and found out that the army had 17,491 rank and file, but only 
7,600 were fit for service. To solve this problem, Washington suggested that the 
committee draft men for a nine-month term in order to fill in the regiments. On 
February 26, 1778, Congress required many states to fill up their continental troops 
through drafts from their militia or any other way possible.  Congress decreased the 
number of all the states’ quota. The German battalion became a part of Maryland 
quota, ‘Let Maryland take the German batalion, wholly, as one of her eight, for she 
already claims a part of it’.109 Moreover, Washington’s 16 additional regiments were 
reorganized into nine since he saw that ‘none of which are strong, some extremely 
weak and others only partially organized’.110 Georgia and South Carolina were in 
British hands and not on the roll. The arrangement was as follows: 
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 New Hampshire      3 
 Massachusetts Bay      15  
 Rhode Island and Providence Plantations   1 
 Connecticut       8 
 New York        5 
 New Jersey        4 
 Pennsylvania       10 
 Delaware       1 
 Maryland (including the German battalion)   8 
 Virginia       15 
 North Carolina       9 
 Total        79111 
 
In May 1778, Congress also adjusted the ration of officers and men in all the units of 
infantry, artillery, cavalry, provost, and engineering department. The Provost was 
established in May to take charge against the prisoners.112 On May 27, 1778 the corps 
of light infantry enhanced their duty—one of light-infantry company attached to every 
infantry regiment.113 The information was drawn from the Journal of Congress on 
May 27, 1778 was as follows:114 
Infantry 
Each battalion of infantry consisted of 9 companies (1 of them was light infantry) 
Commissioned     Pay per month 
1 Colonel and captain     75 dollars 
1 Lieutenant colonel and captain   60  
1 Major and captain     50 
6 Captains      40  
1 Captain lieutenant     26 ⅔ 
8 Lieutenants      26 ⅔ 
9 Ensigns      20 
Pay master,       20 
Adjutant,       13 
Quartermaster      13 
(to be taken from the line)  (in addition to their pay as officers in line) 
1 Surgeon      60 
1 Surgeon’s mate     40 
1 Sergeant major,     10 
1 Quarter master sergeant    10 
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27 Serjeant      10 
1 Drum Major      9 
1 Fife major      9 
18 Drums and fifes     7⅓ 
27 Corporals      7⅓ 
 Privates      6⅔ 
 
Artillery 
A battalion of artillery consisted of 
Commissioned    Pay per month 
1 Colonel       100 dollars 
1 Lieutenant colonel     75 
1 Major      62⅔ 
12 Captains      50  
12 Captain lieutenant     33⅓ 
12 First lieutenants     33⅓ 
36 Second lieutenants     33⅓ 
Pay master,       25 
Adjutant,       16 
Quartermaster      16 
(to be taken from the line)  (in addition to their pay as officers in line) 
1 Surgeon      75 
1 Surgeon’s mate     50 
1 Sergeant major,     11 23/90 
1 Quarter master sergeant    11 23/90 
1 Fife major      10 38/90 
1 Drum Major      10 
72 Serjeant      10 
72 Bombardiers     9 
72 Corporals      9 
72 Gunners      8⅔ 
24 Drums and fifes     8⅔ 
 Matrosses      8⅓ 
 
Cavalry 
A battalion of cavalry consisted of  
Commissioned     Pay per month 
1 Colonel       93 3/4 dollars 
1 Lieutenant colonel     75 
1 Major      60 
6 Captains      50  
12 Lieutenant      33⅓ 
6 Cornets      26⅔ 
1 Riding master     33⅓ 
Pay master,       25 
Adjutant,       15 
Quartermaster      15 
- 44 - 
 
(to be taken from the line)  (in addition to their pay as    
      officers in line) 
1 Surgeon      60 
1 Surgeon’s mate     40 
1 Saddler      10 
1 Trumpet major     11 
6 Farriers      10 
6 Quarter master sergeant    15 
6 Trumpeters      10 
12 Serjeant      15 
30 Corporals      10 
324 Dragoons      8⅓ 
 
Provost 
A provost was established to consist of 
       Pay per month 
1 Captain of provosts      50 dollars 
4 Lieutenant colonel     33⅓ 
1 Clerk      33⅓ 
1 Quarter master serjeant    15 
2 Trumpeters      10 
2 Serjeants      15 
5 Corporals      10 
43 Provosts or privates    8⅓ 
Executioners      10 
 
Engineer Department 
The engineering department had 3 companies to be established, each to consist of 
       Pay per month 
1 Captains      50 dollars 
3 Lieutenants      33⅓ 
4 Serjeants      10 
4 Corporals      9 
60 Privates      8⅓ 
 
The engineer department appeared for the first time in the Continental Army in 1778 
according to the French officers who sailed to join the army in 1777. In fact, the corps 
of engineers had been authorized by Congress since December 1776, and the army 
had a proficient Polish engineer, Thaddeus Kosciuszko, who performed his duty 
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effectively in fortifications in the Northern Army.115 However, the lack of enough 
technicians prevented the army from forming the engineering department. So, 
Congress took no further action until Louis Duportail, a skilful French engineer and 
his men arrived in America in 1777. And on May 27, 1778 Congress authorized three 
companies of engineers. Duportail was appointed a Brigadier general and became a 
Chief of Engineer, which was the first time that the Continental Army relied their 
execution solely on foreign officers. The engineering department then was informally 
referred as the ‘Companies of Sappers & Miners’ according to Duportail.116  
 1778 marked the beginning of foreign involvement and integration in full-
scale. The foreign officers generated special supporting units and provided 
supervision. A topographical section was attached to the engineer corps in order to 
improve surveying and mapping. On July 25, 1777 Congress authorized Washington 
to appoint an appropriate person a ‘geographer and surveyor of the roads and take 
sketches of the country’117. Washington chose Robert Erskine, a Scottish engineer 
specialized in ironworks, who came to America in 1771. He was the person who built 
a mechanical model of chevaux-de-frise that Kosciuszko used to prevent the British 
invasion in 1776 in New Jersey, and supplied the big chain stretched across Hudson 
River in 1777.118  He began his job as a mapmaker in December 1776 when he assisted 
Charles Lee to sketch New Jersey terrain, and drew a pocket-size of map of New 
Jersey and Southern New York for Washington.119  
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 Many other European officers were commissioned and appointed as 
commanders of specialized units and helped to generate new departments. Polish and 
French officers, Casimir Pulaski and Francois Louis Teisseidre, Marquis de Fleury, 
commanded the Corps of Light Dragoons. On 27 May 1778 Congress also created a 
provost guard known as the Maréchaussée Corps. The corps was ‘to be armed and 
accoutred in the manner of light dragoon’,120 performing as a military police corps to 
be used as intelligence collectors, route escorts as well as Washington security 
providers. In June 1778 Washington appointed Captain Bartholomew von Heer, a 
Prussian officer, who had served as an adjutant of Ottendorf’s independent corps and 
a captain of 4th Continental Artillery Regiment in 1777, to command this corps.121  
Full-scale foreign intervention in the war allowed many of the positions in specialist 
units and positions to be filled, and new ones created. 
 The Artillery Regiment became more sophisticated with separate units with 
different responsibilities. Two more artillery artificer companies were added to 
maintain small arms, and in February 11, 1778 Congress appointed Colonel Benjamin 
Flower to command a new Artillery Artificer Regiment.122 
 The inspection by the inspector general helped to acquire accurate 
information. It was at this time that the Continental Army was integrated and 
supervised by foreign officers. The army gradually found its own direction by 
adjusting the military units based on what they had—not by the British role model. 
The Continental Army started to make adjustment to fit their men and capabilities. 
The ‘Conway Cabal’ forced Thomas Conway to resign in March 1778, Congress 
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replaced him with a new inspector general, Friedrich Wilhelm von Steuben, who then 
became not only a legendary drillmaster but skilled in inspecting. He received orders 
from Washington to investigate the entire army, and this improved awareness of the 
actual amount of officers, men, arms and other military supplies in each unit. Steuben 
found out that the existing regulations were not effective, so he wrote to Washington 
with his suggestions to revise the army management. He mentioned that the authority 
of the officers now was able to grant furloughs for his non-commissioned officers and 
soldiers that should be adjusted, ‘It is the Same with furloughs: Almost every Man 
who obtains one, is a Man lost to his Regiment’.123 This was one of the reasons why 
Congress never had supplied the regiments with enough men. Steuben proposed to 
have passes and forms of discharge printed, as he claimed that this was practiced in 
Europe. 124 
 During this phase the Continental Army became much more sophisticated with 
all those special units. Many corps such as artillery, engineers, and cavalry were 
improved. Brigadier General Casimir Pulaski, a Polish officer, was the one who 
proposed Washington to reform the cavalry and enhance its capacities.125 He planned 
to adopt regulations which were practiced in the King of Prussia’s army, train the 
cavalry men and militia for two months for the men to learn the cavalry discipline 
which would be exercised and instructed by the officer rank of colonel. Pulaski also 
suggested how the unit should be organized and clothed and armed. He also 
recommended some capable officers to fill in the vacancies. Washington agreed with 
the idea of keeping the men in order and providing regiments with clothes and 
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accoutrements.126 Pulaski was also interested in the forming a corps of light lancers 
(Polish influence) which was finally authorized as the formation of Pulaski’s Legion 
on March 28, 1778. 
The inspector general arrangements and the organization in 1781 
The Army of 1780 was the result of the rearrangement in 1777. Since the three-year 
enlistment was about to expire at the end of September, Congress needed to recruit 
men. The year 1778 was the time that the main army was shifted to the south. Georgia 
and South Carolina were under the British control and could not send any troops. 
Congress then removed their quotas in 1778. In 1780, Georgia was still unable to 
supply their quota. Twelve states were expected to fill in the continentals of 35,211 
men, and the quotas were distributed as follows: 
 New Hampshire  1215 
 Massachusetts Bay  6070 
 Rhode Island   810 
 Connecticut   3238 
 New York   1620 
 New Jersey   1620 
 Pennsylvania   4855 
 Delaware   405 
 Maryland   3238 
 Virginia   6070 
 North Carolina  3640 
 South Carolina  2430 
 Total    35211*127 
 *Exclusive of blacks.  
 
However, the actual number of the enlisted men had been dropping continuously since 
1778.  The year from 1780-1781 marked the smallest number of men in regular troops, 
but the number of the militia was stable and slightly increased in 1781. However, the 
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American troops of the year 1781 made the lowest number even with the continentals 
and the militia combined. 
 The Continental Army at this moment had an effective inspector general 
whose duty, besides drilling and instilling discipline into the American force, was 
inspecting the army. In France and Prussia the inspector general had power over all 
other officers and was able to generate any order relating discipline. In Steuben’s mind 
he believed that he should have had power to reorganize regiments on he thought 
necessary.128 But in practice in the Continental Army did not seem to work that way. 
First, it was almost impossible that other senior officers would accept this approach, 
and second only Congress could approve it. However, Congress passed the proposal 
to Washington for his decision. Washington asked for his generals’ opinion and 
obviously the proposal was not in favour. Fourteen of the Board of General Officers 
resolved that this proposal was ‘unnecessary’ and ‘it would form a new-fangled 
system of power running through the line of the army uncontrouled and unchecked’.129  
 But Steuben had an important mission waiting for him. After he finished 
publishing the Blue Book in March 1779, Washington appointed him to investigate 
the condition of the men and the army and collect the returns to see if any regiments 
could be preserved. This task was crucial for planning and calculating force for the 
campaign in 1781: 
 the Inspector General and his Assistants shall review the troops at such times 
 and places and receive such returns for that purpose as the Commander in 
 Chief or commanding officer in a detachment shall direct; At which 
                                                 
128 Paul Lockhart, The Drillmaster of Valley Forge: The Baron de Steuben and the Making of the 
American Army (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2008), p. 177. 
129 Hoth, ed., ‘To George Washington from a Board of General Officers, 11 September 1778, vol. 16, 
pp. 567–569. 
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 reviews he or they shall inspect the number and condition of the men, 
 their discipline and exercise and the state of their Arms, Accoutrements & 
 Clothes, observing what of these articles have been lost or spoiled since the 
 last review, and as near as possible by what means, reporting the same with 
 the deficiencies and neglects to the Commander in Chief or the 
 commanding officer of a detachment and to  the board of war.130 
The inspector general started his mission right away. The first major problem that he 
found was lack of discipline. Moreover, number of men in each regiment was less 
than what Congress had expected. Above all, the states could not fill in their quotas, 
and Congress was unable to do anything about it. Steuben went through each brigade 
and found out that the army carried no system to account weapons, supplies, or any 
equipment for soldiers. 131 Steuben then created ‘company books’ to keep track of 
military properties, and ‘soldier’s book’ for men to record what he was issued and 
when.132 He set up a new approach for commanding officers to follow.  
 The army of 1779 expired in September, and Washington wanted to know the 
strength of his men, so he ordered Steuben to continue his investigation in December 
1779, ‘the whole army is to be inspected this month by the Sub and Brigade Inspectors 
who are carefully to examine the Arms, Accoutrements and Clothing of each non-
commissioned officer and private…what quantity of each is on hand and what will be 
wanting for the ensuring campaign; calculating from the 1st day of January 1780—to 
the 1st of January 1781’.133 Steuben found out that that there was a great discrepancy 
between the total number and the men fit for duty. The number of men who were sick 
                                                 
130 Lengel, ed., George Washington, ‘General Orders, 27 April 1779,’ vol. 20, pp. 229–232. 
131 Lockhart, pp. 207-208. 
132 Lockhart, p. 208.  
133 George Washington, ‘General Orders,’ December 13, 1779, The Papers of George Washington 
Revolutionary War Series, vol.23, 22 October—31 December 1779, ed. by William M. Ferraro 
(Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2015), p.577. 
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was moderate but the columns of absent was excessive. In other words, the men who 
showed up on the rolls for government pay suggested a larger army on foot than it 
actually had. This happened with officers as well. Steuben found that in some 
regiments too many officers absent on furlough so that they were left without a 
sufficient number to preserve order and perform the common routine of service.  
Several of the companies appeared without a single commissioned officer, and 
this was ‘inadmissible on every principle’. The non-commissioned officers also made 
another defect. Some corps were insufficient, and some were having more than their 
complement. When the report reached to Washington, he expressed his feeling to his 
generals that, ‘I am extremely concerned to find by the late reports of the Inspector 
General, that most of the corps in the army are in worse order than I had flattered 
myself’.134 Washington then ordered his generals to make a distribution of the 
remaining officers and non-commissioned officers in appropriate proportion so that 
no company would be without officers to take care of the regulations. But if any 
company was still insufficient, new appointments were suggested. 
 Since Steuben was the one who observed the army conditions and the actual 
number of men, he went on pursuing his intention to reorganize the army as he saw 
fit. In March 1780 he proposed his plan to the commander-in-chief. Steuben found 
that the number of men was actually below the establishment, so he suggested 
recruiting as quick as possible to make the regiments equal to fill in some vacancies 
of some regiments and to be able to exercise the troops. He proposed the same 
formation of the infantry but lessening the number of men and horses in each 
regiment. Each regiment should then be completed to the number of 204 men, well 
                                                 
134 ‘Circular to Major Generals and Officers Commanding Brigades,’ January 22, 1780, in The Papers 
of George Washington, Revolutionary War Series, vol.24, 1 January-9 March 1780, ed. by Benjamin 
L. Huggins (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2016), pp. 212-216.  
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mounted, including the non-commissioned officers and trumpeters. He insisted that 
the army should be formed by 35,000 men as a large-size army.  
 Steuben’s plan was agreed with Washington who proposed it to Congress. 
However, the plan was against Congress’ own plan of reduction of number of 
regiments and larger in size—25% of the army would be discarded. Both Steuben and 
Washington disagreed with this ‘incorporation plan’ since it would lessen the morale 
of the troops and present the states as weak and unable to maintain the structure and 
organization of the army in the army’s eyes. But, Congress passed this Act on March 
25, 1780 reducing the battalions, ‘so that all reduction or incorporation is now out of 
the question & for next Campaign the Regiments in the line will be augmented by 
more or less by the respective states’.135  Congress reasoned that this approach would 
save the cost due to ‘all our misfortunes—the bad State of our Finances’.136 
 On October 3, 1780 Congress came up with a new arrangement of the army to 
be consistent with their limited expenses. This time the additional 16 regiments 
originally raised in 1777 were not included, and the German battalion would be 
reduced in the following year. But this year Congress managed to allot the quotas to 
all the 13 states. The regular army since January 1, 1781 would appear this way: 
 4 Regiments of Cavalry or Light Dragoons consisted of 6 troops; each troop 
 contained 64 commissioned officers and 64 non-commissioned officers and 
 privates. 
 4 regiments of artillery consisted of 9 companies; each company consisted of 
 65 non-commissioned officers and matrosses and 65 commissioned officers. 
                                                 
135 ‘To George Washington from Friedrich Wilhelm Ludolf Gerhard Augustin, Baron [von] Steuben, 
28 March 1780,’ in Founders Online, National Archives, 
<http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/99-01-02-01272> [accessed 12 May 2017]. 
136 Ibid. 
- 53 - 
 
 49 regiments of infantry (exclusive of Colo. Hazen’s regiment); each 
 regiment consisted of 9 companies; each company consisted of 64  non-
 commissioned officers and privates 
 1 regiment of artificers consisted of 8 companies; each company of 60 non-
 commissioned officers and privates.137 
Congress also defined the states to furnish the quotas for continental regiments by 
December 1780. If any state could not fill up their respective regiments, such state 
must supply the deficiency with men committed to serve for not less than a year. The 
quotas of the 13 states for the Continental regiments in 1781 campaign was as follows: 
Table 5: State military quotas in 1781 
 
Source: ‘To George Washington from Samuel Huntington, 4 October 1780,’ in Founders 
Online, National Archives 
 
The Continental Army in 1781 had the smallest troops since 1775. However, 
4,000 French troops came on August 19, 1781 to augment its number. The combined 
American and French armies reached in Philadelphia on August 30—nearly the same 
time that French fleet arrived at Chesapeake Bay. More 3,000 French men came to 
                                                 
137 ‘To George Washington from Samuel Huntington, 4 October 1780,’ in Founders Online, National 
Archives <http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/99-01-02-03475> [accessed 9 May 
2017].  
States Infantry Artillery Cavalry Artificers Total 
New Hampshire 
Massachusetts Bay 
Rhode Island 
Connecticut 
New York 
New Jersey 
Pennsylvania 
Delaware 
Maryland 
Virginia 
North Carolina 
South Carolina 
Georgia 
2 
10 
1 
5 
2 
2 
6 
1 
5 
8 
4 
2 
1 
 
1 
 
 
1 
 
1 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
2 
11 
1 
6 
3 
2 
9 
1 
5 
11 
4 
2 
1 
Total 49 4 4 1 58 
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support Lafayette’s force. And on September 28, about 9,000 Americans and 7,800 
French laid siege to Yorktown.138 
Army of 1783 
In June 1783 Congress drafted a military Peace Establishment with many 
reorganizations and adjustments.139 The Articles of Confederation in 1781 stated that 
the United States were obliged to begin to create at the very first moment ‘to employ 
a fleet and army’ and waited for an actual commencement of hostilities so they could 
prepare for defence.140 However, at this time Congress considered that this task 
required a length of time to levy and form the army and even more time to build a 
navy, so it was agreed that such establishments in time of peace were needed for 
common safety. Since Congress had limited finances to spend on the army, the size 
of it was small. Absolute power to appoint staff officers was given to the commander-
in-chief. Washington was in charge to choose a board of officers, the Inspector 
General and Commandant of Artillery and Chief Engineer. He was fully able to revise 
the army regulations and sketch a general ordinance for the service of all troops 
including the militia.  
 The new army consisted of four regiments of infantry, and one of Artillery 
incorporated in a corps of Engineers. The regiments of infantry consisted of two 
battalions, each battalion had four companies, and each company had 64 rank and file 
                                                 
138 Marie Joseph Paul Yves Roch Gilbert Du Motier Lafayette, ‘Lafayette to George Washington, 
September 1, 1781,’ Memoirs Correspondence and Manuscripts of General Lafayette, published by 
his family, vol. 3 (New York: Saunders and Otley, 1837), p.437.  
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pp. xxv, 722–44. 
140 ‘Continental Congress Report on a Military Peace Establishment, [18 June 1783],’ The Papers of 
Alexander Hamilton, vol. 3, 1782–1786, ed. by Harold C. Syrett (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1962), pp. 378–397. 
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which the number would be increased to 128 in time of war. The corps of Engineer 
consisted of one Regiment or two battalions of Artillery, each battalion had four 
companies, each company of 64 rank and file. Congress also maintained a corps of 
Artificers to secure arms and ammunition, and a general hospital for the reception of 
the invalids of the army and navy. 
Table 6: Regiment of Infantry 1783 
 
Number 
Persons 
Ranks Pay per month 
in Dollars 
Rations per 
day 
1 
2 
8 
8 
13 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
32 
64 
448 
16 
 
Colonel 
Majors 
Captains, one to each company 
First Lieutenants, one to each 
company 
Second Lieutenants one to each 
company and furnish Regimental 
staff: paymaster, quartermaster, 
adjutant and two ensigns; one to each 
battalion 
Paymaster extra emoluments 
Quartermaster extra emoluments 
Adjutant extra emoluments 
Chaplain  
Surgeon 
Mate 
Sergeant Majors one to each battalion 
Quartermaster sergeants one to each 
battalion 
Drum& fife Majors one to each 
battalion 
Sergeants 4 to each company  
Corporals included in rank&file  
8 to each company 
Privates 56 to each company 
Drums & fifes 2 to each company  
100 
70 
50 
25 
20 
 
 
 
15 
15 
12 
40 
40 
20 
8 
8 
8 
5 
3 
 
2 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
 
1 
1 
Total 
6,015 
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Table 7: Regiment of Artillery and a corps of Engineers 
 
Number 
Persons 
Ranks Pay per 
month 
in 
Dollars 
Rations 
per day 
Rations 
Forage per 
day 
1 
1 
2 
4 
16 
16 
19 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
5 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
32 
32 
384 
96 
16 
Major General Commandant 
Colonel 
Lieutenant  Colonel 
Majors 
Captains 1 to each company 
First Lieutenants 2 to each 
company 
Second Lieutenants 2 to each 
company including  
Paymaster, Quartermaster 
Adjutant 
Quartermaster extra pay 
Paymaster extra pay 
Adjutant extra pay 
 
Professor of Mathematics 
Professor of Chemistry 
Professor of Natural Philosophy 
Professor of Civil Architecture 
Drawing Master 
Commissary of Military Stores 
Deputies each  
Conductors as many as may be 
found necessary to be appointed 
out of the Non-commissioned 
officers with the additional pay of 
2 dollars per month 
Chaplain 
Surgeon 
Mate 
Sergeant Major 
Quartermaster sergeant 
Drum and fife Major 
Sergeants 4 to each company 
Bombardiers included in 
rank&file 
Cannoniers 48 to each company 
Sappers & miners 12 to each 
company 
Drums & fifes 2 to each company 
 
110 
80 
75 
60 
30 
25 
 
 
15 
15 
12 
 
75 
75 
75 
75 
75 
75 
40 
 
 
 
 
40 
40 
20 
8 
8 
8 
6 
4 
3 
3 
3 
 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
 
 
 
 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
 
2 
2 
2 
1 
 
 
 
 
1 
1 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
1 
 
Total  
630 
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 Congress insisted that a corps of Artillery and Engineers must be kept because 
the officers of this corps required a long study of science and ‘cannot be formed on 
emergency’. Moreover, the proper fortifications were needed—for land and naval, for 
internal security and for protection of the fleet. They had to be established through a 
well-digested system for defence, and this task must be supervised by technicians. 
Congress understood clearly that their lack of this installation ‘would always oblige 
the United States to have recourse to foreigners in time of war for a supply officers in 
this essential branch’.141 The artillery and engineers were combined into one corps 
because these units worked closely together and their duties were reciprocal, and they 
also shared the preliminary and qualifications—‘the union is conductive to 
œconomy’.142  
 The militia was also reorganized and adjusted to be more effective and 
sophisticated. The militia matter was taken consideration with proper arsenals and 
magazines by each state to perform ‘national defence’ and be ‘a part of the 
confederation’. All free males aged twenty to fifty were obliged to serve and be 
divided into two classes: married and single men. The differences of these two groups 
were that the single men were to assemble for inspection and exercise once every two 
months by companies and once every four months regimentally; the married men once 
every three months by companies and once every six months regimentally. Each class 
formed into corps of infantry and dragoons and were formed in the same manner as 
the regulars. Men who were willing to enter the corps of dragoons were expected to 
equip themselves, and the rest would be formed into infantry. If the war broke out, 
                                                 
141 Ibid. 
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men were obliged to take field and remain in service for one year. And when in peace 
they had to serve three years and march wherever their service required.  
 The Treaty of Peace was signed on September 3, 1783 to end the War of 
American Independence. This treaty was actually the same document that was signed 
on November 30, 1782, so Congress produced the report on a military peace 
establishment prior the treaty was signed. The long awaiting report was finally printed 
in the Journals of Congress under the date of October 23, 1783. On this day it was 
confirmed that all the British forces would leave New York in the following month. 
Washington insisted that he was verbally informed by Sir Guy Carleton that he 
expected to evacuate the city by November 20 when the transports from Nova Scotia 
returned.143 
Conclusion 
The Continental Army faced a problem with enlistment from the beginning. The initial 
one-year recruitment used in 1775 was changed to three-year enlistment in 1777 to 
keep the men in field. This approach did not work effectively because the number of 
enlisted men was dropping drastically from 1776. But this could not be blamed on the 
long-term enlistment since Congress and the state government failed to pay and 
supply men with what they had been promised—the soldiers were left half fed, 
clothed, and for long periods unpaid.144 Congress could not keep a large army, so it 
came up with a new arrangement with a decreased number of regiments and men to 
perform in the campaign of the year 1781. However, with the smallest number of men 
in the revolutionary time, the army won the final battle that brought about the victory.  
                                                 
143 ‘From George Washington to George Clinton, 23 October 1783,’ in Founders Online, National 
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 Undeniably the Continental Army of 1781 became much more sophisticated—
the army had more special units, and men were trained properly. French troops and 
fleet made a great contribution to the last phase of the war in augmenting the force 
and performing in the decisive battle and laying siege. The organization of the 
Continental Army started mostly with militia and lacked higher administration but 
then was adjusted along the lines of European ones and got many improvements. The 
army had to adjust to problems and situations it encountered.  
Besides, there were the critical events that shifted the army advancement. The 
Continental Army commanders made an attempt to develop the force to be as close as 
the professional ones in Europe because they realized that only well-trained men could 
stand against their opponents in the open war style. During the eight years of the war 
the American national army changed its structure, doctrine, regulations, training style, 
officers and men in order to make the best use of whatever it had to cope with the 
current and coming situation. In reality it was impossible to create an effective and 
professional force in a short time, but the American generals tried every possible way 
to form the army with necessary units and technique. Moreover they tried their best 
to make their soldiers disciplined and able to put up a fight without running away. The 
development of the men made it possible for the army to be ready for service faster—
as Steuben said to a European officer, ‘Your army is the growth of a century, mine of 
a day’.145 
 
 
                                                 
145 Frederick William von Steuben, ‘Steuben to Baron De Gaudy, New York, 1787-1788,’ in The Life 
of Frederick William Von Steuben, Major General in the Revolutionary Army, ed. by Friedrich Kapp, 
(New York: Mason Brothers, 1859), p. 699.  
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 Chapter 2 Relationship between Congress, States, and the 
Commander in Chief on the Army Characteristics 
 
Introduction 
The second thing the Americans needed to do after they created their own force was 
to make it a professional one. And to make a professional army they had to comply 
with the European warfare tradition on the way armies were organized and fought. 
The decisive outcome was usually decided by the infantry engagement. Chapter 1 
demonstrated how the Continental Army was formed in imitation of the British army. 
However, the American army was adjusted several times because of its limited 
resources and the problems it faced before finally showed its true structure at the 
decisive battle at Yorktown. The overall political control of the Continental Army was 
a crucial aspect of it being accepted and able to function well. Most European armies 
were closely tied to their monarchs, and so Congress needed to find a different way 
to fulfil this function. This chapter will try to analyze the attempts of Congress, the 
States, and the commander-in-chief to carve the Continental Army into professional 
fighters, styled after European troops. 
To encounter the British regulars who threatened the colonists to pay taxes 
made Americans fear the abusive military power especially during in peace time.  This 
idea was deeply established the thought of civilian control over the army prior to the 
time that the army was disbanded by Washington after the siege of Yorktown in 1781. 
This situation exemplifies the problem that Americans faced—they were fighting 
military tyranny yet needed to establish an effective military to do it. This shaped how 
the army would eventually became. In fact, Civilian control emerged in England in 
the seventeenth century and can be regarded as another example of European 
influences. As it appears in the English Bill of Rights 1689, ‘the raising or keeping a 
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standing army within the kingdom in time of peace, unless it be with consent of 
Parliament, is against law’.1 This pattern of social structure made a separation within 
military forces—while the militia was supported by Parliament, the standing army 
was backed by the royals. 
 But it was argued that the ‘professionalism’ of the Continental Army was not 
that important to the war’s outcome; the army was merely an adjunct of the American 
people who played a far more important role. One historian who produces works 
imbued with inspiration and spirituality around the Revolutionary War is Charles 
Royster. In his book A Revolutionary People at War: The Continental Army and 
American Revolution, he pushes the reader to consider public virtue as an important 
factor leading to the war’s final outcome, rather than professionalization as a means 
of explaining more sensible reasons for events during the Revolution. When the war 
ended, the army and the American people had different ideas about how victory had 
been achieved. While the army felt that the Americans had won due to the valiant 
efforts of the soldiers, the public perceived that the moral efforts of the American 
people had instead played the more important role.2   
 The idea of a practice called ‘citizen-soldier’ or employing general men as 
soldiers that led America to Revolutionary victory was discussed. Some experts 
remain sceptical about this claim.  Russel F. Weigley argued that the changes from 
the Europe conventions of the professional army of long-serving enlisted men to the 
army of citizen soldier prolonged the War of the Revolution itself.3 This is because 
                                                 
1 English Bill of Rights 1689, An Act Declaring the Rights and Liberties of the Subject and Settling 
the Succession of the Crown, in Yale Law School, Lillian Goldman Law Library, The Avalon Project, 
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the militia or citizen-soldier or ‘an armed populace’ so called by Walter Millis could 
not complete the action as effectively as well-trained forces.4 Even if the militia had 
been organized before the Continental Army to guard their homeland and proved 
themselves by forcing the British regulars retreat at the Lexington and Concord battle. 
But, this citizen soldier was bounded to fight in short term and wanted to return home. 
Gary Nash sees this tradition of militia recruitment as a way to avoid military service 
and be able stay at home.5  
 America in the revolutionary era was made up of colonies and did not have its 
own central administration and financial system to collect taxes; this made it difficult 
for the army to function effectively. Creating and maintaining an army was expensive 
and required capable management. The resources of the British and American armies 
were incomparable. America lacked the administrative infrastructure and all other 
necessary institutions while Britain had a strong central government, and a parliament 
that could tax to obtain money to support the army. Congress, which was supposed to 
be a national government which dealt with war and military matters, did not have legal 
power. Even if it could specify state quotas, it could not recruit men directly. Congress 
again could not tax, so the majority of the income to fund the army came from the 
state governments of the thirteen colonies. And many times it did not go well. While 
America was creating the nation and other essential foundations, including a fighting 
force, Britain already had its powerful army and navy.  
 There were some vital reasons behind the need to make an army professional. 
To obtain assistance from foreign countries they would have to create an actual army 
and prove its worth in battle. The militia, which was based on volunteers, would not 
                                                 
4 Ibid. 
5 Gary B. Nash, The Unknown American Revolution: The Unruly Birth of Democracy and the Struggle 
to Create America (London: Pimlico, 2007), pp. 217. 
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be acceptable in the world of eighteenth-century military professionalism. A 
conventional army was significantly required to bring people together and officially 
speak for the ‘continuity, stability, and dignity’ of the Revolutionary cause.6 Congress 
sorely needed foreign allies to help support this war, so their army had to be able to 
meet European standards. France and its allies would not aid the war of irregulars. 
The other reason was that only an actual army could confront the British army. To 
achieve this goal, men had to be trained well and long enough to do their job properly. 
Congress needed to keep men in the field to be trained, and to make the men stay, they 
needed to be fed and paid. A military career needed to be taken into consideration 
seriously like other professions that people could enter as well as earn a good living 
from. Congress’ primary task after creating an army then was to acquire money.  
 The American national force relied on three separate institutions: Congress, 
the Continental Army, and provincial governments. The members of Congress or the 
so-called ‘delegates’ were sent from each colony/state to meet in Philadelphia to make 
a decision and resolution relating to the War. The delegation created an army, 
appointed the commander-in-chief and staff officers, generated military policy, and 
planned campaigns and operations. The Continental Army and its commander-in-
chief executed those decision and made other additional requests. State governments 
were the ones who paid and supplied men from their regions. The army’s very 
existence relied on this teamwork. 
 The main source of Congress’ income was from states’ taxes, which were 
gathered through the delegates. And this was the reason that the delegates and 
provincial governments were so important to the army. Congress could not impose a 
                                                 
6 Thomas G. Frothingham, Washington: Commander in Chief (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 
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tax because the people did not elect it, so it could not obligate people to pay taxes. 
Men in the army then were a colonial responsibility and got paid by provincial 
governments. The majority of the sum (39%) to fund the army was from the state 
money. 7 The states were legally able to print money, and they also paid their men of 
their quotas as well as their own militia:  
All charges of wars and all other general expences to be incurred for the 
common welfare, shall be defrayed out of a common treasury, which is to be 
supplyed by each colony in proportion to it’s number of male polls between 
16. and 60. years of age; the taxes for paying that proportion are to be laid and 
levied by the laws of each colony.8 
But the request for support did not get a response every time. Congress struggled to 
obtain money from the outset. Congress had to print its own money to pay men with 
paper money (28%) of the time throughout the war, since the colonies could not 
submit enough money to fund the army.9 On May 7, 1775 Congress needed to vote, 
‘to Issue Notes for 100,000£ and to request your aid in giving them a Currency’ 
because Massachusetts could pay £20,000 in taxes.10 But since Congress’ paper 
money was not backed with metals to mint coins, it was almost valueless. In December 
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1776 Congress authorized Washington ‘to arrest and confine Persons who refuse to 
take the Continental Currency’.11  
 The colonies moreover were free from Congress’ order. The relationship 
between Congress and state were more on requesting approach rather than obliging. 
Each colony was able to manage their own business and income as well as print their 
own money. Their delegates represented their people and made judgement based on 
their people’s interest: 
To establish a form of Government in that Colony, it be recommended to that 
Convention to call a full and free Representation of the People, and that the 
said Representatives, if they think it necessary, shall establish such a form of 
Government as in their Judgment will produce the happiness of the People, 
and most effectually secure Peace And good Order in the Colony, during the 
continuance of the present dispute between Great Britain and the Colonies.12 
Even if colonies/states paid men, the amount for payment of officers and soldiers was 
stipulated by Congress. The tensions between Congress and states emerged when 
there was an attempt to reduce the pay of privates, but Congress voted that the pay 
could not be reduced since this would discouraged men to enlist in the army in 1776. 
Senior officers knew that money pay drew the men to enter the service. Sullivan 
thought that ‘an attempt to reduce the wages at this time, will probably prevent the 
raising of another army’ because men had to spend on clothing and army with their 
pay. So they would be left out with little money. Greene agreed that the reduction 
would make it difficult to fill the regiments and this would ‘possibly weaken the Lines 
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at the Expiration of the old Establishments,’ and men would consequently refuse to 
enlist. Gates shares the same opinion, ‘the pay of The Privates had better be continued 
as at present established’.13 The way Congress listened to the officers and took their 
advice implied a shift of the balance of power between the staff and the delegates. 
 The fact that Congress, as the owner of the national army, was unable to tax 
to fund the army was a critical problem, as well as its inability to draft men into 
military service. The problem that colonies/states were unable to fill in their quotas 
became serious. In fact, many delegates of Congress saw this problem and proposed 
to fix it by putting the Continental Army directly under Congress to ‘Establish a 
Continental Army of which this will be only a part, you [Congress] will place the 
direction as you please’.14 Congress also made a request to create a government which 
had its own army on May 16, 1775. Massachusetts had requested a regular established 
government with the ability to raise the army ‘to have an army although consisting of 
our own countrymen, establish here, without a civil power to provide for and control 
it […] to exercise the power of civil government’.15 This request was not fully 
responded. 
 Throughout the war Congress, however, created extra and additional 
Continental regiments which were controlled directly by Congress and the 
commander-in-chief. Starting in June 1775, Congress requested Virginia to raise two 
companies of riflemen led by Captain Daniel Morgan and Captain Hugh Stephenson, 
and a year later the companies were combined with Maryland companies to be 
Virginia-Maryland rifle regiment.16 In December 1776 Congress voted to grant 
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Washington a great deal of authority to raise several military units drawn from any 
states under his command.17 Those were 16 additional battalions of infantry, three 
thousand Light-Horse, three Regiments of Artillery, and a Corps of Engineers, and he 
could freely appoint the officers of these battalions and design their pay. Moreover, 
Washington could request for assistance from militia from any states if necessary.  
This was Congress’ way of bypassing problems with states and finance. 
 Even if Congress had no legal power to govern, it acted as a national 
government. It was responsible for significant missions and tasks. Franklin’s 
Proposed Articles of Confederation in July 1775 described the foundation of power 
and duty of the Congress on war and peace. At the first stage Congress’s main task 
was to make reconciliation with Great Britain. However, after it decided to declare 
Independence Congress was mostly responsible in military matters to establish the 
posts, print paper money to finance the army, generate the regulation of common 
force, and appoint General confederacy’s civil and military officers such as General 
Treasurer, Secretary, etc.18 Moreover, Congress could specify the quotas of men in 
the army of each colony, ‘the United States assembled shall on Consideration of 
Circumstances judge proper, that any Colony or Colonies should not raise Men’.19 
This men in the colonial/state quotas, however, did not belong to their governors but 
the Continental Army.  
 Even if the army was fragmented, America and its people still needed a force 
to defend themselves and fight in the war. This was the reason why each of these three 
institutions—even with ambiguous command—made its best attempt not to let the 
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army collapse before the war was decided, even if there were many times that it was 
on the verge of doing so. This situation gradually generated the practice of helping 
and relying on each other and networking. Private connections played an important 
role in the existence of the army. Congress’ delegates worked with governors. 
Washington himself went out of his way to exploit his personal connection to get what 
he desired from states. His correspondence showed that he talked to some specific 
delegates and governors directly, and worked closely with the Congressional 
presidents. He also formed his strong team of dominant officers and this really helped 
the army to develop. 
 The Continental Army firstly represented the New England colonies, and the 
army was composed of men from Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island and 
New Hampshire. At this moment the army was a force comprising of volunteer men 
who was far from being like regulars.  
The importance of Congress selecting a commander in chief 
Congress had responsibility for the Continental Army and the superintendent of the 
commander-in-chief. Since the members of Congress believed that a standing army 
could harm the nation, and that they might lose their power to a military commander, 
they had to be selective and careful with who they chose to assume this position. 
Among the candidates, George Washington seemed to be the only one who had both 
a military and political background, and was born as an American. He was well known 
since he served in the French and Indian War as a Virginia militia officer, and he was 
also one of the members of the First Continental Congress, in which men from the 
upper society were acquainted with one another. 
 At first Congress intended to take control over the whole army. Military policy 
was controlled through political policies stemming from the collective agreement of 
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the Congress delegates where Congress had tried its best to take control over military 
operations so as to prevent the military’s absolute power over the American populace. 
Once the Continental Army was established, on June 15, 1775 Washington was 
appointed a commander-in-chief — the only one designated throughout the American 
Revolutionary War. His power was stated in the Journal of Congress, ‘A General be 
appointed to command all the Continental forces, raised, or to be raised, for the 
defence of American liberty. The five hundred dollars, per month, be allowed for his 
pay and expences’.20 Washington won the election over some capable candidates. At 
the time, John Hancock had a desire to be appointed commander-in-chief as well.21 
Thomas Paine also had a great opinion of General Artemas Ward who had a strong 
relationship with him.  
 It was John Adams’s idea to nominate Washington for the job. In his 
autobiography, Adams wrote: ‘I am determined this morning to make a direct motion 
that Congress should adopt the army before Boston, and appointed Colonel 
Washington commander of it’.22 Later, on the same day Congress assembled, John 
Adams gave a speech: 
I had but one gentleman in my mind for that important command, and that was 
a gentleman from Virginia who was among us and very well known to all of 
us, a gentleman whose skill and experience as an officer, whose independent 
fortune, great talents, and excellent universal character would command 
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approbation of America, and unite the cordial exertions of all the Colonies 
better than any other person in the Union’.23 
The motion came under debate, and a few delegates declared themselves against it, 
but Washington seemed to be well liked in the first place, so the proposal appeared to 
be satisfactory. Washington received an overwhelming number of votes. The army of 
New England was having a general of its own, and the troops hoped to apprehend the 
British in Boston.  
 Adams clearly saw Washington as the proper man to lead the army. He was 
confident that Washington would not abuse the power of the position. Washington 
was a wealthy man who had a warm family, good friends, and rich properties waiting 
for him back home. As Adams described in a letter to one of the Congressional 
delegates, ‘There is something charming to me in the conduct of Washington, a 
gentleman of one of the first fortunes upon the continent, leaving his delicious 
retirement, his family and friends, sacrificing his ease and hazarding all in the cause 
of his country. His views are noble and disinterested’.24  
 John Adams explained Congress’ attitude and the causes leading to this 
choice. Adams viewed Washington’s selection as a highly political decision. The 
election of Washington was understood to encourage the people in the South to 
participate in the war and make unity among the colonies: 
This measure of imbecility, the second petition to the King, embarrassed every 
exertion of Congress […], but we were embarrassed with more than one 
difficulty, not only with the party in favor of the petition to the King, and the 
party who were jealous of independence, but a third party, which was a 
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Southern party against a Northern, and jealousy against New England army 
under the command of a New England General. Whether this jealousy was 
sincere, or whether it was more pride and a haughty ambition of furnishing a 
southern General to command the northern army25.  
He concluded, ‘This appointment will have a great Effect, in cementing and securing 
the Union of this Colonies. The Continent is really in earnest in defending the 
Country’.26 Eliphalet Dyer, a Connecticut delegate, expressed a similar thought in his 
private letter to Joseph Trumbull, a commissary general of Connecticut troops, an 
alternate delegate from Connecticut:  
[Washington] is a Gent. Highly Esteemed by those acquainted with him, tho I 
dont believe as to his Military, & for real service he knows more than some of 
ours, but so it removes all the jealousies, more firmly Cements the southern to 
the Northern, and takes away the fear of the former lest an Enterprising eastern 
New England Genll proving successful, might with his victorious Army give 
law to the Southern & Western gentry.27 
Washington’s appointment was primarily based on the political calculation that a 
southerner would need to command the army if it were to be truly continental and not 
just a renamed New England militia force. To be fair Congress had other reasons for 
choosing Washington: he had experience from the French and Indian War, in which 
he served the lieutenant governor of Virginia, Robert Dinwiddle. He was then working 
alongside the British. Washington was a delegate to the Continental Congress and a 
wealthy gentleman who refused to profit from his position as a military commander.28 
                                                 
25 Burnette, ed., p. 130. 
26 Butterfield, ed., ‘John Adams to Abigail Adams, 11 June 1775,’ vol. 1, pp. 215–217. 
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He was praised and much respected by other American leaders, and actually not long 
before the election Washington with other members consisting of Philip Schuyler, 
Thomas Mifflin, Silas Deane and Samuel Adams discussed possible ways to supply 
the colonies with armament and military stores. Washington was made a chairman of 
this first military affair before the Second Congress adopted the Continental Army on 
June 14, 1775.29  
 Washington gained the respect of other influential leaders from the start. After 
the election, Silas Deane wrote of his admiration of Washington in a private letter to 
his wife:  
Genl. Washington, who sacrificing private Fortune independent Ease, and 
every domestic pleasure, sets off at his Countrys call. To exert himself in her 
defence without so much as returning to bid adieu to a Fond partner & Family. 
Let Our youth look up to This Man as a pattern to form themselves by, who 
Unites the bravery of the Soldiers, with the most consummate Modesty & 
Virtue.30  
Eliphalet Dyer, similarly praised Washington in a letter to Jonathan Trumbull, a 
Connecticut governor, ‘He is a Gentn highly Esteemed for his Military & other 
Accomplishments to that Important Command We Esteem him well Adapted to please 
A New England Army and much better Suited to the Temper & Genius of Our People 
than any other Gent not brought up in that Part of the Country’.31 John Adams, who 
supported Washington, also wrote to his wife Abigail Adams, ‘I can now inform you 
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that the Congress have made Choice of the modest and virtuous, the amiable, generous 
and brave George Washington Esqr., to be the General of the American Army’.32 
 Even if George Washington was appointed a commander of a national army, 
American military matters worked according to the chain of command. After 
appointing the commander-in-chief, Congress immediately pursued an arrangement 
for voting in the second in command and the other three major generals. General 
Artemas Ward, a commander of Massachusetts, was elected second in command and 
General Charles Lee third. Lee was a professional soldier whose commission in the 
Continental Army would arouse much controversy ‘in the hope of gaining a high, if 
not the highest, command in the patriot forces in the event of war’.33 Washington 
himself also admired Lee as a British officer. In his diaries on December 30, 1774 
showed that the two men at Mount Vernon discussed a plan for American troop 
organization.34  
 During this week, Congress chose thirteen new generals, drafted initial 
instructions for Washington, and decided how to finance the campaign. Washington 
was allowed to choose Joseph Reed from Philadelphia as his secretary and Mifflin as 
his aide-de-camp.35 After all these proposals had been resolved, Congress continued 
by appointing a committee of three, consisting of Richard Henry Lee, Edward 
Rutledge, and John Adams, to draft a commission and instructions for the generals.36  
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 Congress also gave Washington general directions. These directions showed 
how Congress kept their military commander under observation while allowing him 
for individual initiative.  Washington had to report the number of the forces he used 
and return them together with their military stores and provisions. He might recruit 
some men but to exceed double that of the enemy. He could appoint a person to fill 
up vacancies. He was also able to manage the prisoners of war with his own 
consideration. And, with a special power granted to him, Washington had the 
unspecified authority to make a decision ‘for such emergencies’ to find a solution if a 
situation could not be solved by his instructions.37 Congress gave power to 
Washington, but an inspection was carried out. A committee was appointed to instruct 
him of his responsibilities. The authority of Congress was clearly defined. At the 
founding of the country, Americans adopted the idea of civilian control of the military. 
The authors of the Constitution also made sure that the president of Congress had 
more power than the military commander to avoid the creation of a monarchy or 
dictatorship. Therefore, the President of Congress was the chief executive office of 
the nation, and Congress had unlimited power by any law or regulation, ‘except the 
consent of the people themselves’.38 This paved the approach that the military force 
of the United States was under the control of civil government.  
 Washington in fact realized what members of Congress thought of him. After 
he was elected to be the Military Commander, he declared his loyalty and intentions 
to Congress:  
It may be said, that this is an application for powers, that are too dangerous to 
be intrusted. I can only add, that desperate diseases, require desperate 
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remedies, and with truth declare, that I have no lust after power but wish with 
as much fervency as any man upon this wide extended Continent for an 
Opportunity of turning the Sword into a ploughshare; But my feelings as an 
Officer and a man, have been such, as to force me to say, that no person ever 
had a greater choice of difficulties to contend with than I have. It is needless 
to add, that short inlistments, and a mistaken dependance upon Militia, have 
been the Origin of all  our misfortunes, and the great accumulation of our 
Debt.39 
Luckily, due to his previous military and political background, Washington handled 
the situation smartly. He had been building his network with other legislators long 
before the Revolution. In May 1775, Congress appointed a committee of men to deal 
with defensive operations against Britain, and one of those men was George 
Washington.40 This was a method that Congress used before the Revolution—let the 
representatives freely discuss the situation and vote for the resolution. Washington, as 
one of those leading men, knew exactly what Congress expected.  
 Therefore, Washington’s main duties at the beginning of the war were to give 
reports to Congress and follow their orders. On June 30, 1775 Congress released the 
Articles of War specifying the conduct of the Continental Army which was composed 
by Silas Deane, Thomas Cushing, and Joseph Hewes.41  Congress recommended a 
plan for Washington to intercept British supply ships, adopted resolutions for the 
reconstitution of Washington’s army in Massachusetts, and made provisions for the 
defence of South Carolina and Georgia. On November 13, 1775, Congress also 
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ordered the publication of additional ‘Rules and Regulations for the Continental 
Army’42 which gave more regulations to the commissioned and non-commissioned 
officers and punishment guidance. On December 20, they authorized an attack on 
Boston. Congress did not merely organize an army, they also authorized the 
construction of thirteen ships for the Continental Navy and appointed a Marine 
Committee and a commander-in-chief of the Continental Navy. During the first year 
of the war, the military situation was almost entirely controlled by the delegates.   
 Congress initially set the role of itself superior than the army and the 
commander-in-chief and used the militiamen along with the regulars. This approach 
worked for a year, but then proved ineffective. Congress could not make a proper 
decision or select proper officers to fill their positions. After the first year of the war 
passed, Congress decided to grant Washington much more power to execute 
operations as he saw proper. Washington in return reported to Congress as much as 
he could to let the delegates know what was going on. 
 Selecting Washington had significant meaning for how the army and the war 
developed—Congress did not want only a militarily experienced man, but also 
someone who they related to as a politician who understood the situation well and 
could be relied on. The relationship between Congress and Washington was smooth 
overall—Washington and Congress respected each other. Congress trusted the 
commander-in-chief so much that, even with the fear of a standing army, they 
empowered Washington to do what he desired by the end of 1776.  
 Washington’s decision to serve without pay certainly had a resonance in 
Americans’ minds and demonstrated an informal way of living that true Patriots 
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should emulate—men should volunteer to serve and ordinary people should sacrifice 
their personal interests to support the army and the cause of war. Besides, 
Washington’s practice set a pattern for other officers who were willing to be 
commissioned in the Continental Army, especially the foreign officers. Marquis de 
Lafayette was one who followed Washington’s step to serve the army without pay. 
These characteristics were hard to be found, and they made contributions to the War’s 
outcome. Without Washington, Congress knew that the war would turn out in a 
different way. This was why his subordinates did not hesitate to prove their loyalty 
and do what it took to defend their commander’s reputation. Washington’s sacrifice 
made him highly creditable among other officers, delegates, and provincial governors.  
Military Commander and Congress delegates 
Washington worked closely with the Presidents of Congress. John Hancock was 
elected the first president of the Second Continental Congress and was supposed to be 
Washington’s superior. John Adams’s diaries showed that Hancock wanted to be 
appointed as a military commander, but it turned out that he was voted president of 
the Second Continental Congress. A few reasons can be given for this. He inherited 
not only his uncle’s successful business but also his political connections. Thomas 
Hancock was a successful merchant even before the French and Indian War in 1754 
and had built close relationships with Massachusetts’ royal governors. His uncle’s 
assets and connections made John one of the wealthiest and best-known men on the 
continent. He also experimented with many high positions in his political career and 
was a leading patriotic figure. Furthermore, he had ties with influential leaders such 
as Samuel and John Adams.  
 Again, even if Hancock was the President of Congress, he did not wield 
absolute power. Congress worked towards a resolution by appointing a committee and 
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voting. As a group of colonial representatives Congress was responsible for multiple 
tasks. While America was at war, Congress created and managed the national army 
by recruiting men and supplying the troops; they also supported the commander-in-
chief. In the first few years of the war, Congress members were fond of Washington, 
had great expectations for him, and acclaimed him as a supreme commander who 
would control the whole army, but Washington was actually needed to take 
Congress’s command and direction. Congress maintained its central control from the 
beginning of the war.  
 Rather than the President, it was Congress’ delegates that had a lot of power. 
One of the most difficult tasks to do was to man the 38 regular regiments or find 8,000 
men to serve in the Continental Army. This did not allow the militia and the army to 
work separately since there were many times Congress requested the states to provide 
men to put in the regiments. Even if Congress as the American people’s legitimate 
government assumed control of the troops, it relied heavily on people’s consent from 
the thirteen states.  
 Therefore, the delegates from Massachusetts like Samuel and John Adams 
undoubtedly had much power, but they exercised it subtly during the war. They were 
two of the five elected delegates of Massachusetts who attended the First Continental 
Congress in Philadelphia in September 1774. Fifty-six colonial delegates convened 
for the purpose of composing a response to the Intolerable Acts and discussing a 
boycott of British trade. Samuel had the idea for the first companies of minutemen in 
Boston, soldiers who would be immediately ready for action. Samuel was recognized 
as definitely the most radical patriot of the time.43 This was echoed in his writing:  
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If ye love wealth greater than liberty, the tranquility of servitude greater than 
the animating contest for freedom, go home from us in peace. We seek not 
your counsel, nor your arms. Crouch down and lick the hand that feeds you; 
May your chains set lightly upon you, and may posterity forget that ye were 
our countrymen. 
He was described by Benjamin Franklin as ‘truly the Man of the Revolution’.44 John 
Adams was also one of the most powerful figures of the time, both openly and in 
secret. He was involved in many crucial military committees and made several 
decisions at important times. 
 Historians like Charles Editors have agreed that President Hancock still had 
less power in Congress than these presiding officers and that his main duty was 
dealing with correspondence.45 However, Hancock was the president when the 
Declaration of Independence was written. The Declaration was drafted by the leading 
delegates, John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, Benjamin Franklin, Roger Sherman, and 
Robert Livingston, and those men requested him to add what was missing.46 Even 
though the Continental Congress had had several presidential elections during the 
eight years of the war, Hancock held the highest position in Congress from 1775 to 
1777 and was in charge when Congress created the national army, witnessed the failed 
campaign in New York and New Jersey, and decisively empowered their commander-
in-chief. It is interesting to examine what role the congressional president had during 
the war since when it came to making crucial resolutions, Congress always had to vote 
and then create a committee to manage the resulting situation.  
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Board of War and civilian influence on the Continental Army  
Consequently, military policies and strategies for governing the army were established 
by the Board of War and validated by members of Congress. This idea, in fact, had 
been introduced by Washington as he suggested that Congress institute a war-office 
as it was ‘certainly an event of great importance’.47 On January 24, 1776 Congress 
responded to the proposal by appointing a committee of seven to consider the 
propriety of establishing a war office and its responsibility.48 On June 12, 1776 the 
Congress approved ‘Broad of War and Ordnance’ consisting of five members: John 
Adams as a chairman, Roger Sherman, Benjamin Harrison, James Wilson, and 
Edward Rutledge assisted with one clerk and one secretary. The duty covered all the 
army administration.49  
Congress revised the organization of the Board of War in April 1777 by adding 
two more tasks: procuring all such ordinance, arms, military stores, clothing, 
medicine; and registering all correspondence with the generals and transmit to the 
proper officers all order that refer to the forming, marching, clothing and 
appointments for camp or garrison of the troops in every department.50 In October 
1777, Congress rearranged the Board of War by appointing three gentlemen who were 
not members of Congress and increased the organization’s duty. The committee was 
responsible to fill up all military commissions and control raising, recruiting, and 
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dispatching of the land forces.51 In November 7, 1777 Congress proceeded to elect of 
a Board of War, and the vote went to General Thomas Mifflin, Colonel Timothy 
Pickering, and Colonel Robert Harrison, Washington’s military secretary, but 
Harrison declined the offers.52 Mifflin suggested voting for two more members and 
recommended that major General Gates should be appointed President of the Board 
based on his ‘military skill’ that would ‘suggest reformations in the different 
departments of the army essential to good discipline, order and economy’.53 Congress 
approved the proposal and the delegates elected General Gates as a president of Board 
and Joseph Trumbull and Richard Peters as two additional members.54  
 In other words, the Board of War was created to rule over the military 
organization as a result of fear of military misuse. Even if Congress included 
distinctive members who picked war and desired absolute independence like John 
Adams, Samuel Adams, Thomas Jefferson, and Benjamin Franklin, those people were 
the ones who feared a military coup, and held back long-term military services. This 
idea was deeply rooted in American society for long. Samuel Adams’ article for 
Boston Gazette published on October 17, 1768 clearly demonstrated this idea: 
Where military power is introduced, military maxims are propagated and 
adopted, which are inconsistent with and must soon eradicate every idea of 
civil government. It is morever to be observ'd that military government and 
civil, are so different from each other, if not opposite, that they cannot long 
subsist  together. Soldiers are not govern'd properly by the laws of their 
country, but by a law made for them only: This may in time make them look 
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upon themselves as a body of men different from the rest of the people; and as 
they and they only have the sword in their hands, they may sooner or later 
begin to look upon themselves as the LORDS and not the SERVANTS of the 
people […] Nay, they  may even make laws for themselves, and enforce them 
by the power of the s word!55 
The concern over a standing army had also developed in the colonies since Boston 
Massacre. John Adams commented that the standing army should not be trusted:  
This however is no Reason why the Town should not call the Action of that 
Night a Massacre, nor is it any Argument in favour of the Governor or 
Minister, who caused them to be sent here. But it is the strongest Proofs of 
the Danger of Standing Armies’.56  
This idea led Congress to support initially the militia system and adopt a one-year 
enlistment policy.  
 Washington realized how much Congress was afraid of the emergence of 
standing army, but he dissented from this view, ‘The jealousy of a standing army, and 
the evils to be apprehended from one, are remote, and, in my judgment, situated and 
circumstanced as we are, not at all to be dreaded; but the consequence of wanting one, 
according to my ideas formed from the present view of things, is certain and inevitable 
ruin’.57 Washington also complained about the Congress’ hesitation, ‘I assured 
[Congress] that the longer they delayed raising a standing army, the more difficult and 
chargeable would they find it to get one, and that, at the same time that the militia 
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would answer no valuable purpose, the frequent calling them in would be attended 
with an expense, that they could have no conception of’.58 
 But this advice did not meet with the Congress’ favour. The possibility of 
military dictatorship was frightening and from the beginning Washington was 
commanded to follow the instructions and directions given by a committee of 
Congress.59 Their choice of him as the army commander emphasizes how much they 
tried to demonstrate American unity to the British and foreign allies.   
 Two major events forced the American leaders to rethink and adjust their 
military plan and strategy. The first event was the invasion of Canada. On June 27, 
1775, Philip Schuyler was directly appointed by Congress to seize St. Jean and 
Montreal or any other part of Canada.60 However, the campaign failed and ended up 
with the Americans forced into retreat. In early 1776 the Americans followed a 
consistent method for the use of forces in both the militia and Continental Army, but 
the British soon launched an offensive plan to put down the rebellion. At the same 
time, Congress was preoccupied by the Canadian campaign. Much effort was 
expended to achieve the goals of the Canadian operations. In response to General 
Montgomery’s defeat and death in December 1775, Congress sent reinforcements to 
Canada again in January and later in 1776. In February, Congress appointed a 
committee to proceed to Canada to promote support for the American cause.61 
Because the army’s enlistments expired at the end of 1775, Washington was working 
hard to recruit men for his army. Even when the army lacked troops, Congress still 
sent troops to Canada and limited black recruitment to the reenlistment of ‘free 
                                                 
58 Chase and Grizzard, eds., vol. 6, pp. 440–443. 
59 Ford, eds., vol. 2, pp.100-101. 
60 Ford, eds. ‘Instructions to General Schuyler, Continental Congress,’ vol. 2, p. 1855. 
61 Ford, eds., ‘15 February 1776,’ vol. 4, pp. 150-153.   
- 84 - 
 
negroes who have served faithfully in the army of Cambridge’62 and forbade 
enlistment of prisoners of war.63 Thus, Congress still kept close control of the army. 
 The second event was the battle of Long Island, New York in August 1776. 
Congress wanted the army to defend the city, but Washington knew that it was 
difficult to defend New York since at this time his troops were outnumbered and 
surrounded by professional regulars: 
All agreed the Town would not be tenable If the Enemy resolved to bombard 
& cannonade It—But the difficulty attending a removal operated so strongly, 
that a course was taken between abandoning It totally & concentring our whole 
strength for Its defence—Nor were some a little Influenced in their opinion to 
whom the determn of Congress was known, against an evacuation totally, as 
they were led to suspect Congress wished It to be maintained at every hazard.64 
Washington had probably 20,000 men with half of them militia, but General Howe 
commanded 32,000 British soldiers with 8,000 German mercenaries. The battle ended 
up with a heavy American loss. However, Washington decided at the end of 1776 to 
retreat to Pennsylvania to save his men and arms, ‘Our Retreat was made without any 
loss of Men or Ammunition and in better order than I expected’.65  
 The fall of New York encouraged Congress to rethink the necessity of 
allowing Washington and his subordinates to alter the plans as they saw fit. Congress 
had too many tasks occurring at the same time and could not manage them all 
effectively. This defeat made it clear that Congress could not make the right military 
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decisions on the ground because they were in a different place and communication 
took a long time. After this event Washington wrote to Congress stressing the need 
for employing regular troops instead of using a high percentage of militia:  
Our situation is truly distressing. The Check our Detachment sustained on the 
27th. Ulto. has dispirited too great a proportion of our Troops and filled their 
minds with apprehension and dispair. The Militia, instead of calling forth their 
utmost efforts to a brave and manly opposition, in order to repair our Losses, 
are dismayed, Intractable and Impatient to return. Great numbers of them have 
gone off.66 
Congress did not want to be responsible for the outcome, so Washington was allowed 
to follow his plan for defending the city and evacuating the supplies; but the plan was 
made too late and the British attacked before the supplies could be moved.  
 Washington now was allowed to manage the situation. He could compel the 
troops to stay with the army after their enlistment expired; had power to order 
Virginia, Maryland, Delaware, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey companies to join his 
main army; draw money from the nearest paymaster to spend on paying the troops 
and procure provisions for them on their march; appoint a commissary of prisoners, 
and a clothier general for supplying the army; fix their salaries, and return their names 
to Congress: to fix upon that system of promotion in the Continental Army with his 
judgement; direct the quarter master general to provide teams for each regiment, and 
for other necessary purposes.67 Congress still kept Washington under close scrutiny 
but did not direct operations nor the management of the army on campaign. They 
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ordered him to write to them at least twice daily when the speedy ‘Communication of 
Intelligence’ was necessary.68 They placed more trust in him and allowed him to make 
a decision in some important matters such as choosing suitable personnel and number 
of men for certain tasks.69  
 Washington used his new powers judiciously, seeking to build trust between 
him and Congress. When Congress requested him to report, Washington never left 
Congress waiting. The Writings of George Washington in the Revolutionary War 
Series demonstrate that he wrote to Congress almost every day. Moreover, 
Washington tried to show Congress how much he obeyed civilian power. One distinct 
example occurred in July 1776; twice he rejected direct peace negotiations from 
General William Howe, the commander-in-chief of the British army. He immediately 
made a report to the President of Congress.70 He insisted that it was beyond his 
responsibility to receive this letter directly. In Washington’s opinion, it was 
unacceptable that the British did not take the American army seriously, ‘in this 
Instance, the Opinion of Others concurring with my own, I deemed It a duty to my 
Country and my appointment to insist upon that respect which in any other than a 
public view I would willingly have waived’.71 
 The situation described Washington’s loyalty. Congress subsequently put 
more trust in him and allowed him to make some important decisions. Washington 
gained even more credit when he led his army to defeat and capture the Hessian 
garrison at Trenton on December 26, 1776. This resolution was much supported by 
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Major General Nathanael Greene, one of Washington’s best subordinates. Greene 
wrote to President John Hancock to encourage Congress to enhance Washington’s 
power: ‘that the General will not exceed his Powers altho’ he may sacrifice the Cause. 
There never was a man that might be more safely trusted nor a Time when there was 
a louder Call’.72 Congress took Greene’s recommendation into consideration and 
granted Washington ‘full exertion of the military power’. 
Washington’s private network with civilian leaders 
Washington, as a former congressman, knew many of the delegates and used this 
shortcut to get what he wanted. From the beginning of the war, Washington befriended 
some influential delegates. Several letters were sent formally and privately to make 
requests. There were many influential delegates to Congress, of which John Adams 
of Massachusetts was one. It remains a matter of some debate whether Adams trusted 
in Washington’s military abilities and leadership, or whether he just saw his 
appointment as a way of controlling Washington, since even if Washington was 
appointed as the commander-in-chief, he still had to bow down to Congressional 
authority.  
 The relationship between Washington and Adams was nonetheless 
complicated. Adams obviously believed in his ability to inspire Southern 
participation, but he rarely spoke of Washington’s leadership or military skills. He 
instead admired and paid much respect to Charles Lee and Horatio Gates. In one letter 
he wrote, ‘Lee and Gates are experienced officers [. . .] of such great experience and 
confessed abilities, that I thought their advice, in a council of officers might be of 
great advantages to us’.73 Throughout the war, Washington and Adams wrote more 
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than ten letters to each other, and more than half of them were Adams’s 
recommendations for new staff. Washington once requested that Adams give food to 
one of his men.74 As Adams promoted his own position, Washington did the same. 
There is no evidence to suggest that Washington and Adams did not get along. 
Washington certainly wanted to create the army in his own style. Adams, as one of 
the most influential founding fathers who sought permanent separation from Britain, 
from the beginning just wanted to make sure that the nation would never end up a 
military dictatorship. There was enough agreement between them to work together 
and respect each other. Still, Washington seems to have felt more comfortable making 
requests for aid from other members of Congress.  
 Washington regularly sent official and private letters to the president of 
Congress as well as to other influential delegates. He clearly understood that Congress 
had limited his power. Some of the members of Congress were lobbying to appoint a 
military staff. The event that proved decisive happened on August 1, 1777. Congress 
replaced Philip Schuyler, a commander of the northern department, with Horatio 
Gates. Congress did ask Washington’s opinion on the new commander; however, 
Congress excused him from naming a different commander and appointed the one it 
wanted. The delegates gave the reason that, ‘We take the Liberty to signifie to your 
Excellency that in our Opinion, no Man will be more likely; to restore, Harmony, 
Order and Discipline, and retrieve our Affairs in that Quarter, than Majr. Genll. Gates. 
He has on Experience acquired the Confidence, and stands high in the Esteem of the 
eastern States and Troops’.75 From that point on, Washington considered the northern 
department to be under the Congress’s control, rather than his command.  
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 To accomplish his goals, Washington turned to other influential delegates to 
build a network to get what he wanted for the army. The three men who he wrote to 
the most were: John Hancock, Jonathan Trumbull governor of Connecticut, and 
Joseph Reed of Pennsylvania. It is understandable that Washington and Hancock 
talked a lot because one was the president and one was the commander-in-chief. They 
were also good friends, and in 1778 Hancock named his only son John George 
Washington Hancock. He admired and supported Washington by raising supplies, 
money, and troops for Washington’s army. In the siege of Newport, Rhode Island, 
under the command of John Sullivan, Washington wrote him to raise 5,000 men and 
send a number of militiamen for reinforcement.76 He was authorized by Congress to 
call for aid from New York and New Jersey, and Hancock also sent him 6,000 
Massachusetts men under his command to join the effort.  
 One of Washington’s closest friends and advisors was Jonathan Trumbull. 
Trumbull served as governor in both pre-revolutionary and post-revolutionary 
Connecticut. When Washington was desperate for supplies, he turned to Trumbull:  
Upon the Subject of Powder, I am at a Loss what to say, our Necesseties are 
so great, and it [is]3 of such infinite Importance, that this Army should have a 
full Supply […] Sir be pleased to give us your Assistance, by taking this Matter 
into your hands to Direct, in which I have not the least Doubt, you will attend 
as well to the Expence, as other Circumstances conducive to the public 
Service.77  
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Again, when he needed arms or utensils, he wrote to Trumbull, ‘I must earnestly 
sollicit your regard to their Arms, Blankets, Cloathing, Kettles and Ammunition, that 
they may come as well provided with these necessary articles as they possibly can’78, 
or ‘I find we are greatly deficient in the article of Ball, and as I understand a large 
quantity of Lead has been manufactured at Middletown in your Government, I must 
beg the favor of you to forward as much as you can spare to me, as soon as possible’.79  
When he needed qualified men, he was not hesitant to make a request to Trumbull:  
I sincerely wish this Camp could furnish a good Engineer—The Commisary 
Genl can inform you how excedingly deficient the Army is of Gentlemen 
skilled  in that branch of business; and that most of the works which have been 
thrown up for the defence of our several Encampments have been planned by 
a few of the principal Officers of this Army, assisted by Mr Knox a Gentleman 
of Worcester—Could I afford you the desired assistance in this way I should 
do it with pleasure.80 
He even called on Trumbull when seeking to show guests hospitality:  
I beg leave to recommend to your kind notice Monsieurs Pennet and De 
Pliarne two French Gentlemen who came here last night [. . .] I pray the favor 
of you to supply them with such necessaries as they may want and have 
Carriages provided for expediting their journey as much as possible.81  
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The relationship between Washington and other Congressmen from the start went on 
smoothly up until the winter of 1777, when he lost three battles in Brandywine, Paoli, 
and Germantown. The British captured Philadelphia, which disgracefully forced 
Congress to move to York, Pennsylvania. The loss from the Battle of Brandywine 
greatly affected American morale. However, good news arrived from Saratoga. 
Burgoyne’s troops had been defeated by General Horatio Gates. (Less than a month 
before, Congress had replaced General Philip Schuyler with Gates). It was America’s 
first outstanding victory, which resulted in the capture of Burgoyne and six thousand 
British prisoners of war. The path to triumph for the Americans now became clearer. 
Gates at that time was a hero with his distinct victory, and with much criticism and 
discontent about Washington’s army, Congress determined to appoint General Gates 
as a President of Board of War on 27 November 1777. 82    
 Washington’s reputation and leadership was disparaged. Jonathan Dickinson, 
a sergeant who became Attorney General of Pennsylvania, wrote to James Lovell on 
November 20, 1777:  
Thousands of Lives and millions of Property are yearly sacrificed to the 
insufficiency of our commander-in-chief. Two battles he has lost for us by two 
such Blunders as might have disgraced a Soldier of three months standing, and 
yet we are so attached to this Man that I fear we shall rather sink with him than 
throw him off our Shoulders’.83 
Moreover, Washington’s power was challenged by General Horatio Gates. Thomas 
Mifflin openly criticized Washington and urged Congress to replace him with Gates. 
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Richard Henry Lee wrote a letter to Samuel Adams telling Mifflin’s will, ‘He urges 
strongly the necessity of having Gen. Gates to be president of new Board of War. He 
thinks the military knowledge and the authority of Gates necessary to procure the 
indispensable changes in our army. I believed he is right’.84 Thomas Conway also 
wrote to Gates and reprimanded Washington, ‘Heaven has been determined to save 
your Country; or a weak Genl and bad Counsellors would have ruined it’.85  
 Washington then faced Congress’ check-up on his winter camp at Valley 
Forge according to his reports and complaint about the lack food and supplies. In other 
words, the relationship between Congress and the commander-in-chief came to its 
lowest ebb. Congress, on December 24, 1777, appointed a committee composed of 
Elbridge Gerry, Jonathan Bayard Smith, John Witherspoon, Francis Dana, Joseph 
Reed, Nathaniel Folsom, Gouverneur Morris and John Harvie to inspect 
Washington’s army. The letter from Congress to Washington openly stated its 
dissatisfaction: 
Among the many reasons offered against a Winters Campaign we were sorry 
to observe one of the most prevalent was a general discontent in the army and 
especially among the Officers. These discontents are ascribed to various 
causes  and we doubt not many of them are well founded and deserve 
particular attention, and in the course of the present Winter, will be taken into 
consideration by Congress, and we hope effectually remedied. That a reform 
may take place in the army, and proper discipline be introduced, we wish to 
see the Military placed on such a footing as may make a Commission a 
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desirable object to the Officer, and his Rank preserved from degradation & 
contempt, for these purposes we intend to recommend to Congress.86 
A committee arrived at the camp and was shocked to find a ‘skeleton of an army’. The 
men were starving, in poor health, and was as discouraged as Washington claimed. 
Gouverneur Morris wrote letters to George Clinton Lieutenant Governor of New York 
on February 17 requesting his assistance in terms similar to those used by Washington: 
A part of the army has been a week, without any kind of flesh & the rest three 
or four days. Naked and starving as they are, we cannot eno⟨ugh⟩ admire the 
incomparable patience and fidelity of the soldiery, that they have not been, ere 
this, excited by their sufferings, to a general mutiny and dispersion […] The 
Skeleton of an Army presents itself to our eyes in a naked starving Condition 
out of Health out of Spirits.87  
Congress, moreover, started dealing with foreign cooperation in 1777, and this 
dialogue became more intense in 1778. Many European officers flocked to the 
country. Other than that, some internal issues such as jealousy among the delegates 
and military leaders, desertion, royalists, Indian resistance, and popular uprisings in 
some colonies needed attention. The army command fell largely to Washington, and 
his power was much enhanced. In March 1778, he was authorized to employ 
American Indians with the army,88 and he increased his authority to negotiate prisoner 
exchanges.89 In April, Congress empowered Washington to call up the New Jersey, 
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Pennsylvania, and Maryland militias.90 In June, Congress directed Washington to 
‘proceed in arranging’ the army.91 Besides, longer enlistments were approved this 
year.92 
 Between 1779 and 1781, Congress had its highest confidence in Washington. 
The war was more intensive, and America made a strong decision to reject a British 
peace proposal. In 1777-1780 enlistment terms extended to three years or to the length 
of the war to avoid the year-end crises that reduced forces. Congress’ main roles 
included communicating and making plans with—and requesting supplies from—
their allies. During these years, America and France worked together on Canadian and 
state plans. Congress resolved to reassure France that the United States ‘will not 
conclude either truce or peace…without [her] formal consent’.93 In 1781, the only task 
that Congress gave Washington came in a message dated 4 September that instructed 
him to investigate the British treatment of prisoners.94 
Conclusion  
The Continental Army’s relationship with civilian institutions was also influenced by 
the British practice of managing forces—military under civilian control was based on 
public support which did not want to maintain the army if it was not necessary. The 
Americans only wanted the army to fight in the war, and everyone wanted to see the 
war end as soon as possible. It was the army that reflected much of the civilian aspect, 
even through the commander-in-chief’s practice. Washington acted as the glue in 
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every institution. The British commanders did not have to work the way Washington 
did. They did not have to go out of their way to do anything like this because they had 
a clear chain of command. The Continental Army, on the other hand, was not that 
transparent, because they lacked central legal power. So, their commanding approach 
was not direct, but based more on requesting and helping each other.  
 The problem was that the states could not fill their quotas and Congress was 
unable to draft enough men forced the army to employ militia service. The 
combination of regulars and militia in the same force fighting in the battle made the 
Continental Army peculiar. These two tend to be confounded into one entity even if 
their duties were different—the Continentals fought in the actual war, while the militia 
patrolled, raided, gathered information, and guarded the main troops. Militiamen had 
to protect their own colony/state and preventing the Tories from aiding the British 
soldiers by providing food, supplies and information. Moreover, the militia sometimes 
acted as substitutes in their region if Congress could not acquire enough men to fulfil 
the rank and file.  
 The army acted as a servant of the public purpose, not the monarchy. Even if 
Congress decided to create an actual army with support from the commander-in-chief 
and many of his staff officers, they did not mean to have it to perform with the same 
purpose as European armies. It was true that Congress ultimately was desperate to 
create a professional army, in order to meet the requirements of military tradition of 
the eighteenth-century warfare, for two main reasons: to obtain foreign assistance and 
to produce a well-trained army to the standard of European armies so the men could 
fight properly and effectively enough to confront the British regulars. Moreover, 
disciplined soldiers would obey their commanders, and that is the most crucial 
element of any army.  
- 96 - 
 
 The Americans started their army operations with citizens and notions of 
public virtue in an attempt to change it to something like the regulars of the European 
armies. However, the foundation of the American army was different from others, 
which had more effect on the army’s identity. The contribution of civilian power and 
influence governed the army and shaped what the force became. Americans’ belief in 
freedom and independence prevented the army from being a fully effective fighting 
force. But thoughts on military matters of the American people gradually changed—
they understood the need for an actual army, and they fully trusted their commander-
in-chief, who set a high, exemplary standard for American military commanders. The 
Continental Army then became partly professional, but did not reach the point of a 
full-scale army. The army was disbanded soon after the war ended and maintained a 
small size during peace time.  
 Congress was responsible for, and took control of, the army from the 
beginning of the war. They elected the commander-in-chief and chose his generals. 
Congress adopted methods to limit Washington’s power and to prevent the misuse of 
a standing army. However, this practice gradually changed as the war played out. 
Congress found itself forced to deal with many issues and operations such as 
communicating about and requesting foreign assistance. The fall of New York in 1776 
also proved Congress wrong in its intention to retain absolute control and command 
over the army and its commander. Congress’ idea of short-term recruitment also did 
not work for this long war. All these matters forced Congressional delegates to rethink 
their military strategy. Washington himself tried to obtain what he wanted by lobbying 
some influential delegates privately. Congress learned to trust Washington by working 
with him over an extended period of time. They decided to give him extraordinary 
power and leave the majority of military matters in his hands after 1777. Washington 
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surely became something of a military dictator, but there is no evidence of his misuse 
of power. 
 Selecting Washington as a military commander was one of the best decisions 
Congress made. This was by no mean an accident. The delegates had good reasons to 
make this decision. Washington was a wealthy, American-born gentleman with wide 
connections, as well as one of the First Congress members, making it easy for the 
delegates to work with him. His military leadership skills and experience in the French 
and Indian War as a colonel in the militia of the British Province of Virginia was also 
considered—and this was the thing that most members of Congress sorely lacked. 
There were many times that Congress could not decide on what to do and who to 
appoint, so they delegated to Washington to make a judgment. And the last reason, 
which was significantly important, was his basic good intentions and his sacrifice in 
his service for the American cause. Washington was truly a symbol of American 
virtue. In 1778, he was referred as ‘a Man of approved Spirit & Conduct in whom the 
greatest Confidence may be safely reposed’.95  He represented both military and 
civilian sphere. And for the Americans he was an ideal combination of a revolutionary 
warrior and a patriot.   
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Chapter 3 Military Literature 
 
Introduction 
Before the Continental Army was assisted and supervised by foreign officers, 
America did not have military experts or technicians, so American officers needed to 
educate themselves and find a proper exercise to train the men by reading military 
literature. American officers who were commissioned by the Continental Army were 
experienced in the colonial militia service, and only a few had been in the British 
army. The men who made up the troops were citizens who lacked the experience 
needed for the army to function professionally. The Americans’ only fighting 
experience in an actual war was when they served the British army in the French and 
Indian War. There was no military school to teach and train officers and men properly 
in the colonies. The shortcut to gain military knowledge was to read available books 
on the subject.  
 Washington knew that reading military literature was vital. He realized that 
lack of military education was a problem since he was first commissioned as a 
Virginian provincial officer. When he was elected as the first commander-in-chief of 
American army, sources of military knowledge were limited. The best option was to 
read, since it provided essential instruction when teachers could not be found or 
afforded. Washington noted in his suspension and admonition to his officers in 1756 
that, ‘Do not forget, that there ought to be a time appropriated to attain this knowledge; 
as well as to indulge pleasure. And as we now have no opportunities to improve from 
example; let us read, for this desirable end’.1  
                                                 
1 ‘Address, 8 January 1756,’ The Papers of George Washington, Colonial Series, vol. 2, 14 August 
1755 – 15 April 1756, ed. by W. W. Abbot (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1983), pp. 
256–258. 
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 Washington had desired military knowledge and a commission in the British 
army since he was young. In 1755 he wrote to Robert Orme, a principle aide-de-camp 
to Major General Edward Braddock when he got invited to serve under Braddock that 
this opportunity was ‘the laudable desire’ that he was able to serve his King & Country 
and he wished ‘earnestly to attain some knowledge on the Military Profession’.2 After 
he was elected a general commander of the first actual American army, he wished to 
pursue professionalism in the Continental Army.  
 Washington as a commander-in-chief was responsible for all matters related 
to training, drill, and discipline as well as to occasionally initiate and enforce major 
reforms in the field. Given their admiration of the British Army, it is not surprising to 
discover that the Continental and British armies were using many of the same military 
texts, rules, drills and manuals throughout the Revolutionary War. Following the 
British and French models meant that the American needed the same textbooks to 
guide them. 
 It is important to keep in mind that the Revolutionary War lasted eight years, 
and the army was established during the first year. To create an efficient army in such 
a short time, Washington and his men had to seek manuals to guide regulations and 
military exercises in order to achieve military discipline. Washington ordered books 
according to his personal preferences and by other officers’ suggestion. Later on, 
many of them were reprinted in America, indicating their popularity and wide appeal 
among the officers. Moreover, some new books were written and published during 
the war. Military literature, therefore, can be described as a facet of European 
                                                 
2 Abbot, ed., ‘From George Washington to Robert Orme, 15 March 1755,’ vol. 1, pp. 242–245. 
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contribution and relationship-building across the continents because both the British 
and Continental armies shared many military books.  
 The books mentioned in this chapter were mainly gathered from Washington’s 
own collection of military manuals now held by the Library of Congress, and from 
the recommendation made in the correspondence between Washington and his 
officers. Self-education was a common characteristic of the American officers during 
the Revolutionary War. Henry Knox, the chief of artillery, was an excellent example 
of a self-learning officer. Knox was a bookseller in Boston. He had studied military 
matters by reading, and this was known by John Thomas, a brigadier general from 
Boston. Thomas introduced Knox to John Adams, ‘I have had Some Acquaintance 
[Josiah Waters and Henry Knox] with, the first I take to be judicious, and has by 
Reading, Obtained a Theoretical Knowledge, in fortifications. I have been Pleased 
with Some of his Projections’.3 Therefore Knox and Waters teamed up to make a plan 
for fortifications at Roxbury even at that time Knox was not yet in the army yet.  
Washington and Lee were impressed by the two men’s work. Knox was 
praised much by the two generals as he wrote to his wife, ‘Yesterday as I was going 
to Cambridge I met the Generals who beg’d me to return to roxbury again which I did 
when they had [viewd] the works they express’d the greatest pleasure & surprize at 
their situation and apparent utility to say nothing of the plan which did not escape 
their praise’.4 On Washington’s recommendation on November 17, 1775 he was then 
appointed a colonel of artillery to replace Colonel Gridley.5  Knox inspired other 
officers that military knowledge could be achieved by reading. He helped Washington 
                                                 
3 Taylor, ed., ‘To John Adams from John Thomas, 24 October 1775,’ vol. 3, pp. 239–241. 
4 ‘Knox, Henry to Lucy Knox, 6 July 1775,’ in The Gilder Lehrman Institute of American History, 
<https://www.gilderlehrman.org/collections/bc309e24-0820-48b8-b40d-102043727626> [accessed 
15 April 2017]. 
5 Ford ed., vol.3, pp. 385–59, 399. 
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reorganize artillery regiments. Many of his letters mentioned a list of technical 
readings he recommended to Congress for purchase.  
 In the first year of the war it was not only military leaders made an attempt to 
acquire books for their army, Congress also paid attention to this matter. John Adams 
was one who had been against the idea of a standing army, but when the need to create 
an actual army reached a state of public awareness, he supported the idea of military 
education among the officers. As the war continued, in 1780 he saw the benefits of 
the officers’ acquiring and reading military literature, ‘The American officers have 
however been industrious, they have had the Advantage of reading all the Books 
which have any Reputation concerning military science’.6 He concluded that at this 
time ‘the Art of War is now as well understood in the American Army’.7 
 John Adams also discussed military reading with William Tudor, a lawyer and 
a judge advocate of the Continental Army, and requested a list of science materials 
for young officers to read, ‘I want to know what Books upon Martial Science are to 
be found in the Army, and whether, among the many young Gentlemen in the service, 
any of them are studious of the Principles of the Art’. Adams knew how difficult to 
acquire the materials, and this was such a problem to improve the officers’ 
capabilities, ‘It is a shame for Youths of Genius and Education to be in the Army, 
without exerting themselves to become Masters of the Profession. If it is objected that 
Books are not to be had, Measures ought to be taken to procure them’. 8 However, in 
the letter Adams had a list of books in mind, and those in fact appeared to be used in 
                                                 
6 ‘10. To Hendrik Calkoen, 16 October 1780,’ The Adams Papers, Papers of John Adams, vol. 10, July 
1780 – December 1780, ed. by Gregg L. Lint and Richard Alan Ryerson (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1996), pp. 226–229. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Taylor, ed., ‘From John Adams to William Tudor, 12 October 1775,’ vol. 3, pp. 194–196. 
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the army later on. They were Dalrymple’s Military Essay of 1761,9 Maurice de 
Saxes’s Reveries10, Le Blonds’s Military Engineer,11 Muller’s A Treatise of 
Artillery,12 Major Young’s Maneuvres for a Battalion of Infantry,13 Simes’ Military 
Guide,14 Prussian Field Regulations, King of Prussia’s Advice to young officers,15 
Pleydell’s Field Fortification,16 and Simes’s Medley17. 
 Military literature used by the British is listed in John Houlding’s Fit for 
Service: The Training of the British Army, 1715–1795 and Ira D. Gruber’s Books and 
the British Army in the Age of the American Revolution. Houlding’s work has been 
acknowledged as the best organized and comprehensive list of British military 
manuals used in the eighteenth century. It elucidated the British government’s 
selection of writings from the War of Spanish Succession until the War of the French 
Revolution. The manuals were written by the British military authorities, officers, and 
scholars and covered drills, tactics and strategy, engineering, artillery, amphibious 
operations, and history. Gruber focuses on the importance of particular books during 
this period, and explores the British officers’ preference for certain works which were 
                                                 
9 Cambell Dalrympe, A Military Essay Containing Reflections on the Raising, Arming, Cloathing, 
and Discipline of the British Infantry and Cavalry; with Proposals for the Improvement of the Same 
(London: D. Wilson, 1761). 
10 Maurice, comte de Saxe, Reveries, or Memoirs upon the Art of War, by Field-Marshal Count Saxe. 
Translated from the French (London:  J. Nourse, 1757). 
11 Guillaume Le Blond, A Treatise of Artillery or, of the arms and machines used in war since the 
invention of gunpowder (London: E. Cave, 1746). 
12 John Muller, A Treatise of Artillery (Philadelphia: Styner and Cist, 1779). 
13 William Young, Sir, Manoeuvres, or Practical Observations on the Art of War (London: J. Millan, 
1776). 
14 Thomas Simes, The military medley, containing the most necessary rules and directions for 
attaining a competent knowledge of the art (Dublin: S. Powell, 1767). 
15 Frederick II, King of Prussia, Military Instructions, written by the King of Prussia, for the generals 
of his army: Being His Majesty's own Commentaries On his former Campaigns, Together with short 
instructions for the use of his light troops, illustrated with copper-plates, translated by an officer, 
(London: T. Becket and P. A. de Hondt, 1762). 
16 J. C. Pleydell, An Essay on Field Fortification (London: J. Nourse, Bookseller to His Majesty, 
1768). 
17 Thomas Simes, The military guide for young officers, containing a system of the art of war 
[electronic resource] : Parade, camp, field duty; manoeuvres, standing and general orders; 
warrants, regulations, returns; tables, forms, extracts from military acts; battles, sieges, forts, ports, 
military dictionary, &c. With twenty-five maps and copper plates. By Thomas Simes, Esq. author of 
the Military Medley. 
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drawn from the collection of early modern war books in the Anderson House Library 
of the Society of the Cincinnati in Washington, D.C. Fit for Service combined with 
Gruber’s Books and the British Army provides a thorough analysis of officers’ book 
choices, as well as a complete list of military books used by the British soldiers. 
 These lists of books used by both the British and American officers can be 
divided into two main groups: books that were shared by the British and Continental 
armies, plus separate choices made by the British, and books that were used by the 
Continental Army and printed in America in particular. How can we know that those 
textbooks have been read and applied in the battle field? This question is difficult to 
answer in the absence of direct testimony on reading habits; however, it can be 
addressed in different ways. Firstly, books are mentioned in the correspondence of 
Continental Army officers. Secondly, the print history of the book can be examined, 
for examples looking at number and frequency of reprints and editions. Also, points 
can be gleaned from their physical characteristics, such as if it is concise or not too 
bulky to carry around. Lastly, we have some surviving copies that contain annotations 
by the owner. This chapter plans to use the propagation of military literature during 
the Revolutionary War to explore relationships across continents and European 
influences on the Continental Army, focusing on key shared texts as well as those they 
used exclusively by each.  
 The selection of military books to be examined can affect the conclusion of 
this research. It should be noted that there were many kinds of military writings, which 
targeted different audiences and fulfilled different purposes. Spreading across the 
British and Continental armies were works reflecting eighteenth-century military 
thought. These could be categorized as theoretical texts, such as the essay and the 
treatise, and practical books such as handbooks. These books often had a particular 
- 104 - 
 
audience in mind. Some content was written for the militia officers and sergeants, 
while others were written to educate and advise young and new officers. Others were 
published for experienced officers to enhance their vision in strategic and tactical 
planning. The drill book itself has been categorised at a different level. Throughout 
the eighteenth century, the drill practiced in each regiment (horse or foot) consisted 
of five main elements known as the ‘manual exercise’, the ‘platoon exercise’, the 
‘evolutions’, the ‘firings’, and the ‘manoeuvres’.18  It was with any or all of these 
elements that each of the several regulations and orders issued by the central 
authorities dealt, whether in whole or in part. Nevertheless, all the material ultimately 
aimed to serve the same purpose: training, regulation, and instruction for officers’ 
desired discipline: ‘A system of training could be known as “a discipline.”’19 
Soldiering is more than job, but it was a way of life.20 Training is preparation and 
making him a better skilled warrior, and disciplinarily ready to take dangers.21 
Discipline was designed for producing obedience diffusing in every aspect of soldiers’ 
life. 
Military books shared by British and Continental armies 
During the eight years of the war, there were more than thirty books used across the 
British and Continental armies. Fourteen of them, which were drawn primarily from 
military books published throughout the Revolutionary war, were shared. All these 
fourteen texts were originally published in England, but only four of them were 
subsequently printed in America. These were The 1764 Regulations: the New Manual, 
Platoon, Review Dispositions Firing and Manoeuvres; General James Wolfe’s 
                                                 
18 J.A. Houlding, Fit for Service: The Training of the British Army, 1715-1795 (New York: Clarendon 
Press, 1981), pp. 160-161. 
19 Matthew McCornmack, ‘Citizen Soldiers’ in Soldiering in Britain and Ireland, 1750-1850, ed. by 
Catriona Kennedy and Matthew McCornmack (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), p. 162. 
20 Sylvia Frey, The British Soldier in America (Austin Texas: University of Texas Press, 1981), p. 94.  
21 Ibid. 
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Instruction for Young Officers, Military Instructions for Officers by Roger Stevenson 
and John Muller’s A Treatise of Artillery. However, other books were owned, noted 
and exchanged among the Continental Army’s commanders. This list, in addition, will 
be discussed in greater detail by taking into consideration the books used only by the 
British.  
 The first genre of military literature is the handbook. The popularity and the 
number of editions of The 1764 Regulations make it stand out among other 
publications. The earliest copy was printed in 1766 in London and New York. Its 
regulations specifically contained positions of soldiers under arms and provided 
explanations of manual exercises. The new review procedure and manoeuvre, 
although designed for use only among the English regiments and first introduced there 
in 1764, had spread abroad unofficially and by 1768 was the standard practice 
followed everywhere the British army was stationed. These new drill manoeuvres 
were chosen for standardization because they were considered a comprehensive 
selection from the overall body of manoeuvres generally practised at the time. The 
1764 Regulations remained the standard drill of the British army as a whole until 
1778; during that period, it was often reprinted and was widely available. Indeed, no 
eighteenth-century drill book was so widely or frequently reprinted as particular 
elements or the whole of the 1764 Regulations.  
 The 1764 Regulations was actually used to train the militiamen who formed 
the army of Boston in 1775. Congress recommended it to Washington to ‘use their 
utmost endeavours to make themselves masters of the military exercise published by 
order of his majesty in 1764’.22 So, Washington ordered six copies of it.23 The book 
                                                 
22 Abbot, ed., ‘Resolutions of Fairfax County Committee, 17 January 1775,’ vol. 10, pp. 236–237. 
23 A. P. C. Griffin, Catalogue of the Washington Collection in the Boston Athenaeum, Boston, 1897, 
pp. 135–6. 
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was also printed in America. As many as twenty-six American imprints were created 
between 1766 and 1780, and ten editions were made from 1775 onwards: in New York 
in 1766, 1769, 1773, 1775, and 1780; Boston in 1774 and 1780; Philadelphia in 1775–
1776; Wilmington, Delaware in 1775; Providence, Rhode Island in 1774; Lancaster, 
Pennsylvania in 1775; and Newburyport, Massachusetts in 1774. It was used by most 
military units in America until it was replaced by Baron Von Steuben’s manual in 
1779.24 
 Both the British and American forces, which were certain to increase in size 
for the upcoming war of 1775-1783, demanded more copies from the publishers.25 
There are several reasons for its popularity across the Atlantic. As the British led, the 
Americans followed. Finally this publication was obviously selected because it was 
popular among the British, and the American wanted to copy their style of training. 
In addition, the book gained popularity among the two armies since it was concise, 
containing only thirty-eight pages. It explained all of the basic positions of a soldier 
under arms, the practices of priming and loading, and the position of each rank in the 
firing. Secondly, using British drills helped make the colonial soldiers feel more 
secure by commencing with the prominent British manual. This confidence in British 
drill is reflected by the fact that many new American publications drew heavily upon 
the 1764 Regulations, such as Lewis Nicola’s A Treatise of Military Exercise used by 
Philadelphia’s troops, and Timothy Pickering’s An Easy Plan of Discipline for the 
Militia. These drill books share the same characteristics by emphasizing subtle details 
of motions and movement, especially standing still. This publication was the most 
popular and the only pure drill book both armies shared.  
                                                 
24 Friedrich von Steuben, Regulations for the Order and Discipline of the Troops of the United States 
(Philadelphia: Styner and Cist, 1779), p. 3. 
25 Houlding, p. 214. 
- 107 - 
 
 The next category of military literature was the treatise, larger works that went 
beyond drill to consider wider roles within the military, management of units and even 
military philosophy. Humphrey Bland’s A Treatise of Military Discipline was a dense 
explanation of the duties of officers and soldiers. It may be considered one of the most 
well-read books in the British army and was reprinted in seven editions, between 
1727–1753. Washington had read Bland since he served in the British provincial 
militia, as he saw that the book was full of essential military information.26 When 
Steuben arrived at Valley Forge in 1778, he found that only two military books had 
been used by Washington: those of Bland and Simes.27 This book was not printed in 
America during the war, but Washington ordered it from England in 1775, and was 
sent the 1727 edition.28  
 The book was written for young officers, and the context emphasized the 
importance of their duties. Thinking carefully that he had a new-born army with a lot 
of inexperienced officers, Washington relied on this book to help him improve the 
officer corps, as the aim of this book was written to pass on military experience. As 
Bland put it in his introduction:  
Considering how few old Officers remain, and that they are diminishing every 
Day, I hope I shall not be censured for having ventured to commit to Writing 
the little Knowledge I have acquired in Military matters for the Instruction of 
those who are yet to learn; who, in a little time longer, if they have no 
                                                 
26 Abbot, ‘Address, 8 January 1756,’ vol. 2, pp. 256–258. 
27 Fred Kapp, Life of Steuben (New York: Mason Brothers, 1895), p. 130.  
28 Catalogue of the Washington Collection in the Boston Athenaeum, compiled and annotated by 
Appleton P. C. Griffin, Internet Archive (2007) < 
http://www.archive.org/details/catalogueofwashiOObostuoft> [accessed 17 February 2014]. 
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opportunity of going Abroad, and wanting the Example of Old Officers to 
guide them.29  
This complex treatise was no doubt popular among the British officers because it was 
written by the British officer at a time when the military book market was dominated 
by foreign texts. It consisted of twenty chapters that covered every principle which 
might be required both for training and on the battlefield. It contained information 
about organizing and managing major events, including directions for the forming of 
battalions, and many little details such as visiting the soldiers’ quarters and hospital. 
The treatise also provided tactical advice, such as directions for how a foot battalion 
should defend itself when attacked by horse,30 and it includes the grand division,31 as 
well as rules for encamping an army. The treatise contains not only regulations and 
military discipline procedures but also many types of exercise: manual exercise, 
platoon exercise, firing and evolutions. It also was a British engineer textbook, which 
contains the duties of the troops at siege.         
 Bland’s work inspired another text that was used by only the British army, 
Capt. Bennett Cuthbertson’s A System for the Compleat Interior Management and 
Economy of a Battalion of Infantry. The Continental Army did not adopt this book 
which was specific to the British army presumably because the American officers 
preferred Bland’s treatise which covers with a wider variety of British military 
discipline, and officer’s and soldier’s duty. It offered a deep knowledge of regimental 
affairs, including a section on the regular exercising and manoeuvring of the battalion 
and a suggestion of light company training. Having served as adjutant for twelve 
                                                 
29 Humphrey Bland, A Treatise of Military Discipline, 7th edn. (London: John and Paul Knapton, 1753), 
p. 7. 
30 Ibid., p.126.  
31 Ibid., p.134.  
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years, Cuthbertson claimed that many treatises he had seen in that century from 
French, German and a few British officers, except Bland’s, were all designed for 
generals.32 Therefore, he aimed in his book to write to instruct the lower ranks of the 
profession and pass on knowledge of how to manage a company or battalion of young 
officers.33 He focused more on life and actions rather than armies, routes of columns 
or battle plans, and urged young officers to become familiar with this small version 
of memoirs or reveries and be skilled with the interior duties. This medium-sized book 
contained up to thirty chapters that gather all the essential managing approaches, such 
as qualifications to be sergeant major, drum and fire major; treatment of the sick and 
management of a regimental hospital; clothing; arms care such as the method for 
keeping arms and accoutrements in the best condition and preserving ammunition 
from being damaged; some basic rules of recruiting, courts-martial and punishment; 
and life events such as marriage of non-commissioned officers and soldiers and 
methods for preventing improper ones as much as possible, burial of non-
commissioned officers and soldiers. 
 Another similar book shared by both the armies was Thomas Simes’s A 
Treatise on the Military Science. This was considered one of the most famous British 
treatises as well. This book was first printed in London in 1780. It differed in its 
editorial and included advertisements, and a special part was dedicated to its 
subscribers whose names were printed in the first part of the book to prove its 
popularity.  The book claims to draw on several ancient disciplines and retains other 
military knowledge quoted from other British officers. However, the manoeuvring of 
British troops extracted from the ancient texts had been removed or changed since the 
                                                 
32 Bennett Cuthbertson, A System for the Compleat Interior Management and Economy of a Battalion 
of Infantry (Bristol: Rouths and Nelson, 1776), p. vii. 
33 Ibid., p. viii. 
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formation of light infantry in that time of the theatre of war. This book was divided 
into two major sections: the first section involved preparations before taking the field 
and the march of an army upon leaving its quarters to go to the cantonment, and the 
second involved the attack and defence of a military post. Apart from these subjects, 
the book touched on punishment by mentioning the historical method of punishment, 
specifically the manner in which Spico suppressed and punished sedition that occurred 
in the Roman Army; it then offered methods of preventing mutiny in the army. The 
last part involves the principle of matters of utility, duty and obligations of conduct.   
 The other book written by Simes that the American and British shared was A 
Military Course for the Government and Conduct of a Battalion, printed in London, 
1777. This long book was ordered by Washington but not published in America. This 
book was made particularly for the British army to deal with the rebellious conduct of 
the Americans since Simes saw that it was necessary to publish some instructions for 
the young and unexperienced officers. The book was designed for regulations in 
quarters, camp and garrison. It contains seven parts of varied information, and is 
basically a variety of regulations and disciplines. Both Simes’ works reflect the British 
military mindset, so it is not surprising that the American had to acquire them. 
 James Wolfe’s Instructions to Young Officers was one of favoured texts 
among the leaders in both armies. It is a collection of daily orders on routine 
regimentation for the British foot. It is distinguished in terms of its approach to 
military seniority which aims to teach ‘young officers’ what was expected from them. 
This concise work would benefit the Americans even more because they were 
sculpting new officers, and it was printed in Philadelphia in 1778. The book 
emphasizes the duty of officers to obey their superiors’ orders and punctually execute 
their own orders rather than learning exercises, saluting, firing in the platoon, 
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mounting guards, and exposing their men on the day of battle.34 It helped young and 
uninformed officers to perfect matters of firelock in a short time so they could train 
other young soldiers. It taught other necessary information, such as learning the names 
of persons in the company they belonged to, observing men’s dress, their pay, and 
visiting company quarters at least thrice a week to check for cleanliness.  
 The other similar title, Roger Stevenson’s Military Instructions for Officers, 
was first published in London, 1770, and reprinted in Philadelphia in 1775 for the 
honourable George Washington and edited for the situation of the revolution. This 
work was one of the most practical books, and suited a new army like the Continental 
Army ‘in a country where every gentleman is a soldier and every soldier is a student 
in the art of war’.35 It expressed the necessity of following the military treatise when 
‘arms are the alternative of commerce; and a nation robbed of the one, and invaded 
by the other’36; it also offered encouragement and support from the editor and the 
publisher to Washington. The book itself was all about performing the operations 
rather than principles. It taught officers geometry and different ways of fortifying 
posts, churches, mills, other detached buildings, and villages. The book also explained 
small detachments of regulars and ‘partisan corps’ (light legions) which had been seen 
in most European armies during the 1740–1748 war and, more commonly, during the 
1756–1763 war and could by themselves conduct small operations of the greatest 
utility to their larger parent armies. Moreover, it offered instructions for going on 
detachment and secret marches, reconnoitring, defending posts and attacking posts; 
surprises and stratagems for seizing posts; and ambuscade and retreat. It was the only 
book used by both armies that illustrated plans of the manoeuvres necessary for 
                                                 
34 James Wolfe, General Wolfe’s Instructions to Young Officers (London: J. Millan, 1768), p. 13. 
35 Roger Stevenson, Military Instructions for Officers (Philadelphia: R. Aiken, 1775), p. 3. 
36 Ibid. 
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carrying on the petite guerre. It showed the formation of a partisan corps and its duties 
to perform reconnaissance, attack and defend posts, fortify villages and buildings, and 
conduct raids, ambuscades, and skirmishes.  
 The British also added one other of Simes’s books into their collection. The 
Regulator, or, Instructions to Form the Officer is one of the books that outline the 
administration and management responsibilities of a regiment. In this book, since he 
tried to describe the duties of all ranks in a regiment and illustrate the internal 
management and discipline of the regiment, and perhaps this was too specific 
information to appeal to the new Continental Army. Simes might have planned to 
write it because he had complained that he found the candidates for commissions to 
be not professionally qualified, as the duties were not mentioned clearly. He wrote, ‘I 
hope the time will come soon, when a particular description, by authority, of duties 
required from each commission in the Service, with a general view of every thing an 
Officer should be acquainted with, will accompany all Commissions’.37 
 The last type of military book explored the strategy, tactics and techniques of 
combat or in other words the ‘art of war’. One shared work was Major William 
Young’s Maneuvers, or Practical Observations on the Art of War is a manual of 
exercises and words of command offering the construction of a new system of 
fortification by making use of standing timber.38 This content was really useful when 
Washington’s troops arrived at Valley Forge during the winter of 1777, and the 
                                                 
37 Quoted in Houlding, pp. 219-20. 
38 William Young, Maneuvers, or Practical Observations on the Art of War (London: J. Millan, 1771), 
p. 79. 
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soldiers needed to find shelter to prevent wind and cold. The 12-man huts were built 
from standing timber found in valley.39  
 Field Marshal Count Saxe’s Reveries or Memoirs upon the Art of War was 
widely read in America. General Charles Lee referred to it in a letter to Washington. 
Lee also suggested the books for forming an army to Washington as he claimed that 
he had studied this subject really well and almost got his own writing published:  
I have given You must know that it has long been the object of my studies, 
how to form an army in the most simple manner possible—I once wrote a 
treatise tho I did not publish it, for the use of the Militia of England—by 
reading Machiavely institutions and Martial Saxe1 I have taken it into my head 
that I understand it better than almost any Man living.40  
General Henry Knox quoted it to John Adams, for example:  
There are a variety of Books translated into English which would be of great 
Service but none more so than the great Marechal Saxe ‘who stalks a God in 
war.’ Tis he who has done more towards reducing war to fix’d principles than 
perhaps any other man of the age. Indeed his Reflections on the propagation 
of the human Species are odd and whimsical, as they without hesitation put to 
death all the fine feelings of the human heart.41 
                                                 
39 Andrew Stough, ‘The American Revolution Month-by-Month January 1778’, Revolutionary War 
Historical Article, 
<http://www.revolutionarywararchives.org/index.php?view=article&catid=37%3Athe-american-
revolution-month-by-month&id=248%3Ajanuary-
1778&format=pdf&option=com_content&Itemid=59> [accessed 2 May 2014]. 
40 Hoth, ed., ‘To George Washington from Major General Charles Lee, 13 April 1778,’ vol. 14, pp. 
495–496. 
41 Henry Knox, ‘To John Adams from Henry Knox, 16 May 1776,’ in Papers of John Adams, Founders 
Online National Archive, < http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/06-04-02-0081> [accessed 
27 January 2014].  
- 114 - 
 
It is quite clear why Saxe was mentioned many times by American officers, since the 
book gives many different points and contents. As the title of the book implies, Saxe 
saw the mechanical part of war as uninteresting, and other art of war books gave 
principles but only a small amount of good opinion. He began with directions of 
administrating matters related to the manner of raising troops, clothing, subsisting, 
paying, exercising and forming the troops for action. Knox once again quoted it in 
other places, ‘I wish you to consult Marshall Saxe on the Chapter of paying the 
troops’.42 Saxe concentrated on recruitment and he initiated the idea of conscription 
as law which nobody could avoid: 
Would it not much be better to establish a law, obliging men of all conditions 
in life, to serve their king and country for the space of 5 years? A law, which 
could not reasonably be objected against, as it is both natural and just for 
people to be engaged in the defense of that state of which they constitute a 
part.43 
One chapter emphasized the cavalry and its armour, arms and accoutrements for man 
and horse, as well as the establishment of the cavalry with its manner of forming, 
engaging, marching, foraging, tent camping, and providing detachments or parties of 
light-armed service. In addition, the eighth chapter was devoted to the military 
discipline and disobedience was considered a crime. He wrote: 
Next to the forming of troops, military discipline is the first object that presents 
itself to our notice; it is the soul of all armies; and unless it be established 
amongst them with great prudence, and supported with unshaken resolution, 
                                                 
42 Henry Knox, ‘To John Adams from Henry Knox, 21 August 1776,’ in Papers of John Adams, 
Founders Online National Archive < http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/06-04-02-0225> 
[accessed 10 February 2014]. 
43 Maurice Count de Saxe, Marshal-General, Reveries, or, Memoirs Concerning the Art of War 
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they are no better than so many contemptible heaps of rabble, which are more 
dangerous to the very state that maintains them, than even its declared 
enemies.44  
There were also works for particular military units. Capt. Robert Hinde’s The 
Discipline of the Light-Horse devoted to a highly mobile cavalry. A similar text, 
written by Major General de Grandmaison, was found in America: A Treatise, on the 
Military Service of Light Horse, and Light Infantry, in the Field, and in Fortified 
Places, which was translated from the French by Major Lewis Nicola. It was 
addressed exclusively to the light dragoon regiments, whose cavalry officers would 
profit from the study of this book. It showed all aspects of the light dragoon service: 
interior management, arms, training and drills, clothing, accoutrements, horses, and 
active service conditions. 
 The next group of texts that influenced the development of the artillery was 
suggested by Henry Knox, the artillery leader. In his letter to John Adams, he wrote, 
‘Mullers Artillery and Hollidays principles of Gunnery Monsr. Clariac [Clairac] 
Mullers and Pleydells field fortification are Books so necessary for a people struggling 
for Liberty and Empire’.45 Knox mentioned two books for studying artillery. Both 
were written by British men. First, Muller’s A Treatise of Artillery initially described 
the gunnery. However, in the seventh of his eight parts devoted to artillery service at 
home and to service in war, he explained tactics to use in battle. This book intended 
to provide an understanding of artillery and the foundation of artillery tactics. It also 
described the commander’s responsibility in selecting the terrain for his artillery, 
identifying the point of attack of the enemy, servicing of individual pieces, selecting 
                                                 
44 Ibid., p. 2. 
45 Taylor, ed., ‘To John Adams from Henry Knox, 16 May 1776,’ vol. 4, pp. 189–191. 
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types of ammunition, assuring the safety of the cannon and crew and the positioning 
of powder carts. Other books of Muller’s were still ordered except this one since this 
book was popular enough to be printed in Philadelphia in 1779. Congress ordered 
‘100 Setts of Mullers Military Works in English except his ‘“Treatise of Artillery” of 
which there is no want’.46 
 The other book, Hollidays’ An Easy Introduction to Fortification and 
Practical Gunnery, was written particularly for English men.47 In this book, he 
omitted a description of the rules of gunnery, making it concise and ‘easy’. His book 
shows the importance of mathematics in ballistics and gunnery. Holidays insisted that 
it helped to keep an accurate account of shots and powder for any piece and to have 
an understanding of geometric trigonometry. 
 Knox also mentioned books for engineering. As he wrote, ‘I have This—There 
are others that are more scientific which those who intend to be a Warlike people had 
not ought to be without. Monsr. Clairac, Müller, & Pleydell held Engineering the most 
useful Kind of Fortification’.48 Lieutenant John Pleydell’s An Essay on Field 
Fortification Intended Principally for the Use of Officers of Infantry is the book 
designed for infantry officers on campaign in how to construct redoubts and other 
posts without the assistance of an engineer. The other engineering book was a French 
text, Louis-André de la Mamie Clairac’s L'ingénieur de champagne or The Field 
Engineer. The book was first published in 1749 and printed again in 1757. It was 
translated in 1758, 1760 and 1773. The 1773 version, which was translated by John 
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Muller, was imported to America. In this book the author argued that even though 
many wrote on the construction of fortification and the attack and defence of places, 
little had been written in regard to the necessary knowledge of an engineer in the field. 
This was divided into two different kinds: general principles (science) and action. He 
emphasized that speculative knowledge is sufficient to understand geometry, but 
much experience is necessary to give satisfactory instructions on the practical part. 
All the different parts of engineering were related to fortification. The book was 
distinguished by insisting that construction is an art including different objects and 
depending on so many circumstances.  
 In the early years of the war, the Continental Army could not find experienced 
and well-educated engineers, so their military fortifications were based on books’ 
guidelines. In 1776, the decision to make a fortification in Dorchester Heights in 
Massachusetts was made, and Washington recommended using ‘chandeliers,’ or 
portable breastworks, which consisted of a framework made of wood holding fascines, 
since the ground was frozen. 49 Lieutenant Colonel Rufus Putnam, a chief engineer of 
northern campaign, was responsible for building fortifications. He picked the 
translation of an engineering book of Louis André de La Mamie de Clairac’s, The 
Field Engineer, to be a guideline for this work and read from the start, ‘I found the 
word, Chandiliears, what is that thought I [.] it is something I never heard of before, 
but no sooner did I turn to the page where it was described with its use’.50 The purpose 
of this plan was put a lodgement on Dorchester Heights as a part of a plan to oblige 
‘the enemy to Leve Boston’.51                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
                                                 
49 Chase, ed., ‘From George Washington to Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Reed, 26 February–9 March 
1776,’ vol. 3, pp. 369–379. 
50 Rufus Putnam, The Memoirs of Rufus Putnam and Certain Official Papers and Correspondence, ed. 
by Rowena Buell Marietta (Ohio: The National Society of the Colonial Dames, 1903), p. 58.  
51 Ibid. 
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The Military Books Used by the Continental Army 
Some of the military textbooks used by the Continental Army were ordered from 
England; however, many were made and reprinted in America. The evidence appeared 
in Military Manuals from Washington’s own collection, which is now located in the 
Library of Congress. It provides a great list of works, including fifty books of 
eighteenth-century military literature that cover strategies, tactics and ordinances. The 
collection also covered the famous ‘Washington’s five books’.52 This list of military 
books was discussed in the correspondence between Colonel William Woodford to 
Washington. In November 1775, Woodford, writing from Virginia, asked for advice 
from the new commander-in-chief. Washington gave many suggestions and also 
recommended five military books for study: 
As to the manual exercise, the evolutions and manoeuvres of a regiment, with 
other knowledge necessary to the soldier, you will acquire them from those 
authors who have treated upon these subjects, among whom Bland (the newest 
edition) stands foremost; also an Essay on the Art of War; Instructions for 
Officers, lately published at Philadelphia; the Partisan; Young, and others.53  
According to the letter, the five books were published in English and French, which 
is not surprising since the British officers in the eighteenth century preferred French 
texts. Humphrey Bland’s A Treatise of Military Discipline was the longest English 
military writing of the century. The first edition was owned by George Washington, 
which dated from 1727. The second book is Essai sur l’Art de la Guerre, written in 
1754 by Count Turpin de Crissé. It was translated from French into English by Captain 
                                                 
52 John Bell, ‘Washington’s Five Books’, Journal of the American Revolution (2013) < 
http://allthingsliberty.com/2013/12/washingtons-five-books/> [accessed 13 January 2014].  
53 Chase, ed., ‘From George Washington to Colonel William Woodford, 10 November 1775,’ vol. 2, 
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Joseph Otway and published in London in 1761 as An Essay on the Art of War (two 
volumes). The third book was Instruction for Officers by Roger Stevenson (1775). 
The fourth book, The Partisan (The Art of Making War in Detachment), another 
French manual, was translated and published in London in 1760. Finally, Young’s 
Essays (Major William Young’s Maneuvers, or Practical Observations on the Art of 
War) was published in London in 1771. 
 It is notable that Washington opted to recommend a small number of books. 
John Bell remarked that Washington tried to avoid the dense and complicated treatises 
on artillery and fortifications because they were impractical for the infant troops at the 
time.54 Washington did not mention any field manual books; his reading list was 
particularly for high-ranking officers. He also had mentioned his favorite book while 
he was dinning with the Marquis de Chastellux at his New Windsor headquarters in 
1780. Chastellux wrote:  
War was frequently the subject: on asking the General which of our 
professional books he read with the most pleasure, he answered me that they 
were the King  of Prussia's Instruction to his Generals, and the Tactics of M. 
de Guibert; from which I concluded that he knew as well how to select his 
authors as to profit by them.55 
The first book mentioned in the letter was Frederick II’s Military Instruction from the 
Late King of Prussia to his Generals. In this text, Frederick the Great integrates ideas 
learned from military history into the instructions for his officers, ‘Our reason only 
works upon matters upon which our experience throws light’.56 Presumably, 
                                                 
54 John Bell, ‘Washington’s Five Books’. 
55 Francois Jean Chastellux, Travels in North-America in the Years 1780-81-82, Vol.1 (Bedford, 
Massachusetts: Applewood Books), p. 163. 
56 Quoted in Jay Luvass, Frederick the Great on the Art of War (New York: First Da Capo Press 
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Washington was impressed by the King’s modernized vision of tactical and strategic 
concepts and his success in the War of Austrian Succession, Silesian Wars and the 
Seven Years’ War. As a result of his battlefield excellence, Washington was 
determined to get a Prussian drill master to train his own force. In addition to 
Washington, top officers, such as General Nathanael Greene, held a great admiration 
for this book. In his letter to Washington, Greene wrote, ‘The King of Prussia the 
greatest General of the age strongly protests against attacking troops by storm in 
villages much more, in large regular brick cities—He observes, it often proves the 
ruin of the best part of an army’.57    
 It is understandable that Washington mentioned Jacques-Antoine-Hippolyte, 
comte de Guibert’s work A General Essay on Tactics as one of his favorites. No doubt 
this was probably because he was having a dinner with a French officer, but in fact 
during the period of the American Revolution, two schools of tactics reigned in 
France. The first was headed by Mesnil-Durand, proposing the idea of a revolt against 
the linear system. The line was, he argued, unsuited for shock action or movement, so 
formations in small columns were recommended. Guibert led the other school and 
was impressed by the linear system of Frederick the Great. Guibert’s work, Essai 
General de Tactique, was a favorite book of Washington. Indeed, Guibert’s work 
suited the Revolutionary War because he recommended the idea of revolutionary 
fighting, which incorporated mobility, rapidity, and bravery in conducting the 
operations, achieving logistic solutions by relying on the countryside, and movement 
in independent formations.58 Also preferred was flexible manoeuvring in open 
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columns before deploying into the firing line, rather than the complex and rigid 
manoeuvring of linear formation preferred by the Prussians.59  
 Gruber also discussed ‘the five books’, the texts preferred by British officers 
between 1753 and 1783.60 These books helped to organize the British officers’ 
approach to warfare. The history and theory of war was still key to professionals in 
arms.61 The five books were Marlborough’s Campaigns, Bland’s work, translation of 
works by Saxe, Clairac and Vegetius. It is interesting to compare Washington’s list 
with the books that the British commanders-in-chief preferred reading during the 
Revolutionary War. Between Thomas Gage, Sir Henry Clinton and Sir William 
Howe—the three commanders-in-chief during the Revolutionary War—only Clinton 
kept a record of his thoughts and readings in his leather-bound notebooks.62 According 
to Gruber, Clinton was fond of the works of Caesar, Vegetius and Polybius as well as 
the tactical treatises of Mesnil-Durand, Guibert and Hinde. Clinton, like other British 
officers, was influenced by French philosophy and military strategy rather than British 
authority.63 Except for the aforementioned works of Bland, Saxe and Hinde, we can 
see that the British officers enjoyed reading the classics. Mesnil-Durand and Guibert 
represent the two French schools of tactical thought. It is understandable since the 
British and French had been fighting each other throughout the eighteenth century, 
and the Revolutionary War is no exception. The British were not only trying to defeat 
the colonists, but they were also competing with French. According to a comparison 
between British and American ‘five books’ and commanders’ favorite, we can see that 
Bland’s and Guibert’s works seemed to be favoured by both the armies’ commanders. 
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 The American force, however, started to create their army by using drill books, 
and many ‘American’ drill books relied heavily on British works. Even if Steuben’s 
regulations seemed to be a core text for training the American men, before his arrival 
the Americans had already produced two drill books: Timothy Pickering’s An Easy 
Plan for Discipline for the Militia (1775); and Lewis Nicola’s Treatise of Military 
Exercise Calculated for the Use of American (1776). Drawing up alongside the 1764 
Regulations, Pickering’s works were adapted from an English model and extracted 
from A Plan of Discipline, Composed for the Use of the Militia of the County of 
Norfolk. Washington recommended Pickering to Congress; he described Pickering as, 
‘A great Military genius, cultivated by an industrious attention to the Study of War, 
and as a Gentleman of liberal education, distinguished zeal and great method and 
activity in Business’.64 This book served as the textbook for militia in Massachusetts, 
and was the foundation and inspiration for the training of the New England militia at 
that time. Nicola’s Treatise of Military Exercise represents a condensed version of 
them both, A Plan of Discipline and Pickering’s An Easy Plan, and was meant to teach 
and train the new American officers. We can see that even the most celebrated 
writings of the Revolutionary army drew upon British works.    
 The two drill books emphasized simplicity by using the fewest possible 
movements to load, fire, and manoeuvre. The Continental Army consisted of ‘people 
in arms’ who were likely to refuse to learn or perform difficult manoeuvres; therefore, 
the army in 1775-1777 had no uniformity for training or performing combat 
manoeuvres. The commanders adopted whatever plan they liked and let the sergeants 
teach it, but the soldiers made little effort to learn. But having a few guides was better 
than having only the commanders’ orders and their spirit. Pickering’s An Easy Plan 
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contained an outline for the discipline eventually developed in the Continental Army. 
Even though the revolutionaries disliked the European discipline at first, they could 
work with this simplified drill. Continental generals tried European discipline because 
they wanted to achieve their idea of a regular army and because they thought that men 
could best be restrained by force. An Easy Plan for Discipline advised the officers to 
win the affection of their men and, as a militia officer, Pickering marched and carried 
a pack. He did not believe that every man was equal, and he wanted to lead. In order 
to win his men’s respect, he believed that he had to be more active and able than 
others. This method describes an American early way of drilling since the beginning 
and affected Steuben’s regulations later on.    
 The most outstanding and well-known military manuals used among 
American staff during the years of the American War of Independence were Steuben’s 
Regulations, twelve editions of which were produced in America. Von Steuben 
considered the situation carefully. He began crafting his regulations by applying some 
of the British 1764 Regulations, which he saw had been already widely used. 
Steuben’s regulations began by providing instruction to the officer concerning such a 
topic as the formation of a company or a regiment. It then moved on to teach the new 
men the instructions. Interestingly, Steuben taught them different march steps: the 
common step, at 75 steps per minute, as in the British style, and the quick step, at 120 
steps per minute, as in the American style.65 He emphasized the use of the musket and 
taught skills in using the bayonet, a practice in which the British were expert. He 
adjusted the light troops into a flexible unit that, when with the regiment, must form 
itself twenty paces to the right of the parade and exercise by itself. When the light 
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infantry was embodied, however, the light troops can exercise in the same manner as 
the battalion in the line.  
 Because there were a large number of men in the camp, General Washington 
ordered the model company to assist Steuben. In his general orders, he wrote, ‘One 
hundred men are to be annexed to the Guard of the commander-in-chief for the 
purpose of forming a Corps to be instructed in the Manoeuvres necessary to be 
introduced in the Army and serve as a Model for the execution of them—As the 
General’s Guards is composed intirely of Virginians, the one hundred draughts are to 
be taken from the troops of the other States’.66 The model company consisted of one 
hundred men from various regiments, whom Steuben began to train from the outset. 
After the training, he would allow the men to return to their units so they could train 
the rest of the soldiers. Steuben played a major role in training the Continentals in the 
mixed and adjustable European professional manoeuvre. His kind-heartedness and 
attitude towards the army and its men shone throughout his book. He gave instruction 
to both the commissioned and non-commissioned officers, focussing on the 
importance of gaining the hearts of his men: 
The first object should be to gain the love of his men, by treating them with 
every possible kindness and humanity, enquiring into their complaints, and 
when well founded, feeling them redressed.67 There is nothing which gains an 
officer the love of his soldiers more than his care of them under the distress of 
sickness.68 He should endeavour to gain the love by his attention to every thing 
which may contribute to their health and convenience69 By avoiding too great 
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familiarity with the men, they will not only gain their love and confidence, but 
be treated with a proper respect; whereas, by a contrary conduct, they forfeit 
all regard, and their authority becomes despised.70  
This idea echoed attitudes within the British militia. Matthew McCormack also 
emphasizes that contemporaries thought training citizen militia would be best 
achieved by appealing to the soldiers’ sensibilities rather than through hardness. 
Citizen soldiers could be motivated to defend themselves as humans, along with their 
families, properties, and liberties.71 
 Steuben recommended that the officers and non-commissioned officers of 
each regiment educate themselves thoroughly through the manual exercises, marches 
and firings as well as through the security of the troops and discipline.72 The officers 
should be able to train and drill the army themselves. The commanding officers were 
supposed to take charge of the general instruction of the regiment, the exercises and 
the reason to do the exercise, if necessary.73 Previously, the sergeants trained the 
troops and taught them to obey their orders. Members of the American Army, on the 
other hand, required an explanation for why an order or manoeuvre was necessary 
before they would obey. Yet, under Steuben’s guidance, the army was able to perform 
complicated battle manoeuvres and became more orderly and disciplined than it had 
previously been. The Regulations or the ‘Blue book’ continued to be widely used until 
1812.74 This regulation was the culmination of European influence adapted to suit the 
new American army. 
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Conclusion 
The Continental Army fought on very different terrain, and the numbers of troops 
were fewer in number than in Europe, so the relevance of European military writing 
could be questioned. But the colonists found the European military literature 
interesting once they had observed British troops, who were sent to fight with the 
French in North America in the 1750s and 1760s. We can see the British and 
Continental armies’ reading choices were similar but also different. The British army 
had professionalized their troops since the middle of eighteenth century, and its 
officers had acquired the continental art of war, using the continental books as their 
foundation. The British Army learned its tactics and strategies from French scholars 
and philosophers. On the other hand, the Continental Army started with officers who 
had gained experience in the Seven Years’ War, and why read books on their 
commander-in-chief’s recommendation, and trained their men with any knowledge 
they acquired. Most of the drill books they used in the beginning—even if they 
claimed that they wrote them—were extracted from British military exercise texts. 
The texts for the Continental Army commanders were mostly British and French. The 
Continental Army not only adopted a drilling model derived from the British military 
forces, but its commanders were influenced by French military theory of the 
eighteenth century, and the men were trained by the Prussian drill master. As 
suggested by their reading choices and the books printed in America during the 
Revolutionary War, the Americans definitely applied British and other European 
techniques, but selectively. These three armies were involved in the same war where 
they gained knowledge of each other’s fighting style. Moreover, this intelligence was 
something that each wanted to gain, as Sun Tzu said in The Art of War, ‘If you know 
the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles.  If you 
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know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a 
defeat’.
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Chapter 4 Non-American Recruitments 
 
Introduction 
When the Continental Army was first established, Congress had expected to employ 
white American colonists to form the army, but as the war progressed, the army was 
unable to fill its regiments with Americans, so Congress sought other ways to enlist 
men in the service. The idea of employing non-American white men in the army was 
actually inspired by the methods of the British—the Americans followed the British 
example in their attempt to recruit Native Americans, Germans, and slaves to their 
cause. Washington saw the importance and necessity of recruiting non-Americans into 
the armed forces, just as the British had done before—employing non-British soldiers 
when drafting their own men became challenging: 
If the Enemy mean to hold their present Posts in the United states the 
presumption is, that their operations next Campaign will be vigorous & 
decisive because feeble efforts can be of no avail unless by a want of Virtue 
we ruin & defeat ourselves; which, I think, is infinitely more to be dreaded 
than the whole force of G. Britain, assisted as they are by Hessian, Indian, & 
Negro Allies.
1
 
One of the American Revolutionary War myths is that all colonial able-bodied men 
took up arms in this war, which was considered the American spirit, fighting 
throughout this eight-year-long war. Initially, this seemed to be an impressive fact 
about the American manpower in the opening battle of the war, the battle of 
Lexington-Concord, Massachusetts on April 19, 1775. The news of British incursion 
quickly spread over New England. In this fight 700 British soldiers marched on their 
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way to Concord in order to destroy the rebel military supply, but they were forced to 
retreat to Boston by heavy fire from the American militia. The victory was a good 
start and strengthened the American morale, proving they could encounter and 
overcome one of the most powerful armies in the world. This battle was quickly 
followed by the Battle of Bunker Hill on June 17, 1775. This time the British won, 
but heavily suffered heavy casualties. Among the 2,200 men of the British forces, 200 
were killed and 800 were wounded, while around 100 American died and 300 were 
injured, among their 1,000 troops.2 
  During this time, around 16,000 American militiamen gathered around 
Boston to lay siege to the British to force them leave. This siege lasted more than 10 
months and was successfully achieved. These events proved that this was no minor 
rebellion. The rebels did not to give up easily. What both the British government and 
the patriots faced was a full-scale revolution. It would require actual armies, and 
probably the use of mercenary troops as well. This impressive assembly of the New 
England men who quickly responded the request to fight was one of the reasons the 
Second Continental Congress decided to create the first army in America.  
 But after the first phase of the conflict had passed, people realized the danger 
of armed service. These citizen-soldiers were no longer interested in being in the army 
and wanted to go back to their businesses and families:  
A Soldier reasoned with upon the goodness of the cause he is engaged in and 
the inestimable rights he is contending for, but adds, that it is of no more 
Importance to him than others. The Officer makes you the same reply, with 
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this further remark, that his pay will not support him, and he cannot ruin 
himself and Family to serve his Country, when every member of the 
community is equally  Interested and benefitted by his Labours.
3
 
This was one of the major reasons that General George Washington, commander-in-
chief, mistrusted the militia and the system of these soldiers, since they saw 
themselves as volunteers and believed they could go home when they wanted. 
Washington was right, because the following year there were only a few men left in 
service. In his letter to Congress he wrote:  
When Men are irritated, & the Passions inflamed, they fly hastily, and 
cheerfully to Arms, but after the first emotions are over to expect, among such 
People as compose the bulk of an Army, that they are influenced by any other 
principles than those of Interest, is to look for what never did.
4
  
In the commander-in-chief’s opinion hiring soldiers was normal and would effective 
persuade men to be in the service:  
This contest is not likely to be the Work of a day—as the War must be carried 
on systematically—and to do it, you must have good Officers, there are, in my 
judgment, no other possible means to obtain them but by establishing your 
Army upon a permanent footing; and giving your Officers good pay. this will 
induce Gentlemen, and Men of Character to engage’.
5
 
Congress also realized that the rebellious cause and motivation could not last forever. 
A year later, the Continental Army was facing its major problem, a shortage of men 
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in arms. The army turned to Congress to seek a solution. The army quickly became a 
type of business. Cash bounties, wages, clothes, and land were offered to induce men 
to enlist. From this point, being a soldier was not different from any other occupation. 
The problem of deficient manpower in the Continental Army is evidence that the 
American spirit as the main driver of the armed forces was only the case at the onset 
of the war.  
 It seems clear that it was difficult to persuade American men to enlist in the 
army. It is estimated that during the Revolutionary War period there were 2.5 million 
people living in North America, excluding the Natives,
6
 of whom 500,000 were black 
(about 20 percent).
7
 Among those, if half of them remained royalists, we could 
roughly estimate that 500,000 men could join the fight. Throughout the eight years of 
war, as many as 150,000 men joined the Continental Army, but the largest number of 
troops fighting at any given time was around 19,000 soldiers in the Battle of Long 
Island on 27 August, 1776, and at the Siege of Yorktown on 28 September, 1781.
8
 
America had an advantage over England in that the war took place on American soil, 
where the American army could replenish their roster of troops much more easily than 
the British, who had to sail 3,000 miles to reach the colonies. However, the American 
army size each year never reached up to 47,000 men.
9
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<http://www2.census.gov/prod2/statcomp/documents/CT1970p2-13.pdf> [accessed 1 December 
2016]. 
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1779: 27,699, 1780: 21,015, 1781: 13, 292, 1782: 14,256, 1783: 13,476. See Fred Anderson Berg, 
Encyclopaedia of Continental Army Units (Pennsylvania: Stackpole Books, 1972), p. 143. 
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 The British and American armies used similar methods to encourage men to 
enlist in their armies. First, they used economic necessity as a motivator. The British 
started out offering a monthly pay of one pound, which in 1778 was increased to three 
pounds. However, voluntary recruitment became more difficult to achieve by 
monetary means, so, in 1778 and 1779, the British government invoked the Press Act, 
which allowed them to conscript a man into the army. In 1776 America, men were 
offered signing bonuses of ten dollars and monthly pay of six and two-thirds dollars. 
By spring 1777, the bonus had doubled to twenty dollars, with 100 acres of land 
promised at the end of the war. Washington urged a draft of militia for a twelve-month 
enlistment. By 1778, every state had a draft and each militia regiment contributed a 
quota that helped fulfil the state’s obligation to the regular army.  
 These approaches did help; however, they did not solve the problem 
completely. Both armies still suffered from a lack of men. On the American side, the 
truth is that not all American men were willing to go to war. Conversely, the British 
soldiers were fighting very far away from home at a time when Britain was dealing 
with other conflicts in Europe. Both sides sought new and effective ways to build 
armies. The two armies sought to acquire reinforcements, and there were many times 
they found themselves competing against each other for the same manpower. Those 
men who were available for service, outside of the American and English men, were 
the American natives, slaves and Germans.    
Native Americans in the American Revolution 
Indigenous Americans were employed by Europeans before the American 
Revolutionary War. Earlier, in the French and Indian War, these aboriginal people 
allied with France. With Canadian and Indian help, the French defeated the British in 
many battles, until the situation turned in 1757, when the American colonists suffered 
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from being foraged. The French troops, commanded by Louis-Joseph de Montcalm, 
with his troops of 8,000 French regulars, 3,000 Canadian militia and 2,000 Indians, 
combined to attack the British Fort William Henry in New York. Between 70 and 150 
people were killed, scalped and beheaded by the Indians.
10
 This event shocked the 
white men, and even Montcalm had to stop fighting. For the Americans, this 
‘merciless and savage’ action still stuck in their minds. The event pressed the British 
to send 20,000 troops to protect their people and block French ports. Moreover, in 
1758, Britain offered terms that prevented the colonists from invading the Indian land 
in the Ohio Valley. The negotiation was made and the British colonial officers and 
Indian chiefs of 15 Woodland Aboriginal Peoples signed the Easton Treaty. This 
resulted in the Indians staying neutral throughout the war, and it played a part in the 
British victory in this war.    
 Even if in the American Revolution Native Americans played a part in the 
conflict, acting as local guides, messengers, traders, and fighters alongside both the 
British and American troops, they were accused of getting on the wrong side of the 
war by the Americans. The majority of the Indians joined the British since they had 
become allies with mutual trade and force. More importantly, the firm thought of 
Indians as ‘the inhabitants of our frontiers, the merciless Indian Savages,’ which 
appeared on the Declaration of Independence on the July 4, 1776, still stained the 
American people’s minds. This quote has not been widely discussed, and it is surely 
not fair to those Indians who sided with the patriots during the war. Yet, since the 
Seven Years’ War, the Indian way of fighting had been represented cruel, irregular 
warfare. From white people’s perspective, beheading and scalping were unacceptable. 
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Charles Neimeyer considered the Indians ‘ignoble savages’.
11
 Still, until 1776, even 
John Adams was reluctant to recruit the Native people for the army. He admitted that 
he did not know much about the Indians and what he had heard was, ‘they are very 
expensive and troublesome Confederates in War, besides the Incivility and 
Inhumanity of employing Such Savages with their cruel, bloody dispositions, against 
any Enemy whatever’.
12
 Nevertheless, Adams agreed that if the Indians offered their 
assistance to the Americans, there was no need to keep them neutral, and this should 
not be refused.
13
   
 Congress decided to persuade these non-American citizen men to join the 
army or at least keep them neutral. Discussions on dealing with the Indians had been 
taking place since the beginning of the war. In July 1775 three committees were 
appointed according to the three groups of the Indians—the northern department, 
known by the name of the Six Nations; the southern department, composed of all the 
Indians of the south, including the Cherokee; and the middle, or the Indian Nations 
that lay between the other two groups.
14
  The mission was to treat the Indians well, to 
‘preserve peace and friendship’ and prevent them from getting involved in the 
commotion.
15
  
 In 1777, it was estimated that there were 200,000 Indians from 85 nations east 
of the Mississippi River.
16
 Among those numerous nations, the League of Iroquois, or 
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the Six Nations of the Iroquois, comprising the Oneida, Cayuga, Seneca, Mohawk, 
Onondaga, and Tuscarora, was the most powerful one.
17
 In 1775, the Iroquois 
Confederacy had a membership of 12,500 people.
18
 In the early days of the 
Revolutionary War attempts were made formally by the Americans to keep the Six 
Nations neutral, and the tribes agreed with this decision. The patriots insisted that this 
was ‘a family quarrel’ between father and son, with the Second Continental Congress 
releasing a statement to that effect to the Six Nations and their allies, the seven tribes 
on the St. Lawrence River, on July 13, 1775. This statement warned the League of 
Iroquois to stay away from the conflict and insisted the issue lay with the American 
bloodline with the English, ‘Brothers, thus stands the matter betwixt old England and 
America. You Indians know how things are proportioned in a family – between the 
father and the son – the child carries little pack—England we regard as the father—
this island maybe compared to the son. […] You Indians are not concerned in it’.
19
    
 The Six Nations and their allies were invited to meet again with Congress 
representatives in August at Albany, and this clearly showed that the League of 
Iroquois was more powerful than any other tribes. The letters were carried to the Six 
Nations by Reverend Samuel Kirkland and General Phillip Schuyler. One of the main 
objectives of the message was to ask the Indians to remain neutral, not join either side 
and not to ‘take up the hatchet against the king’s troop but keep the hatchet buried 
deep’.
20
 Congress also aimed to restore their harmony to the tribesmen as, ‘we intend 
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to re-kindle the council fire which your and our ancestors sat round in great 
friendship’.
21
 Congress tried to remain at peace with the tribes so they did not have to 
deal with both the British and the Indians at once. As Congress resolved on July 1, 
1775 that if any Indians were convinced ‘to commit actual hostilities against these 
colonies, or to enter into an offensive Alliance with the British troops,’ the colonies 
should retaliate by making alliances ‘with such Indian Nations as will enter into the 
same, to oppose such British troops and their Indian Allies’.
22
   
 The majority of the Indian people sided with the British, and this was not 
anything unexpected. The British could offer more products, especially weaponry. 
They were also able to promise the reduction in white people’s invasion of Indian 
lands. The American knew that they could not compete with Britain in either case of 
recruiting or economic support. It would not be a surprise if they inclined to side with 
a particular group of people who could deliver what they needed. The best way at that 
time was encouraging the Indian to remain neutral. 
 Washington, however, predicted that sooner or later the Indians would be 
pushed to participate in the war, ‘In my opinion it will be impossible to keep them in 
a state of Neutrality—they must, and no doubt soon will, take an Active part, either 
for or against us’.
23
 The Indians could be a source of warriors and carry some useful 
tasks for both the adversaries. Washington suggested that Congress consider whether 
it would not be best immediately to engage them on American side, ‘to prevent their 
minds being poison’d by Ministerial Emmissaries, which will ever be the Case while 
a King’s Garrison is suffered to remain in their Country’.
24
 Washington was right 
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about that, when trading and European products including weaponry became a crucial 
part of native life. The tribes in Maine wrote him that ‘we are in much want of Powder 
to Hunt with—the Old English people will not let us have any, Unless we will fight 
against our Brothers & Countrymen’.
25
 This statement explained the current situation 
that the native people somehow were obliged to fight, because the British were the 
ones who held the trade and were able to supply the products, while the Americans 
could not or could but not enough. Until the Americans could offer an equal exchange 
the best thing they could do was to maintain the alliance with the Six Nations. 
 While Congress tried to maintain peace and keep the Indians neutral, the 
American established stronger relationships with some of the other tribes. Those were 
the Mohican, the Wappinger, and the Munsee from New England, who sided with the 
patriot cause from the beginning of the war. These tribes’ men were the first group to 
support the colonists’ revolution. The Sachem of the Mohican tribe in Stockbridge, 
Solomon Uhhaunauwaunmut, gave this statement in a speech to Congress, ‘Brothers; 
I would not have you think by this that we are falling back from our engagements; we 
are ready to do any thing for your relief, and shall be guided by your counsel’. 
However, they asked to fight in their style, and they did not need to be trained like the 
Continentals, ‘if you send for me to fight, that you will let me fight in my own Indian 
way. I am not used to fight English fashion, therefore you must not expect I can train 
like your men. Only to point out to me where your enemies keep, and that is all I shall 
want to know’.
26
 The Indians of St. Francis, Penobscot Stockbridge, and St. John’s 
Tribes also offered their services to Congress if they were wanted. Congress accepted 
their proposal and agreed that these Indians might be called on in case of ‘real 
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necessity and that the giving them presents’ was proper and suitable.
27
 The Indian 
Stockbridge men later formed a unit under the name Stockbridge Militia, led by 
Jehoiaikim Mtohksin and Abraham Nimham under the command of Major General 
Horatio Gates. These men took part in the Siege of Boston and Fort Ticonderoga.  
 On the other hand, the British undertook several meetings to turn the Indians 
in New York and Canada against the patriots. Guy Johnson, a superintendent of Indian 
Affairs in the northern department, had secret orders from General Thomas Gage to 
secure the Indian cooperation. Johnson then ‘assembled 1,458 Indians and adjusted 
matters with them in such a manner that they agreed to defend the communication [on 
the lake] and assist His Majesty’s troops in their operations’.
28
 At the beginning of 
July, Johnson moved to Montreal, where on July 17th he ‘convened a second body of 
the northern confederates to the amount of 1,700 and upwards who entered into the 
same engagements’.
29
 This information was heard by Washington, and he suggested 
his men watch out for the movements of the Indian agent (Colonel Guy Johnson) to 
prevent his influence with the Indians. The men were also ordered to gather 
information of the temper and disposition of the Indians and Canadians that, ‘a proper 
Line may be mark’d out to conciliate their good Opinions and facilitate any future 
Operation’.
30
 
 It was confirmed that some of the meetings between British leaders and Indian 
tribes were successful when Congress received the report that the Caughnawaga 
Indians (Mohawk) ‘had taken up the Hatchet’ on behalf of the King and ‘that 
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Governor Carleton was giving them presents daily’. The committee also reported that 
Carleton was ‘building Floating Batteries and Boats’ at St. Jean, but that his 
preparations had been hampered by the refusal of English merchants at Montreal ‘to 
take up arms against the Yankees’.
31
 In response to this situation, Congress appointed 
Major General Philip Schuyler to ‘take or Destroy all Vessels, Boats or Floating 
Batteries prepar’d by Governor Carlton’ on or near the waters of the Lakes and to take 
possession of St Johns and Montreal if he found it practicable and not disagreeable to 
the Canadians.
32
 
 The British action to use the Indians against the Americans marked a shift in 
Congress’ policy and forced Congress to change its plan. While the British appointed 
a superintendent to persuade the Indians to ally with the royal army, the colonists 
exploited their cause and asked for compassion from the tribes against the British, 
whom the Americans claimed would ‘slip their hand into our pocket without asking, 
as though it were there own; and at their pleasure they will take from us our charters 
or written civil constitution, which we love as our lives’.
33
 Congress still attempted to 
take the peaceful route by appointing Samuel Kirkland, a Presbyterian, to convince 
the Indians of the American’s intention to be friends. Kirkland presented himself to 
Congress, offering his mission to propose a treaty to the five (then six) nations, and 
that he thought they would consequently be more willing to join the American cause. 
However, he also informed Congress that the five nations lately resolved in a 
conference meeting that they would not admit any white people to settle among them, 
‘The great God (said they to some white people) does not chuse we should live 
together: he hath Givin you a white skin & said live you on that side of the river: to 
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us he hath given a Red skin & said live you on other side the river—let us not disobey 
him’.
34
 
 Kirkland made an attempt to persuade the Six Nations to stay neutral, but soon 
after the war began the Indian tribes could not keep their unity. Four of them took 
sides with the loyalists, but the Oneida and Tuscarora favoured the patriots. The credit 
for this likely goes to Kirkland, who lived with the Oneida, and had been a missionary 
to the Oneida Indians since 1766.
35
 His approach to gain the Oneida’s trust was to be 
generous and graceful. He used religion as a part of life, became a consultant, educated 
the locals, and gave them agricultural tools and sometimes food and clothes. Even if 
other tribes were estranged from the colonists, the Oneida maintained their loyalty. 
Colonel Cornelius Van Dyck the commanding officer at Fort Schuyler described the 
characteristics of the Oneidas as that they ‘stood in to the Six Nations as head of the 
Confederacy’.
36
 
 There were also similar missions to convert and educate Indian youths.  
Eleazar Wheelock, a minister from Connecticut who devoted himself as a teacher and 
missionary. He founded Dartmouth College in order to train the Indians to be 
missionaries. Washington wrote to one of Wheelock’s leading students, Joseph 
Johnson, a Mohegan, to strengthen the friendship between the Americans and Indians:  
You can tell our friends, that they may always look upon me, whom the Whole 
United Colonies have chosen to be their Chief Warrior, as their brother, whilst 
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they Continue in Friendship with us, they may depend upon mine and the 
protection of those under my Command. Tell them that we don’t want them to 
take up the hatchett for us, except they chuse it, we only desire that they will 
not fight against us, we want that the Chain of friendship should always remain 
bright between our friends of the Six Nations and us.
37
 
While the British government arranged their superintendent to deal with the native 
matters, the Americans too had an Indian agent, James Deane, who was a relative of 
Silas Deane. He served in this position and also as interpreter from November 1775 
until the end of the war, with his proficiency in Iroquois languages.
38
 The Americans 
also applied the same method of approaching the Indians by supplying them goods. 
The Massachusetts Provincial Council made an attempt to keep them in control, 
stating ‘it was absolutely necessary that the Truck house at Machais should be 
supplied with Cloth, Corn, Rum, and every Kind of Stores Necessary for such a 
Department as the best means to secure Tribes of Indians from taking part with the 
enemy’.
39
 
 But the American intention of keeping the peace became slowly deemphasized 
after a year passed, as this method did not seem to be working well, since many 
Indians decided to join the Royal army. Major General Philip Schuyler, who had dealt 
with Indian affairs since the beginning of the war, became disfavoured by this action 
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of the tribesmen. He urged that a meeting should be held to request the Six Nations’ 
assistance for the American side as well:  
Since some Indians have now openly joined the Enemy it becomes our Duty 
to request that such of them as are our Friends should declare for us, and that 
we and they should enter into mutual Engagements to defend each other […] 
that in order to secure ourselves and our Indian Friends.
40
  
And if they supported the British, Schuyler warned the Indians that ‘they must never 
expect to return to their Families, or ever hope for a Reconciliation with us’.
41
  
 The policy to deal with the Indians started to change in 1776. In a meeting 
held from June 14 to 17, Congress authorized a conference with the Six Nations and 
the employment of Indians where Washington saw fit.
42
 Washington recommended 
the payment of Indians for the capture of British soldiers, ‘a reward of one hundred 
dollars for every commissioned officer, and of thirty dollars for every private soldier 
of the King's troops that they shall take prisoners’. Additionally, he thought that a 
bounty, as a ‘powerful inducement,’ should be offered to the Indians as well, to 
encourage them to engage in the service.
43
  
 By the end of 1777 the Creek-Nation joined the Americans with the attempts 
of George Galphin, a commissioner of Indian Affairs, in the South. His approach to 
persuade the tribesmen was to supply them with goods they wanted, copying the 
method that the British had used, ‘the Emissaries of British Government would by 
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their Activity, and the advantages they possessed, of supplying the Indians with goods, 
spirit them up to become our Enemies’.
44
 With this successful mission Major General 
Robert Howe, a commanding officer of South Carolina, planned to use these Tribes 
of Indians to form effective troops—all these men would make 18,200 in total.
45
 
However, Washington disagreed with the idea. He believed that the numbers of the 
Indians in the Southern Tribes were less that what Howe assumed, ‘the account you 
give of the numbers of Indians in the Southern Tribes far exceeds any thing that I had 
an Idea of, and it therefore behoves us the more to cultivate their friendship’.46 
 But in 1778, Washington proposed a plan to Congress to recruit native soldiers 
to the American army to act against the British. Washington suggested Congress 
employ two or three hundred Indians against General Howe’s army in an upcoming 
campaign.
47
 He also mentioned Kirkland as a person who was ‘able to bring half that 
number of Cherokees’ as well as the Northern tribes. These Indians and the army 
woodsmen would ‘probably strike no small terror into the British and foreign troops, 
particularly the new comers’.
48
 With the consideration of the committee, Congress 
approved this plan and empowered Washington to employed no more than 400 
Indians. Washington decided to use them to reinforce and attach to the light infantry, 
but the plan was not achieved since the Cherokee were prevailingly royalists. 
 The war became more intense in 1778, when France formally took the 
American side, and both the armies focused more on their main troops. However, the 
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Indians provided some significant assistance to both the British and Americans. For 
the American side, the year 1777–1778 was the time that the Americans received the 
most Indian assistance. The Oneidas were responsible for scouting in the Battle of 
Oriskany. Later on they sent 150 men to support the Burgoyne Campaign, and at the 
camp of Valley Forge, 50 natives accompanied Washington’s expeditions. And even 
when the French arrived in North America, they reinforced General Lafayette in the 
Battle of Barren in May 1778.  
 The first treaty between the United States and Native Indians was signed in 
1778 called Treaty of Fort Pitt and was the only formal treaty made during the War. 
The plan was made and the commissioners were appointed in June for ‘the purpose of 
holding a treaty with the Delaware, Shawnees, and other Indians who may assemble 
at Fort Pitt’.
49
 This treaty allowed the Americans to travel into the Lenape territory in 
Delaware and ‘give a free passage through their country’.
50
 This was the nearest and 
best ways for the troops to get closer and attack the British posts, forts and towns. 
Moreover, the treaty stated that the Indian in this Nation would supplied such troops 
with ‘corn, meat, horses or whatever’ as well as their men engaging to join the 
American troops. Congress hoped that the Lenape would bring more tribes to be 
friends with the United States and join the present confederation.  The tribesmen 
would receive the better security of ‘the old men, women and children […] whilst 
their warriors are engaged against the common enemy’ in return. More importantly 
their territorial rights of the nation of Delawares was guaranteed by the United States. 
However, the treaty and the relationship collapsed after Chief White Eyes, the leader 
of the Lenape, died when he was serving as a guide for the American expedition in 
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Ohio Country in late 1778. After his death, the Lenape became estranged from the 
Americans, and some switched to assist the British.
51
 
 The Continental Army was still consistently assisted by the Oneidas. In 
Washington’s opinion they were ‘the strongest Attachment’.
52
 In March 13, 1778 
Congress authorized Washington to employ four hundred Indians to be used as 
servants and light troops.
53
 Washington showed great regard for this strong 
commitment to their missionary, ‘Mr Kirkland seemed to have an uncommon 
Ascendency over them and I should therefore be glad to see him accompany them’.
54
 
Washington also planned to raise half the number among the Southern and the 
Northern Indians under the command of Colonel Nathaniel Gist who was, ‘acquainted 
with the Cherokee & their Allies,’ to bring as many men as he could to join the 
troops.
55
 General Schuyler with the commissioners of Indian Affairs decided to build 
a small fort Oneida, ‘about sixteen or twenty mile from Fort Schuyler’.
56
 There the 
Indians of the Tryon County militia started to ‘cut theyr wood themselves, some tools, 
(and) some picquets’.
57
 
Slave Recruitment during the American Revolutionary War 
The idea of using black slaves to fight in the war emerged initially on the British side. 
The exchange of freedom for military service was offered to black slaves in America 
who decided to join the British. Black slaves were eager to respond to anyone who 
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offered them liberty, either British or American. The status of slaves in America 
remained that of servants rather than soldiers, but once the armies began to suffer from 
a severe lack of men, slaves seemed to be a good and convenient choice. Whilst it 
became clear that it was difficult to persuade white men to enlist in the troops, 
Congress still refused to conscript black slaves for the service. 
 Even if slaves were excluded from military service, they had white 
sympathizers, such as Arthur Lee and Robert Pleasants from Virginia, Samuel 
Hopkins from Rhode Island, James Otis and Samuel Cooke from Massachusetts, John 
Woolman from New Jersey, and Anthony Benezet and Benjamin Rush from 
Pennsylvania, men who supported the idea of freedom for black people.
58
 In John 
Adams’s summary of James Otis’s celebrated oration, Adams wrote: 
He asserted that every man, merely natural, was an independent sovereign, 
subject to no law but the law written on his heart and revealed to him by his 
Maker […] He asserted that these rights were inherent and inalienable. That 
they never could be surrendered or alienated but by idiots or madmen and all 
the acts of idiots and lunatics were void and not obligatory, by all the laws of 
God and man. Nor were the poor Negroes forgotten. Not a Quaker in 
Philadelphia or Mr. Jefferson in Virginia ever asserted the rights of Negroes 
in stronger terms.
59
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The American troops, however, did not completely exclude black men from the 
action, and a few freemen were found within militia ranks.
60
 Evidence is shown in a 
letter from General John Thomas, a Massachusetts commander, to John Adams, ‘we 
have some Negroes; but I look on them. In General, Equally Serviceable with other 
men, for Fatique & in action; many of them have proved themselves brave’.
61
 But 
Adams still disagreed with the idea of having black people in their forces. In a letter 
to William Heath, Adams wrote, ‘in the Massachusetts Regiments, there are great 
Numbers of Boys, Old Men, and Negroes, Such as are unsuitable for the service’.
62
  
 Military policy still excluded black slaves from enlistment in the army. 
However, American leaders reconsidered the idea of using slaves when Dunmore’s 
Proclamation was signed on 7 November, 1775, by John Murray, 4th Earl of 
Dunmore, a royal governor of the British Colony of Virginia, and formally announced 
on 14 November, 1775, as a martial law. It was a cunning and effective plan to 
persuade and offer black slaves a chance to be free. The proclamation guaranteed 
freedom for those who fled from either patriot or loyalist masters to join the British 
army: 
I do require every Person capable of bearing Arms, to resort to His 
MAJESTY'S STANDARD, or be looked upon as Traitors to His MAJESTY'S 
Crown and Government, and thereby become liable to the Penalty the Law 
inflicts upon such Offences; such as forfeiture of Life, confiscation of Lands, 
&c. &c. And I do hereby further declare all indented Servants, Negroes, or 
others, (appertaining to Rebels,) free that are able and willing to bear Arms, 
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they joining His MAJESTY'S Troops as soon as may be, for the more speedily 
reducing this Colony to a proper Sense of their Duty, to His MAJESTY'S 
Crown and Dignity.
63
 
Dunmore’s statement was promptly opposed by colonial slave owners. Many strong 
warnings to slaves who wished to run to the British side were printed in the Virginia 
Gazette, ‘The aged, the infirm, the women and children are still to remain the property 
of their masters, masters who will be provoked to severity, should part of their slaves 
desert them’. The Americans blamed this on Dunmore, and said that if slaves joined 
the royal army, the safety of the remaining slaves or their families could be in 
jeopardy. The publishers continued to attack the Proclamation, saying it was a lie and 
that no one should believe it or risk the safety of ‘their defenceless fathers and 
mothers, their wives, their women and children’.64 If they escaped, they must expect 
to suffer if they fell into the hands of the Americans.  
John Hancock decried Dunmore’s methods, noting that such ‘measures are 
taking as will speedily and effectually Repel His Violences and secure the peace & 
safety of that Colony’.
65
 Congress suggested that Virginia take utmost action to resist 
Dunmore’s proclamation.
66
 The Virginia Gazette immediately published the 
proclamation, exhorting and warning those slaves who might think to join Dunmore 
to consider whether his words were trustworthy: 
                                                 
63 Transcription of Dunmore’s Proclamation, Tracy W. Mcgregor Library, University of Virginia, 
<http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/06-04-02-0081> [accessed 27 March 2015].  
64 Letter Regarding Dunmore's Proclamation, Virginia Gazette (Dixon and Hunter), November 25, 
1775, in Colonial Williamsburg <http://www.history.org/history/teaching/tchaaltr.cfm> [accessed 24 
June 2016]. 
65 Chase, ed., ‘George Washington from John Hancock, 2 December 1775,’ vol. 2, pp. 469–471. 
66 Ford, eds., ‘Monday, December 4, 1775,’ vol. 2, pp.402-405. 
- 149 - 
 
Lord Dunmore’s declaration, therefore, is a cruel declaration to the Negroes 
[…] But should there be any amongst the Negroes weak enough to believe that 
Dunmore intends to do them a kindness, and wicked enough to provoke the 
fury of the Americans against their defenceless fathers and mothers, their 
wives, their women and children, let them only consider the difficulty of 
effecting their escape, and what they must expect to suffer if they fall into the 
hands of the Americans.
67
 
The Americans, on the other hand, initiated a policy to halt the progress of slavery 
and prevent human trafficking.
68
 The Continental Association forbade the importing 
of slaves after 1 December, 1774, writing of this ban to Thomas Cushing, Samuel 
Hopkins observed that ‘They have indeed manifested much wisdom and benevolence 
in advising to a total stop of the slave trade, and leading the united American Colonies 
to resolve not to buy any more slaves, imported from Africa’.
69
 But these intentions 
were thwarted more by English merchants, ‘who have always encouraged and upheld 
this slavery, than by their present masters, who pity their condition’.
70
 The slaves were 
also told that the English ministry refused to stop slave trading and that if the colonists 
were defeated, their slaves would be sold in the West Indies. The Virginia Convention 
announced a declaration that fugitives who returned to their masters within ten days 
would be forgiven.
71
 But still there were able-bodied male slaves who managed to 
make it to Dunmore’s camp. Three hundred of them were drafted as soldiers, the 
breasts of their uniforms bearing the inscription ‘Liberty to Slaves’ under Lord 
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Dunmore’s ‘Ethiopian Regiment’. In the winter of 1775–1776, eight hundred men 
were organized into this regiment.  
 The Ethiopian Regiment model may not have been successful because of an 
outbreak of smallpox spread throughout the camp and killed approximately five 
hundred of his men, but it definitely inspired the patriots to think about the same 
practice. Since many northern colonists already opposed slavery, the idea that fighting 
for the American Revolution could be used to promote black freedom was a popular 
one. This program proved effective—the slaves were motivated by this offer. John 
Adams feared that more slaves would fall for Dunmore’s approach, which set an 
example. Slaves joining the British army were provided with arms and clothes and 
could proclaim freedom ‘all the Negroes who would join his Camp, 20,000 Negroes 
would join it from the two Provinces in a fortnight’. And if some slaves joined the 
British army, others would do the same thing, ‘the Negroes have a wonderfull Art of 
communicating Intelligence among themselves. It will run severall hundreds of Miles 
in a Week or Fortnight’.
72
 And if some slaves joined the British army, others would 
do the same thing. 
 In the general officers’ circular of October 1775, there was a question 
concerning reenlisting black men whether it would be advisable to reenlist any 
Negroes in the new army, or whether there was a distinction between slaves and black 
free men’.
73
 The intention to employ slaves was refused by the majority of the 
Committee of Congress, ‘Ought not Negroes to be excluded from the new Inlistment 
especially such as are Slaves? All were thought improper by the Council of Officers? 
Agreed, that they be rejected altogether’.
74
 The idea of recruiting slaves into the army 
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had been disapproved at the first place like General Horatio Gates warned the 
recruiters, ‘you are not to enlist any deserter from the Ministerial army, nor any 
stroller, negro, or vagabond’.
75
  
 But the sympathizers such as Samuel Hopkins did not give up. They still called 
for rights for black men and posed the questions: 
Have they not a right to their liberty, which has been thus violently, and 
altogether without right, taken from them? Have they not reason to complain 
of any one who withholds it from them? Do not the cries of these oppressed 
poor reach to the heavens? Will not God require it at the hands of those who 
refuse to let them go out free?
76
 
In his letter to Cushing, Hopkins had also recommended the same approach that Lord 
Dunmore had used so that the slaves could fight for their freedom and the army could 
add more men without hiring foreign soldiers:  
Does not the conduct of Lord Dunmore, and the ministerialists, in taking the 
advantage of the slavery practised among us, and encouraging all slaves to join 
them, by promising them liberty, point out the best, if not the only way to 
defeat them in this, viz. granting freedom to them ourselves, so as no longer 
to use our neighbour’s service without wages, but give them for their labours 
what is equal and just?
77
 
Not long afterward, Congress resolved ‘that the free negroes who have served 
faithfully in the army at Cambridge, may be re-inlisted therein, but no others’ on 16 
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January, 1776,
78
 based on Washington's suggestion.
79
 However, in composing the 
1776 Virginia Constitution, Thomas Jefferson still denied black men rights in all of 
his three drafts.
80
 The slaves were in fact seen as ‘wealth […] Negroes a Species of 
Property—personal Estate’.
81
 The idea of enlisting freemen persisted, but there were 
not many of them.  
 The Congressional resolution of expanding the army to 88 battalion army in 
fall 1776, however, ignited the idea of conscripting slaves again. Since the Continental 
Army was unable to acquired white men, they turned to black recruits.
82
 From William 
Heath’s note showed that the black people were eventually allowed to join the army 
in New England colonies:  
There are in the Massachusetts Regiments some Negroes. Such is also the case 
with the Regiments from the Other Colonies, Rhode Island has a number of 
negroes and Indians, Connecticut has fewer negroes and a number of Indians. 
The New Hampshire regiments have less of both.
83
  
Washington complained of the difficulty of getting waggoners and of the enormous 
wages given them. He was tempted to use easier and cheaper labour. He wrote to 
Congress, proposing a plan to use black men for this service, ‘whether it would not be 
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eligible to hire negroes in Carolina, Virginia and Maryland for the purpose’.
84
 
However, he still insisted that those must be freemen, ‘for slaves could not be 
sufficiently depended on. It is to be apprehended they would too frequently desert to 
the enemy to obtain their liberty’.
85
 
 But lack of men could not be easily remedied. In early 1778 Brigadier General 
James Mitchell Varnum wrote to Washington, asking whether he might raise a 
Battalion of Negroes, since the two battalions from the State of Rhode Island were 
small and needed more men to make up their proportion in the Continental Army, ‘it 
is imagined that a Battalion of Negroes can be easily raised there. Should that Measure 
be adopted, or recruits obtained upon any other Principle, the Service will be 
advanced’.
86
 Washington finally agreed to the idea. He sent Varnum’s proposal to 
Nicholas Cooke, a governor of Rhode Island, and the Rhode Island general assembly 
passed this resolution on February 9, despite protest from six members.
87
 It was the 
first time that a Continental regiment consisted of slaves, and this was because it was 
necessary, ‘considering the pressing Necessity of filling up the Continental Army, and 
the peculiarly difficult Circumstances of this State which rendered it in a manner 
impossible to recruit our Battalions in any other way’.
88
   
 But the idea of employing slaves in the army was still under debate. In 1778 
Lieutenant John Laurens, one of Washington’s aides-de-camp, had proposed a plan to 
form a black regiment in South Carolina, and Washington agreed to the plan, but no 
action was taken at that time. As the war went on in 1778, the revolution moved to 
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the southern theatre. After facing defeat in the Saratoga campaign, the British moved 
to the southern colonies and captured Savana, Georgia. This change made a significant 
difference when the Continental Army lost battles both in Charleston and in Camden, 
South Carolina. So, in early 1779 Laurens resumed his plan again since the country 
needed reinforcements, and ‘such black Men as I could select in Carolina I should 
have no doubt of success in driving the British out of Georgia & subduing East Florida 
before the end of July’.
89
 But Washington still hesitated and thought that arming 
slaves was a ‘moot point’. He thought that idea should only be adopted if the British 
did. Moreover, Washington saw that employing slaves would cause jealousy with 
those who still remained in servitude, which likely would lead to more slave 
troubles.
90
  
 But Laurens did not give up his plan. The plan was well supported by 
Alexander Hamilton, who agreed that in the present situation it was good to raise ‘two 
three or four battalions of negroes’. Hamilton saw that the negroes would make ‘very 
excellent soldiers with proper management’. He also argued against the theory that 
negroes were too stupid to make soldiers. In his opinion, those men had natural 
faculties that were ‘as good as ours,’ and their habits of subordination from a life of 
servitude would make them ‘sooner become soldier than our White inhabitants’.
91
  
Laurens took leave to propose his plan in South Carolina to Congress. And eventually, 
on March 29, 1779, Congress’ members, including Henry Laurens, John’s father, 
considered the necessity and utility of arming Negroes, recommended South Carolina 
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and Georgia to raise ‘three thousand able bodied negroes’ to be put into the main army 
and be formed into separate corps as battalions, under the command of white 
commissioned and non-commissioned officers.
92
 Congress would make provision for 
paying proprietors of such Negroes who enlisted in the service. However, those men 
would receive no pay or bounty, but Congress would pay for their clothes and living 
expenses.
93
 Congress recommended that ‘every negro who shall well and faithfully 
serve as a soldier to the end of the present war, and shall then return his arms, be 
emancipated and receive the sum of fifty dollars’.
94
 However, this resolution was not 
adopted by South Carolina.
95
 
 A short while after, Sir Henry Clinton adopted Dunmore’s Proclamation to 
encourage slaves in North America to join the Royal Army. The Philipsburg 
Proclamation was declared on 30 June, 1779, promising freedom, protection, and land 
to slaves who escaped their patriot masters. This differed from the old proclamation 
since it was offered only to patriots’ slaves, not to those of loyalists. Later, Clinton 
issued a stricter version, threatening the patriot slaves, saying they would be sold back 
into slavery if they were captured in American uniforms.
96
 It was estimated that many 
slaves escaped from their masters to join Clinton’s troops, and more than 5,000 of 
them were from Georgia.
97
  
 The idea on employing Negroes finally came in practice in late 1780. In 
November Joseph Jones, a Virginia delegate, suggested that James Madison raise and 
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‘give a bounty in Negroes to such Soldiers as will enlist for the War’.
98
 In December 
1780 Congress agreed to make another attempt to form a corps of one thousand able 
bodied Negroes in Georgia and South Carolina with the same condition of the act of 
the 29th of March 1779.
99
 The corps would be organized and directed under the 
commanding officer in the Southern Department. In January 1, 1781 the Board of War 
considered Laurens’ plan and gave orders to the Commissary General of Military 
Store to provide Laurens 400 cartouche boxed and repair arms as well as clothing for 
his corps.
100
  
 It was understandable that the Americans refused to allow slaves to be enlisted 
into their forces. The Americans not only feared slave insurrection, but many of them 
did not want to lose what they considered their own property. The Revolutionary War 
was at first a white man’s war. However, this idea changed over time because the 
slaves had white sympathizers who insisted upon emancipation and rights for black 
men. Other than that, the idea of exchanging freedom for service (as offered by the 
British in order to take men from the patriots) actually invoked the ‘Liberty to Slaves’ 
idea. It motivated the slaves to press for their freedom and to prove their honour by 
demonstrating that they too fought for independence, just as other Americans did.   
German Soldiers in America 
German combatants had the same fortunes as other races and ethnic groups fighting 
in the American Revolutionary War—they shared the same ethnicity but were on 
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disparate. Those who sided with the King’s army were hired and brought over from 
several states in the Holy Roman Empire to North America, but the Germans who 
supported the Patriot cause already lived in the colonies. However, the numbers of 
each supporting group were uneven. Even though both of the armies did not have 
enough men to fill in their regiments to fight in this war, the British were much better 
off. On the British side, King George III was the Prince-elector of Hanover in the 
Holy Roman Empire, and this made Britain the ally of other Protestant nations, 
especially German states.  
 After the Battle of Breed’s Hill in June 1775, the King negotiated contracts for 
the hired troops with many German princes.
101
 Throughout the Revolutionary War, 
the British government employed soldiers from Hesse-Cassel, Brunswick, Hesse-
Hanau, Ansbach-Bayreuth, Waldeck, Hanover, and Anhalt-Zerb. In 1776, the British 
were able to acquire 17,775 men from Brunswick, Hesse-Kassel, and Weldeck.
102
 It 
was estimated that from 1776–1783 the British government kept 20,000 German 
forces in active duty and around 30,000 men in total were taken to America.
103
 It has 
been estimated that at least 34 percent of the total British troops in America were 
Germans.
104
 
 Around 10 percent of the colonists in America during that time were 
Germans—some of them joined the loyalists as militiamen, but some became Patriot 
sympathizers.
105
 In March 1776, Washington received news from George Merchant, 
                                                 
101 Rodney Atwood, The Hessians Mercenaries from Hessen-Kassel in the American Revolution 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), pp. 24-26. 
102 Christopher Ward, The War of the Revolution (Connecticut: Konecky & Konecky (Old Saybrook, 
CT), 2006), pp. 208–209. 
103 Edward J. Lowell, The Hessians and the other German Auxiliaries of the Great Britain in the 
Revolutionary War (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1884).  
104 Neimeyer, p. 61. 
105 Benson Bobrick, Angel in the Whirlwind: The Triumph of the American Revolution (New York: 
Simon and Schuster, 1997), p. 482. 
- 158 - 
 
a soldier in Captain Daniel Morgan’s rifle company, who just returned from London 
where he was taken prisoner. In the letter Merchant reported that the British King had 
made several contracts to employ troops from German.
106
 This message made the 
American people furious and they condemned the Crown and government as having 
hired foreign mercenaries to kill their own people. On June 10, 1776, Congress 
considered the resolution as a whole committee, and it was agreed to adopt a new 
government, ‘where no Government sufficient to the Exigencies of their Affairs, hath 
been hitherto established, to adopt such Government as shall in the Opinion of the 
Representatives of the People best conduce to the Happiness and Safety of their 
Constituents in particular, and America in general’.
107
 The committee consisting of 
John Adams, Edward Rutledge, and Richard Henry Lee was appointed to write the 
preamble to the Resolution on Independent Governments on May 15, 1776: 
The whole force of that kingdom, aided by foreign mercenaries, is to be 
exerted for the destruction of the good people of these colonies; And whereas, 
it appears absolutely irreconcileable to reason and good Conscience, for the 
people of these colonies now to take the oaths and affirmations necessary for 
the support of any government under the crown of Great Britain, and it is 
necessary that the exercise of every kind of authority under the said crown 
should be totally suppressed, and all the powers of government exerted, under 
the authority of the people of the colonies.
108
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In drafts before June 1776 of the Declaration of Independence, one of the reasons to 
act against the British was that the monarch employed these foreign soldiers to kill 
his own people: 
George Guelf king of Great Britain and Ireland and Elector of Hanover hath 
endeavored to pervert the same into a detestable and insupportable tyranny; 
[…] by transporting at this time a large army of foreign mercenaries to 
compleat the works of death, desolation, & tyranny already begun with 
circumstances of cruelty & perfidy so unworthy the head of a civilized 
nation.
109
 
Much propaganda was released to persuade the colonists to support the American 
cause, including the famous ‘Sale of the Hessians’. It was claimed that Benjamin 
Franklin wrote this satire, supposedly from Count de Schaumberg to Baron 
Hohendorf, a commander of the Hessian force in America. This propaganda bitterly 
insulted the German princes and the British Crown: 
It is true that their king, Leonidas, perished with them: but things have 
changed, and it is no longer the custom for princes of the empire to go and 
fight in America for a cause with which they have no concern. And besides, 
to whom should they pay the thirty guineas per man if I did not stay in Europe 
to receive them? Then, it is necessary also that I be ready to sent recruits to 
replace the men you lose. For this purpose I must return to Hesse. It is true, 
grown men are becoming scarce there, but I will send you boys. Besides, the 
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scarcer the commodity the higher the price. I am assured that the women and 
little girls have begun to till our lands, and they get on not badly.
110
 
Washington saw that America might have to exploit the German colonists, so he 
suggested that Congress set up a German group of soldiers.
111
 One of Washington’s 
reasons to create German companies was to send some of them to be with the German 
troops who had just landed in America for ‘exciting a spirit of disaffection and 
desertion’ of those men, and he was positive enough to ‘think they would have great 
weight and influence with the common Soldiery, who certainly have no enmity 
towards us, having received no Injury, nor cause of Quarrel from us’.112  
 Virginia was the first colony that Congress authorized to raise German troops. 
In January 1776 Colonel John Peter Gabriel Muhlenberg, born to German parents, 
was appointed a commander of the German Regiment or the Eighth Virginia 
Regiment.
113
 On June 27, 1776, Congress authorized a German Battalion in 
Pennsylvania and Maryland as well as additional riflemen in Maryland and Virginia; 
five companies from eastern Pennsylvania, two from Baltimore, Maryland, and two 
from Frederick, Maryland were formed as a separate unit.
114
 In July 1776 Congress 
appointed Nicholas Haussegger, an immigrant from Hanover, Germany, who came to 
America in 1774, to take command of the German Battalion as a Colonel.
115
 The 
German battalion under Hausegger’s command was assigned its first major task in the 
Battle of Trenton in December 1776, where the men were attached to Matthias Alexis 
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Roche de Fermoy’s Brigade.
116
 In this battle the American troops under the Command 
of George Washington were fighting against the Hessians hired by the British. 
Fermoy’s brigade was set to prevent the Hessians from retreating. As a result the 
Hessians yielded to the Patriot force and surrendered. The victory of this battle 
substantially heartened the Americans and gave them courage. The battalion then 
participated in many major battles in Princeton, Brandywine, Germantown, and 
Monmouth, and the Sullivan Expedition.  
 For a company commander, Washington recommended John David Wilpert 
(Woelpper), a German lieutenant who had been a soldier in his own country to 
command the regiment.
117
 Washington was acquainted with Wilpert since they were 
in the Virginia forces together. Being a good soldier and a German made Wilpert ‘a 
man of good character’ for this position. Since a majority of men in the battalion were 
German, to appoint German officers to command the corps would at least eliminate 
language and communication problems and create a sense of unity. This fitted with 
Washington’s purpose that German patriots ‘counteract the designs of our 
Enemies’.
118
 In Congress’ view this German battalion influenced and induced German 
men in the colonies to recruit in the spirit of ethnic solidarity.
119
 As Washington 
suggested combining the German battalions,
120
 in February 1778 the Pennsylvania 
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and Maryland companies were formed as a formal German Battalion, or the 8th 
Maryland, and served as part of Maryland’s quota.
121
 
 During the Revolutionary War one of the most significant problems the British 
army was facing was the desertion of German troops. Major General Henry Clinton 
suggested getting the Russians and putting no trust in the Germans, saying, ‘We must 
be reinforced, not with Germans (I fear they will desert), [but with] my friends the 
Russians. They have no language but their own; they cannot desert’.
122
 In fact, the 
British minister had proposed to get 20,000 Russian soldiers from the Empress 
Catharine as their foreign mercenaries. But this proposal was denied. The Dutch came 
to the same opinion and refused to send their troops to serve outside Europe. So the 
British turned to their German allies. And like Clinton predicted, some of them left 
the service and slipped away as soon as they arrived in North America.  
 There were some crucial reasons for the Hessian desertion. Charles Patick 
Neimeyer in his America Goes to War made the interesting point that in fact some of 
German men who were sent to fight in America did not even know how they were 
employed by the Prince, because they were captured on the street, dressed in uniform, 
and shipped across the Atlantic.
123
 They had no concept of the rebellion; therefore, 
they attempted to escape at the first opportunity. Congress saw this as the opportunity 
to encourage those men to desert the British, and some ‘Hessian’ (the name that the 
colonists called German soldiers) deserters turned to Continental Congress to be 
enlisted in the Continental Army. Some of them were captured after the British defeat 
in the Battle of Trenton in 1776. Washington as a commander-in-chief supported 
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German desertion but disagreed with the plan that Congress tried to enlist those 
German prisoners of war. In his opinion this was not consistent with the Rules of War 
nor appropriate politically. He suggested that Congress follow the method the British 
used by persuading men to join the British army with offers, not obligations. The 
prisoners must be for only exchange and return. He wrote to Congress: 
Our Enemies have committed an unjustifiable Action by inticing, and in some 
Instances, intimidating our Men into their Service, we ought to follow their 
Example. Before I had the honour of yours on this Subject, I had determined 
to remonstrate to General Howe on this Head. As to those few who have 
already inlisted, I would not have them again withdrawn and sent in, because 
they might be subjected to Punishment, but I would have the practice 
discontinued in future. I remarked, that the Inlistment of prisoners was not a 
politic Step, my Reason is this, that in time of danger, I have always observed 
such persons most backward, for fear, I suppose, of falling into the Hands of 
their former Masters, from whom  they expect no Mercy, and this Fear they 
are apt to communicate to their Fellow Soldiers. They are also most ready to 
desert when an Action is expected, hoping, by carrying Intelligence, to secure 
their Peace.
124
 
Therefore, the Congress terminated its attempt to recruit those captives. In January 
1777, Congress circulated recruiting instructions to the colonels of the 16 additional 
Continental Regiments, emphasizing that officers must enlist only freemen of the age 
17–50 and not deserters from the Army of the King of Great Britain. And every non-
commissioned officer and private who enlisted would receive a bounty of twenty 
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dollars and clothes annually as they continued in the service, and they would also earn 
a hundred acre of land at the end of the war or after three-year service.
125
 
 Many attempts were made to influence the Germans’ minds. In September 
1777, Brigadier General James Varnum, a commander of the 1st Regiment of Rhode 
Island, sent a letter to Colonel Friedrich von Lossberg who commanded the loyalist 
troop in the same state. The message conveyed a sense of brotherhood between the 
American and Hessians, ‘the man who fights for gain (a sordid mercenary)—what is 
he? Why do Hessians contend with Americans? By nature they are brethren, the 
offspring of one universal parent, bound by universal laws of God to mutual 
benevolence. The glittering coin of Britain, or her dark intrigues, has interposed’.
126
  
 All these persuasive efforts might have worked to some extent, but the number 
of German deserters from the British army remains unclear. But after the British loss 
and retreat from the Battle of Rhode Island in August 1778, there was the first major 
desertion of 236 German men. It was consistent with the report from Wilhelm 
Knyphasen, a second-in-command of an army of Hessians under General Heister: 
The cause of this [heavy desertion], so far as I can guess, is that printed leaflets 
were spread about amongst the men in a secret manner, in which each men 
who would desert and settle here in the country was promised a quantity of 
land, two horses, one cow, and similar encouragements; Also those who were 
exchanged from captivity have made such glowing descriptions of the regions 
there, and how well they had been received; Which we can also presume, 
because the desertion in the three captive regiments, especially mine, of which 
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the most men have been returned from captivity, was proportionately the 
greatest.
127
  
The Hessian headquarters also made a similar report of their recruits, criticizing the 
princes’ men, saying that they came to America not for duty but to flee away, ‘Most 
of the recruits, mainly foreigners, behave very badly and desert at the first opportunity; 
therefore we cannot use them on outposts. Many of them may have intended to take 
advantage of the chance of free passage to this country, and finally to quit Europe. 
They would have had to work about forty years to pay the cost of their crossing’.
128
 
 In November 1778, Congress further released a proclamation written by 
General Israel Putnam to Germen soldiers in America to persuade them to desert the 
British army. Putnam made it clear that Germans were ‘brothers and fellow 
inhabitants' who could be carried back to their fatherland at public expense after 
desertion.
129
 This made a remarkable change since those deserters did not only have 
to join American troops, but they also had a chance to live the way they wanted. Of 
course some decided to be enlisted and served in some military capacity, but some 
worked on farms and married American women. Most importantly, they were free to 
make a living by their own choice and became citizens of America.
130
 
 Neimeyer saw the Hessian desertion as a legacy of the war, and many of the 
deserters were in American service or provided local labour.
131
 But historians like 
Rodney Atwood in his Hessians Mercenaries from Hessen-Kassel in the American 
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Revolution has insisted that the failure of the American plan to encourage the German 
troops to abandon their army was a failure. Atwood gives the reason that the Hessians 
were captured after the battle of Trenton, and that it was their first employment 
overseas, not desertion, and after the summer of 1778 British army turned to loyalists 
and left the duty of garrison and raids for the Germans.
132
 He concluded that there was 
no evidence to prove the British failed because of the German soldiers’ desertion.   
 The German Battalion dissolved in January 1, 1781. And on February 21 all 
foreign non-commissioned officers and privates including the Germans who belonged 
to any reduced corps were transferred to Colonel Moses Hazen’s regiment.
133
 Hazen 
requested his men to be uniformed in ‘white with Green facing,’ and he was willing 
to pay for any officers who could not afford it.
134
 After the siege of Yorktown, the 
regiment was still on duty and built its reputation. Washington’s trust in Hazen is 
shown through the fact that after the main army was disbanded in late 1781, he kept 
this regiment and ordered Hazen to ‘collect and keep together the Officers and Men 
of the Regiment…& hold them in readiness to march on the Shortest warning’.
135
 The 
regiment continued its service until June 1783 when 300 men were discharged. The 
corps was finally disbanded in November 1783 around the time that the Treaty of 
Paris was signed. 
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Conclusion 
In June 1775, soon after the battles of Lexington and Concord, the Second Continental 
Congress created the American Continental Army. Around 16,000 American militia 
assembled around Boston within weeks when they heard news of a British garrison 
there. Boldly encountering the British regulars and preventing their movement across 
land, the Americans created a legend of brave patriots harassing British regulars. 
However, a year later, as the war ground on, Congress faced a desperate shortage of 
manpower. After the siege of Boston ended, with the British safely evacuating over 
9000 troops, the American militia decided to go home. Offering wages, food, clothes 
and land bounties, Congress tried to persuade the American colonists to join the army 
but this proved unsuccessful. Because Washington could not fill his regiments with 
Americans, Congress sought others, including those from minority groups such as 
Native-Americans, slaves, and Germans. Congress, initially reluctant to recruit from 
these groups, was left with no choice, but the policy was not straightforward. 
 Congress wanted to keep the Indians neutral, knowing that most would side 
with the British anyway because of a long-established trading relationship going back 
to the French-Indian War (The Seven-Year War). In fact, in return for their help, the 
British were prepared to give Native-Americans what they wanted, including 
weapons, tools, housewares and especially a guarantee not to encroach on Indian land.  
As for the slaves, the Americans did not trust them, realizing that to arm slaves 
might lead to a slave uprising. The Southern colonists, moreover, needed slave labor 
to run their plantations, and while the Southern colonists were ready to challenge the 
Crown, they were not ready to overturn their own social hierarchy. It had taken 
Congress a few years to pass the proposal to raise slave troops—and this mainly due 
to an insufficiency of men and cope with the British proclamation to emancipate 
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slaves who join the royal army. The slaves succeeded in part at proving themselves 
free men. But without Lord Dunmore’s cunning idea, it might have taken even longer 
for the emancipation movement to take hold. Moreover, the labour market was also 
put at stake. The British threatened the slaves who were patriots that they would be 
sent back to the bondage, but the Americans tried to adjust their slave policies and 
barred the slave trade.  
 The Germans were better placed to side with the Americans, since they were 
allowed to enlist in their own regiments, speak German, and be commanded by 
German officers. The employment of German mercenaries by the British must have 
had some effect on the Revolutionary War because, at least, it decisively turned the 
conflicts between English men into an actual war. And this war eventually became a 
global war, since, as the war went on, many European countries got involved on both 
the British and American sides. The decision to hire foreign soldiers by the British 
Crown and ministers was a turning point. These overseas reinforcements actually 
could have helped to break down the rebellion, but the outcome was in fact turned 
upside down. Negotiations and compromises could not be made anymore when the 
Patriots were shocked by the number of German troops who were sent to kill those 
who always considered themselves the King’s children. The Continental Congress 
tried every possible way to recruit men, including those German immigrants, to 
encounter the British army. The plans might have worked to some extent, along with 
attempts to encourage the Germans to abandon the British army. But the actual 
effective response indeed happened right away after the King made contracts with the 
German princes. Then the Americans rushed to declare their independence, and the 
Americans struggled to survive until finally they received crucial assistance from 
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France. This was a costly lesson for the British of the perils of using force against 
their own people.   
Congress, however, looked unfavourably on these groups of people, but when 
they saw that the British were recruiting them, they had little choice but to follow 
suit—British and American seemed to use the same approach to recruit men-at-arms. 
The Americans, then, conscripted non-Americans into their army because they could 
not persuade enough Americans to sign up, many of whom believed, after the initial 
enthusiasm for the war had faded, that there was little appeal to being a professional 
soldier. Throughout the war, the Continental Army did not have sufficient men to 
fight, which forced Congress to hire those who had little or no interest in the 
revolution. 
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Chapter 5 Foreign Officers’ Roles  
 
Introduction  
The Americans lacked proficient military officers, and so needed foreign officers to 
sail across the Atlantic to America, to fill these vacancies. Congress wanted the 
Continental Army to be composed solely of American people, but in reality, to create 
an actual army like the European ones, America needed a large amount of money, 
skilled officers, and well-trained men. As mentioned in previous chapters, it was 
crucial to acquire foreign aid to deal with all these deficiencies. The Americans looked 
to France as the biggest source of aid. As soon as Congress declared independence, 
America sent its emissaries to Paris to plead French support. The French not only 
promised to provide money, munitions, troops, and other essential war supplies, but 
they also sent over some of their officers to furnish the American force—some were 
unfit, but some were indispensable.  
 The Continental Army acquired many foreign officers who were seeking 
honour, promotion, or adventure, and some who genuinely immersed themselves in 
the idea of liberty. These gentlemen got involved before the war began and remained 
active until the end, starting with helping to bring French support as an observer, and 
then providing advice in organizing, managing, working, and improving technical 
military units like artillery and engineering. Later on, foreign support was extended 
to other military units such as the infantry, and special tasks like training the troops, 
and even political missions. This chapter will focus on the roles of foreign officers in 
the Continental Army, focusing on some outstanding figures who devoted their efforts 
to the cause in various ways. They made a great contribution towards the Army’s 
advancement and improvement. They all assisted with critical problems and events 
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during the war. Without the help of foreign officers the war might have turned out 
differently. They were greatly involved in the battles and crucial events until the 
decisive battle at Yorktown in 1781.  
Early French support acquisitions 
The Americans started to seek foreign assistance after they decided to open the war 
with their motherland. France was their initial and primary target. Conversely, the 
French government also sent their representatives to assess the situation and the 
Americans’ attitude toward the British after the French and Indian War. This was 
aimed to determine if the French and Americans could work alongside against the 
British power. This showed that foreign intervention in any dispute between Britain 
and its American colonies was being considered even before the conflict broke out. It 
underlines how the tensions and then the war had an international and trans-national 
dimension from their inception.  
 In April 1767, Johann DeKalb, a German officer who served in the French 
army, was appointed (among other officers) to travel to North America to act as an 
observer. Some of his secret mission instructions were to inquire about the intentions 
of the colonists and try to find out whether the Americans were in need of ‘good 
engineers and artillery officers, or other individuals, and whether they should be 
supplied with them’. He would examine their troops, fortified places, and forts. More 
importantly, his task was also to estimate how much the Americans wanted to be free 
from the English government, what their plan of revolution was, and who would lead.1 
In military matters, Kalb’s instructions showed that the French had already known the 
American force’s need and weakness of the shortage of artillerists and engineers. This 
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could be the reason that, when the war broke out, and before formal assistance was 
made, the French government first sent this group of men to America (among these 
men were some talented gems).  
 When Kalb arrived in America, he observed the American discontent with the 
tax on tea. He similarly found that the colonists were furious with the Stamp Act. In 
his report in 1768 he wrote that, ‘[I] am in a fair way to procure reliable information 
as to the discontent produced in the colonies by the passage of the stamp act. This 
affair is very far from being adjusted’. Kalb also mentioned that each colony had its 
own separate assembly and had their own measure to do any action. He added that, 
‘Some, it is true, were more violent than others, but the substance of each refusal was 
the same. The most violent of these provincial assemblies were those of Boston and 
Philadelphia, where the commissioners of the new impost were even threatened in 
their persons’. Kalb concluded that the tax was the main problem that would trigger 
the contradiction, ‘The colonies have the same right; they can only be taxed by their 
own assemblies’. 2   
 Kalb further observed that the Americans would prefer a parliament or a 
continental assembly, a power which, however, would soon become dangerous to the 
crown’. In his opinion the American people were imbued with such a spirit of 
independence and freedom from control. Sooner or later all the provinces would be 
united under a common representation, an independent State will soon be formed. He 
concluded the situation that ‘this country is growing too powerful to be much longer 
governed at so great a distance The people are strong and robust, and even the English 
officers admit that the militia are equal to the line in every particular’.3 
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 The French observation, plus his thought to develop army professionalism, led 
Washington and his supporting officers to urge Congress to send American envoys to 
recruit European officers. Due to this, when French officers later flooded America in 
their fight for promotions and higher pay, Congress and Washington refused to grant 
it to many of them because they did not meet the required qualifications. This issue 
was an annoyance for Washington throughout the War:  
I fear, it will be hardly possible to satisfie the views & claims of some of the 
French Gentlemen. From the high marks of distinction, but too readily 
conferred upon these Men, in many instances, they seem to have lost sight of 
what is just and reasonable’.4   
And a day later he sent another letter to stress his point that he was not willing to give 
commission to those French men, ‘I take the liberty to ask you, what Congress expects 
I am to do with the many Foreigners they have, at different times, promoted to the 
Rank of Field Officers?’5   
 Even if Washington and many of his generals strongly disagreed with the idea 
of commissioning unqualified foreign officers, they allowed it for those who were 
truly talented. In fact they genuinely admired some foreign officers, as evidenced by 
the fact that many crucial tasks, such as fortifications, commanding special infantry 
units, and troop training, were assigned to foreign officers. The American envoy Silas 
Deane visited Paris in 1776 and was later joined by Benjamin Franklin to recruit two 
groups of French officers. The first group was claimed to have expertise in artillery, 
led by Philip Tronson du Coudray, a military theorist with a rank equal to an artillery 
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major.6 The second group was skilled in engineering led by Louis le Begue de Presle 
Duportail.7 Kalb was with the third group of the French officers who would present 
in infantry force. One of these men was the most famous foreign officer in the 
American Revolution, the Marquis de Lafayette, Gilbert du Motier, a young powerful 
French man who had inner connections with the French Court.  
Foreign officers and military leadership 
Bringing in foreign officers was aimed to aid the new troops; however, at the same 
time, it revealed the jealousy toward foreign officers, Congress and the commander-
in-chief had to deal with this problem throughout the war. Washington, in particular, 
utterly disagreed with the idea of recruiting foreign officers that would outrank 
American officers. He wrote directly to Silas Deane: 
The difficulty of providing for those Gentlemen in a manner suitable to the 
former ranks of some, and the expectations of many, has not a little 
embarrassed Congress and myself. The extravagant Rank given to the Officers 
who first came over from France, most of whom have turned out but little 
better than Adventurers, made those of real Merit and long Service, who came 
over with proper credentials, naturally conclude that they should enjoy the 
highest posts in our Army; indeed it could not be expected that they would 
consent to serve in this Country in an inferior Station to those whom they had 
commanded in France. Had not this difficulty been in the way, it would have 
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been in a great measure impossible for us to have provided for them all in the 
line of the Army.8 
Jealousy as well as disunity, and distrust were also found among the American officers 
themselves. Washington’s vulnerable leadership was one of those situations. The 
Conway Cabal once shook Washington’s leadership. Many people got involved in this 
event including foreign officers. Moreover, the situation was cleared up with the help 
of one of Washington’s French officers, Marquis de Lafayette. And, Washington 
gained even more power partly with this support.  
 With this strong bond between the two men, Lafayette helped to restore the 
commander-in-chief’s reputation and take revenge for his adoptive father on the 
Conway Cabal. Winter 1777 was a critical time of leadership in the Continental Army. 
Lafayette spent his late December 1777 until March 1778 on his Canadian campaign 
along with defending Washington’s honour, by being confronted with the Conway 
conspiracy and the Board of War who acted against Washington. Horatio Gates’ 
conquest of the Battle of Saratoga and the heavy loss of Washington at the Battle of 
Brandywine at about the same time made a critical comparison between the two 
commanders. Gates’ victory increased French confidence and persuaded France to 
formally sign a treaty and lend the Americans money, as well as supporting the 
Continental Army with war supplies. Washington’s loss on the other hand resulted in 
1,000 American soldiers wounded and killed. In addition, it allowed the British 
General Howe capture and conquer Philadelphia which at that time was America’s 
capital city and where Congress was located. Congress now was a body in exile and 
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had to set up a new place 100 miles away to the west of Philadelphia in York 
Pennsylvania.     
 Washington then was facing criticism of his poor judgement and weak 
leadership. A lot of members of Congress openly reprimanded him. John Adams the 
one who nominated Washington as a commander-in-chief actually was not satisfied 
with his military commander’s power. He saw that Washington gained too much 
popularity and authority after he won two important battles at Trenton. Washington 
gained credibility from his victory that helped to correct Congress’ mistake in 
delaying command and take back New Jersey from the British. Adams was covertly 
glad that the commander’s fame was diminished. After Gates defeated Burgoyne, he 
expressed his relief to his wife:  
Congress will appoint a Thanksgiving, and one Cause of it ought to be that the 
Glory of turning the Tide of Arms, is not immediately due to the Commander 
in Chief, nor to southern Troops. If it had been, Idolatry, and Adulation would 
have been unbounded, so excessive as to endanger our Liberties for what I 
know. Now We can allow a certain Citizen to be wise, virtuous, and good, 
without thinking him a Deity or a saviour’.9 
Congress did not replace Washington with Gates, but the fact that they named Gates 
as a head of the Board of War, a position that gave him a voice in making war strategy, 
was a bitter taste for the commander-in-chief. ‘This is the low point of George 
Washington professional life,’ said Bruce Chadwick, author of George Washington’s 
War, ‘Congress begins to lose confidence in him. Gates followers are pumping up. 
Gates and the ideas then brought Gates ought to be the commander-in-chief, but now 
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Washington knowing that he has seen as weak must win that soon to solidify that 
command’.10 The new high position allowed Gated and other officers who were 
against Washington to make a plan without seeking his advice. And on January 1778 
Congress passed a resolution to invade Canada with the recommendation from the 
Board of War.  
 Lafayette was appointed to command the expedition with his deputies: Major 
General Thomas Conway and Brigadier General John Stark’.11 This command was 
arranged by Gates. Presumably, Gates chose Lafayette as a head of the campaign to 
please the French, but he actually intended to make Conway as a real commander.12 
Lafayette was given instructions that the propose of expedition to persuade Canadians 
to support the Americans and stir up rebellion in a former French colony, and destroy 
and seize of supplies from Montréal.13 But Lafayette was furious that he was 
appointed as a commander of the Northern Campaign, given that this would be 
considered disrespectful to Washington since Lafayette considered himself 
Washington’s subordinate. But the commander-in-chief encouraged him to accept this 
appointment. So Lafayette did, but he demanded to have Conway replaced by Kalb. 
In a letter to Henry Lauren, the President of Congress, Lafayette straightforward 
scolded Congress for choosing Conway to be with him in this campaign, and this was 
all because of Conway’s accusation against Washington: 
Amongs All the men who could be sent under me Mr. Conway is the most 
disagreeable to me and the most prejudiciable to the cause. I confess you that 
over and friendship have alwaïs been my düties. This last sentiment I feel to 
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the most perfect degree for General Washington. How can I support the society 
of a man who has spoken of my friend in the most insolent and abusive terms, 
who has done and does everyday all his power to ruin him, who tries to spend 
the fire in every part of the army and the country? On the other hand I am very 
certain that every one who can find one single reason of refusing düe respect 
and love to Gal. Washington will find thousand ones of hating me to death.14 
Lafayette request was finally approved by Congress. And because Gates and Conway 
did not seem to have anything to gain from this campaign, the plan was casually 
abandoned and left unprepared. When Lafayette arrived at Albany on February 17, 
1778 he found out that this plan was a joke, ‘I have been much disappointed at my 
arrival in this place, when I seen such a difference between what promised me by the 
Board of War and what I have found’.15 Lafayette realized that it was Conway’s plan 
to disgrace Washington’s leadership and take him away from his commander. He 
wrote to Washington, ‘If they have sent me far from you for I do’nt know what 
purpose, at least I must make some little use of my pen to prevent all communication 
be cut of[f] between your excellency and me. I fancy (between us) that the actual 
scheme is to have me out of this part of the continent, and Gal. Connway in chief 
under the immediate direction of General Gates’.16  
 Lafayette did not hide his anger at this fraud. He wrote to the Board of War 
aiming at Gates, ‘I expect with the greater impatience letter from Congress and the 
Board of War where I’ll be acquainted of what I am to do. I hope the good intentions 
of the honorable Board in my favor could be employed in a better occasion—indeed, 
                                                 
14 Idzerda ed., ‘To Henry Laurens from Marquis de Lafayette, Valley Forge, January 26, 1778,’ vol. 1, 
p. 254. 
15 Idzerda ed., ‘To Moses Hazan from Marquis de Lafayette, Albany February 18, 1778,’ vol.1, p. 288. 
16 Idzerda ed., ‘To George Washington from Marquis de Lafayette, Albany February 23, 1778,’ vol. 2, 
pp. 321-322. 
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Sir, there has been good deal of deception and neglect in that affair’.17 Then Congress 
passed a resolution to suspend this expedition and thank Lafayette for this mission. 
The Board of War resolved that, ‘the Marquis and General Kalb will leave to Ga. 
Conway the chief command of the troops’. Lafayette was glad to be transferred to 
Washington’s command, but the point that Congress made Conway replace him as a 
commander of the Northern Army could not be ignored. At this time Lafayette would 
not pardon Gates’ action or let Conway be ‘a commander’ which would make his 
position equal to Washington’s. He sent a harsh letter to the President of Congress 
disdaining this decision to replace him with Conway: 
Gal. Gates tells me that a niew arrangement will be made for the general 
officers in this part of the continent. That sentence I don’t well understand, but 
was interpreted to me in this way—the Marquis and General Kalb will leave 
to Gal. Connway the chief command of the troops. If it is so (unless such a 
disposition has been made out of a particular consideration for General 
Washington’s recommendation) I’ll beg leave to object that in my country we 
hold a particular military command as an honorable mark of confidence—that 
if I am recalled to leave this command in the hands of a gentleman who comes 
from Europe as well as myself, who is not above me neither by his birth neither 
by his relations or influence in the world, who has not had any more particular 
occasion of distinguishing himself than I have had, who has not the advantages 
I can glory myself in, of being born a French man, I will took upon myself as 
not only ill used but very near being affronted—and such will be the sentiment 
of all those of my nation and Europe whose opinion is dear to me.18  
                                                 
17 Ibid. 
18 Idzerda ed., To the President of Congress from Marquis de Lafayette, Albany March 12, 1778,’ vol. 
2, pp. 348-349. 
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Lafayette threatened to resign and warned Congress that this might affect the 
relationship with France. Lafayette was not someone who would brag about his power 
or connection since he never wanted to accept to be a commander of the Canadian 
expedition, but this all was to protect his commanding general and to teach Gates and 
Conway a lesson. More importantly this event actually deepened relationship between 
Washington and Lafayette. Lafayette showed everyone that he would stand by his 
commanding general no matter what happened, and Washington trusted Lafayette as 
his true friend and supporter even if he never completely trusted France. And he also 
knew that Lafayette did not mean to leave the Continental Army at once.  
Military Expertise  
Engineering 
 One of the American army’s biggest problems was a lack of proficient 
engineers ‘to construct proper Works & direct Men’. Washington mentioned this 
problem since he was appointed as a commanding leader.19 This was agreed by 
Charles Lee. Even if at that time Congress appointed two officers, Richard Gridley 
and William Burbeck, as engineers in Philadelphia, Washington and Lee did not see 
them fit for this task, ‘We were assured at Philadelphia that the army was stock’d with 
Engineers. We found not one’.20 
 The Continental Army stressed the pressing need for engineers most of all. 
Before Congress sent their first envoy, Silas Deane, to Paris in 1776, Arthur Lee an 
American diplomat in London, had already requested that France lend them experts. 
Neither du Coudray’s nor Duportail’s team were the only European engineers who 
                                                 
19 Chase, ed., ‘From George Washington to John Hancock Letter Sent, 10–11 July 1775,’ vol. 1, pp. 
85–97.  
20 ‘II. Letter Sent, 10–11 July 1775,’ in Founders Online, National Archives 
<http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/03-01-02-0047-0003> [accessed 29 June 
2017]. 
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were commissioned in the American army. The first engineering officer that France 
offered was the Polish captain Thaddeus Andrzej Bonawentura Kosciuszko, a 
scholarship graduate of French engineering school, who sailed for America in June 
1776. 
 This skill shortage was critical since engineering was essential in the 
eighteenth-century war. Kosciuszko had been well trained in France and spoke 
French. He was a suitable man to do this job. From his noble Polish family, 
Kosciuszko learned history, drawing, math, French, and Greek philosophy. When he 
was eighteen he pursued his education at a Royal Knight School, established by 
Poland’s princes. This was a military academy and a school of patriotism, where he 
studied English, history philosophy, mathematics with military engineering and 
fortification.  After he graduated at the top of the class he was employed as an 
instructor at the Royal Military School. A year later, he was granted a scholarship to 
study in France where he learned even more strategies, bridge-building, and 
architecture. Kosciuszko was one of the best educated of all the officers commissioned 
in the Continental Army.  
Kosciuszko was an example of an ideal officer—properly educated and truly 
skilled, a rare find in terms of military expertise. It seems like the French were sending 
over one of the best, if inexperienced, engineering officers. His journey to America 
began when he was contacted by Pierre-Augustin Caron de Beaumarchais, a French 
diplomat and spy, following Arthur Lee’s request for war supplies and engineers. 
Beaumarchais arranged Kosciuszko and other men, Romand de Lisle, and Nicolas 
Dietrich, Baron von Ottendorf to sail to America. These men were the first group of 
foreign officers who were sent across the Atlantic by Beaumarchais.  
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 Kosciuszko showed his confidence in his skills since he first arrived at 
Philadelphia. Without any recommendation, Kosciuszko went directly to see 
Benjamin Franklin at his shop and asked if Franklin could test his ability by doing an 
exam. Franklin was surprised and impressed. He told Kosciuszko that no one knew 
anything about ‘engineering or military architecture’.21 So, Franklin sent him to be 
examined by David Rittenhouse an expert in scientific mechanism who he worked 
with in the project of defending Delaware River, and Kosciusko breezed through the 
test.22    
 Franklin decided to hire Kosciusko to help him design the fortifications in 
New Jersey and also recommended Kosciuszko to Congress. Shortly Kosciuszko was 
assigned his first task in August 1776 by Washington (at first Washington thought 
that Kosciuszko was a Frenchman23) to fortify Fort Billingsport to prevent the British 
from entering the Delaware River and attacking Philadelphia. In retrospect, it was 
quite risky to put this responsibility in a foreigner’s hands, especially one whom he 
had never met, but neither Congress nor Washington had a better choice. Washington 
chose Kosciuszko’s services instead of Gridley’s. Kosciusko succeeded, and he 
proved himself a capable engineer. With French artillery officer Romand de Lisle and 
thousands of Philadelphian men, the fort was built to prepare for the potential British 
invasion in Long Island.  The speed at which they was put to use is a good indication 
                                                 
21 Alex Storozynski, The Peasant Prince: Thaddeus Kosciuszko and the Age of Revolution (New York: 
Thomas Dunne Books, 2009) p. 20. 
22 Ibid, p. 21. 
23 In the letter Washington wrote, ‘If the Measure of fortifying the City should be adopted, some Skillful 
person should immediately view the Grounds and begin to trace out the Lines and Works. I am 
informed there is a French Engineer of eminence in Philadelphia at this time. If so he will be the most 
proper’. This is because he had not met Kosciuszko in person and Kosciuszko primarily spoke 
French—one of the reason he became close to Gates who could speak French as well. See ‘From 
George Washington to John Hancock, 9 December 1776,’ in The Papers of George Washington, 
Revolutionary War Series, 21 October 1776–5 January 1777, vol. 7, ed. by Philander D. Chase 
(Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1997), pp. 283–285. 
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of the need for engineers. It was pretty ad-hoc and done without much reference to 
Congress. 
 Even if the British took the fort in the Battle of Long Island, and Kosciuszko 
had not had a chance to completely finish the fortifications, he managed to design a 
180-foot redoubt with a deep moat. He also adapted a technique to rip the enemy’s 
ships’ bottom by using chevaux-de-frise.24 It was a technique that the American 
officers were not familiar with to stop an invasion:  
The Structures were towed up the North River this morning; and seem to be 
intended for Cheveaux de Frize to block up the Passage, either to prevent the 
Ships, that are now above, from coming down, or our Fleet from getting up, 
without being raked by their Batteries. It is of a peculiar Construction; and all 
the Industry of malevolence, which is the most active Sort of Industry, has 
been used to complete it. Our People don’t seem to regard it, and fancy they 
can easily run it down, or remove it out of their way’.25  
And this technique proved very effective, ‘Last night four ships, chained and boomed, 
with a number of amazing large chevaux-de-frise, were sunk close by the fort, under 
the command of General Mifflin, which fort mounts thirty pieces of heavy cannon’.26 
Congress was impressed with Kosciuszko’s design and work, so they decided 
to commission Kosciuszko as an engineering colonel on October 18, 1776. This was 
likely the first time that Congress and Washington saw the real talent in foreign 
officers. Kosciuszko never asked for any promotion or other benefits except his pay. 
                                                 
24 A defensive obstacle which usually were interconnected beams with sharp spike or spear tips for the 
use of fortifications. In this case Kosciuszko laid them under water to tear open the British vessels.  
25 Ambrose Serle, The American Journal of Ambrose Serle: Secretary to Lord Howe, 1776–1778 (San 
Marino California: The Huntington Library, 1940), p. 54. 
26 Chase, ed., ‘To George Washington from Brigadier General Thomas Mifflin, 6 August 1776,’ vol. 
5, pp. 580–582. 
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Even if Washington still misunderstood Kosciuszko as a Frenchman, Kosciuszko’s 
capabilities and reputation was well-known. Without any recommendation or personal 
connection, he proved his talents. Washington often mentioned Kosciuszko’s 
expertise to others. Kosciuszko surpassed many French volunteers in Washington’s 
opinion:  
I know of no other man tolerably well qualified for the conducting of that 
business. None of the French gentlemen whom I have seen with appointments 
in that way, appear to me, to know any thing of the matter. There is one in 
Philadelphia whom I am told is clever, but him I have never seen.27 
Kosciuszko later was given a task to oversee many crucial fortifications in the 
Northern Department to protect the Delaware River in early 1777. Kosciuszko’s 
humility led him to be more trusted to supervise the even greater construction at Fort 
Clinton at West Point. He then was assigned to build Fort Mercer on the New Jersey 
side and Fort Mifflin on the Pennsylvania side.  Kosciuszko located Fort Mercer on a 
high cliff armed with heavy guns in order to watch over and fire British ships that 
attempted to get into the capital. For Fort Mifflin, Kosciuszko ordered his men to dig 
deep trenches outside the fort’s walls and added another fortress along the river cliff. 
The fort was mounted with cannons ready for the invasion.     
 In April 1777 Kosciuszko was appointed to be an engineer of the Northern 
Department under the commander of Horatio Gates. Gates spoke French, and the two 
men developed their friendship quickly. Gates assigned Kosciuszko to investigate Fort 
Ticonderoga, a huge stone fortress on the border of America and Canada in New York, 
located where Lake Champlain and Lake George meet, for its defensive works. After 
                                                 
27 Chase, ed., ‘From George Washington to John Hancock, 20 December 1776,’ vol. 7, pp. 381–389. 
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finishing his observation Kosciuszko suggested to put cannons on the Sugar Loaf Hill, 
a hill a few hundred yards away from Fort Ticonderoga that overlooked the fort, to 
watch over the fort and block the British attack.  
 Gates and Colonel Wilkinson supported this idea. But during that time Gates 
was replaced from being a commander of the Northern Department by Major General 
Philip Schuyler. He conferred with Major Jeduthan Baldwin, a forerunner engineer at 
Fort Ticonderoga and Major General Arthur St. Clair the commander of the fort, and 
they reasoned that since the hill was wooded and very steep, it was impractical to take 
cannons on top of the hill, ‘no Engineer hitherto, French, British, or American, had 
believed in the practicality of placing a battery on Sugar Loaf hill (Mount Defiance), 
was not disposed to embarrass himself or his means of defense by making the 
experiment’.28 Schuyler ignored Kosciusko’s idea and left the hill exposed. 
 On July 1, 1777, General John Burgoyne, along with his 8,000 men, came 
down from Canada along Lake Champlain. They cleared a road up to the hill and then 
erected a block and ripped the guns apart to lift them up piece by piece and put them 
back on top of the hill. Burgoyne’s troops took control of Mount Independence on 
July 5, before opening fire at Fort Ticonderoga. They eventually started firing at the 
Americans on the ground. St. Clair had no choice but to order the men to retreat. The 
army got away, but they left behind huge cannons, food, medicines, and supplies. 
They had to blow up ammunition and arms that they could not carry away.  
 Schuyler was faced with this shameful defeat by his negligence. He now knew 
that the Polish engineer was right, so now he decided to place hundreds of men under 
Kosciusko’s command in to delay the British hunt so they could evacuate. Kosciusko 
                                                 
28 Quoted in Storozynski, p. 28. 
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ordered the men to cut down the trees along the road and destroy the bridges to 
intercept the British convoy. His tactics worked brilliantly, as it took the British Army 
twenty days to travel only 22 miles.29 The continentals made it to New York but 
suffered tremendously though war material losses.   
 But General Burgoyne’s forces finally came to the American base in 
September. However, this time Kosciuszko was trusted to make whatever plan he saw 
best for defending. He investigated the area and located the defences at Bemis 
Heights. There he crafted strong protection with the use of barriers, trenches, and 
redoubts to encounter the British assaults. He also placed cannons 100 feet below 
Bemis Heights to fire at the enemy. Burgoyne’s troops could not pass the defences, 
so they had to enter the woods and the rebels were waiting to attack them in there.  
 On September 19, 1777, as it had been planned, the British were left with the 
only option of taking a roundabout way, and they walked into the forest where they 
were facing with the militia men. This battle was known as the Battle of Freeman’s 
farm—the first clash of the Battle of Saratoga. Burgoyne’s troops suffered more than 
500 casualties. He decided to press a more offensive attack, but General Henry Clinton 
sent a message that he would come to meet Burgoyne’s troops for reinforcement, so 
Burgoyne held off on his plan.  
 The second battle occurred on October 7, when Burgoyne, without assistance 
from Clinton (which seemed like it never came) decided to attack the American line. 
Under the command of Gates, Major General Benedict Arnold led the attack, 
supported by Colonial Daniel Morgan’s rifle regiment. The American troops waited 
                                                 
29 Paul K. Walker, Engineers of Independence: A Documentary History of the Army Engineers in the 
American Revolution, 1775-1783 (Washington DC: Historical Division, U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers, 1977), p. 111. 
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for the British as they got deeper in the wooded area around Bemis Heights in the 
South of Saratoga. Before long, the Americans attacked the British regulars and drove 
them back with heavy loss. Around 20,000 Americans surrounded Burgoyne’s troops 
of 5,000 men until October 17 at Saratoga. Finally Burgoyne surrendered.  
 The two battles and the siege of Saratoga brought glory to the Americans. 
Gates praised his Polish friend, crediting his wise defending and sharp exploiting 
tactics, ‘Let us be honest. In war, as in medicine, natural causes not under our control, 
do much. In the present case, the great tacticians of the campaign were hills and 
forests, which a young Polish Engineer was skilful enough to select for my 
encampment’.30 
 Washington acknowledged Kosciuszko’s talent and reputation and wanted to 
promote this Polish engineer, ‘While I am on this Subject, I would take the liberty to 
mention, that I have been well informed, that the Engineer in the Northern Army 
(Cosieski, I think his name is) is a Gentleman of science & merit. From the character 
I have had of him, he is deserving of notice too’.31 But Kosciuszko humbly refused to 
get promoted since he knew that the promotion would bring him just jealousy.  
 1777 was the time that French officers sailed to America to be commissioned 
in the army claiming for rank and pay, but Washington refused to do so several times. 
Even when Duportail asked for promotion for his men and passed the request to 
Congress and the Board of War, ‘In respect to their abilities and knowledge in their 
                                                 
30 Miecislaus Haiman, Kosciuszko in the American Revolution, in Armstrong’s Memorial, Sparks 
Papers, series 49, vol. 1, (New York: Kosciuszko Foundation, 1975), p. 29. 
31 Ibid. 
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profession, I must observe, they have had no great Opportunity of proving them since 
they were in our service’.32  
 Kosciuszko’s humility led him to be more trusted to supervise the even greater 
construction at Fort Clinton at West Point. In early 1778 Congress decided to create a 
fort to look over the Hudson River in New York at West Point in order to ‘resist a 
sudden Assault of the Enemy’.33 The fort was named Fort Clinton after Colonel James 
Clinton who took control over this fort during the Saratoga Campaign in 1777. He 
made a great contribution in preventing Sir Henry Clinton to reinforce Burgoyne’s 
troops. The fort firstly was placed under the instruction of French engineer Colonel 
La Radiere (Louis de Shalx la Radiere), but he seemed not to be able to work with 
anyone, so it was agreed that the task would fall to this humble Polish Kosciuszko 
would be responsible to build this most important defence in the north, ‘That it will 
be improper for Col: Radiere to Command the Troops, as he ought to Confine himself 
to the Business of an Engineer only […] That Colo. Kosciuszko be directed to repair 
to the Army under General Putnam, to be employed as shall be thought proper, in his 
Capacity of an Engineer’.34 
 Washington appointed Kosciuszko as chief of engineer of the Middle 
Department where he spent two and a half years designing and supervising the 
construction of fortifications at West Point.35 In September 1778 Gates requested 
Washington to appoint his favorite Polish engineer under his command because the 
fort was almost finished, ‘if I had not an Affectionate regard for This amiable 
Foreigner, I should upon no Account have made this my request—The out Works at 
                                                 
32 Grizzard and Hoth, ‘From George Washington to Henry Laurens, 10 November 1777,’ vol. 12, pp. 
199–202. 
33 Hoth, ed., ‘To George Washington from Major General Alexander McDougall, 13 April 1778,’ vol. 
14, pp. 496–498. 
34 Ford, eds., vol. 10, p. 222. 
35 Col. Thaddeus Kosciuszko continued as chief engineer at West Point until June 1780. 
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West point are in a manner finish’d & the Body of the place in such forwardness’.36 
But Washington denied it because he wanted Kosciusko to stay working at the fort 
since the fort might need some additions, ‘Colo. Kosciusko has had the chief direction 
and superintendence of the Works at West point, and it is my desire, that he should 
remain to carry them on. New plans & alterations at this time, would be attended with 
many inconveniences, and protract the defences of the River’.37  
 Despite hunger, lack of suitable winter clothing for men and supplies 
Kosciuszko managed to finish the construction in 28 months. The fort was then ‘the 
key to the continent’. By 1779 a chain was drawn across the Hudson River, and it 
proved so effective that British ships did not directly challenged it. When the British 
attempted to move their army from Canada to join the troops in New York, they found 
that their way was blocked. Therefore, Sir Henry Clinton abandoned his objective to 
attack West Point and ordered a retreat leaving New York for the south.   
 After his work at West Point was completed, Kosciusko immediately asked 
Washington to send him south to work at the front line, ‘I beg your Excellency to give 
me permission to leave the Engeneer Department and direct me a Command in the 
Light Infantry in the Army under your immediate Command or the Army at the 
Southward agreable to my ranck I now hold. Your Excellency may be certain that I 
am acquiented with the Tactic of discipline and my Conduct joind with a small share 
of ambition to distinguish my self, I hope will prove not the Contrary’.38 Even if 
Washington believed that the fort should be looked after by an expert, this time he 
                                                 
36 Hoth, ed., ‘To George Washington from Major General Horatio Gates, 11 September 1778,’ vol. 16, 
pp. 574–575. 
37 Ferraro, ed., ‘From George Washington to Major General Alexander McDougall, 19 June 1779,’ vol. 
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38 Tadeusz Kosciuszko ‘To George Washington from Tadeusz Andrzej Bonawentura Kosciuszko, 30 
July 1780,’ Founders Online, National Archives 
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allowed Kosciusko to work in the Southern Department.39 Under Greene’s command 
in the southern campaign he worked as an engineer, intelligence carrier, and cavalry 
officer.  
Infantry and military tactics 
 European officers also helped to improve American infantry. Armand-Charles 
Tuffin, marquis de La Rouërie or Charles Armand was one of French infantry officers 
who volunteered to come to America. He was a nobleman who had joined French 
military, the Royal House Guards, since he was ten. He was fluent in English and 
German.40 With Deane’s recommendation letter, he sailed to American in April 1777 
and was one of those who were rejected by Washington at first, ‘I shall inform Monsr 
Armand, and reconcile him to it in the best manner I can, that there is no vacancy for 
him at present’.41 But when Washington was presented by Armand’s humility and 
faithfulness he changed his mind. Armand pleaded Washington courteously and 
sincerely to command his own French troops, and this would help to solve the 
communication with other French officers: 
I am come into your country to serve her, and perfect my feeble talent for war 
under the command of one of the gratest generals in the world, of you, my 
general. i have proposed to honorable Congress to be employed in your army 
with this character…to levy, 60, or, 80, french soldiers […] if my talents were 
dissaprouved in time to come by your excellency, you would put in my place 
one other officer, and that i would with pleasure obey him in all opportunitys 
                                                 
39 George Washington, ‘From George Washington to Tadeusz Andrzej Bonawentura Kosciuszko, 3 
August 1780,’ Founders Online, National Archives 
<http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/99-01-02-02795> [accessed 9 February 2017].  
40 Reneé Critcher Lyons, Foreign-Born American Patriots (North Carolina: McFarland & Company, 
Inc., Publishers, 2012), p. 125. 
41 Chase, ed., ‘From George Washington to John Hancock, 16 May 1777,’ vol. 9, pp. 438–440. 
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[…] some french soldiers who are in your army, not understanding the English 
language and will be more useful in your projects with a french chief.42 
Before Washington took action, Congress had already commissioned Armand as a 
colonel on May 10. Washington agreeably accepted Armand’s request on May 19, 
1777, granting him a command of a partisan corps (a light infantry corps) of 200 
French men, ‘I have consented to the request you made me of raising and commanding 
a Partisan Corps. You probably will have it more in your power, to distinguish 
yourself at the head of a body of Men that understand the French Language, on the 
usual terms, any number of Men not exceeding two hundred’.43 
 Washington appointed Armand to take command of the corps of Major 
Ottendorff, a German mercenary, who deserted to the British.44 So, Armand would 
direct the corps that comprised of French, Prussians, and Americans. He and his men 
engaged in the Battle of Short Hills with other troops comprising of 2,500 men where 
he suffered from the loss of 32 out of 80 men.45 But he was able to manage to keep a 
cannon.46  Later on he was trusted by Washington to discuss the plan to attack the 
British at the Head of Elk, Maryland. And in August his corps was responsible for a 
skirmish. Captain Muenchhausen, General Howe’s aide-de-camp recorded that 
Armand was regarded by Washington to urge immediate attack on General Howe’s 
troops. Armand made it at the right time when British men were exhausted from long 
                                                 
42 Varick transcript, handwritten copies in one of the bound volumes used by the team of clerks on 
GW’s headquarters staff who worked from 1781-83 under the direction of Lt. Col. Richard Varick to 
record correspondence, orders, instructions, and related items from GW’s Revolutionary War papers. 
Quoted from Instructions to Colonel Armand, 19 May 1777, in The Papers of George Washington, 
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(Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1999), pp. 468–469. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Grizzard, ed., George Washington, ‘Orders to Armand, 11 June 1777,’ vol. 10, p. 2. 
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46 Lyons, pp. 127-128. 
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journey and were able to use neither cavalry nor artillery because of sick horses.47 
Armand’s corps participated in many battles later at Red Bank under Lafayette, 
Brandywine, and Germantown. Mostly he was responsible to command Hessian 
men.48 
 At Valley Forge winter camp he was allowed by the Board of War to enlist 
deserters and trained them in his unit.49 Washington disagreed with this idea as he saw 
that using the deserters or prisoners’ services was risky and might damage his army, 
‘I am certain I never gave you any encouragement to inlist deserters because I had 
ever found them of the greatest injury to the service by debauching our own Men and 
had therefore given positive orders to all recruiting Officers not to inlist them upon 
any terms’.50 But his advice was ignored, and Congress after all approved Armand to 
recruit ‘deserters from the Enemy’s foreign Troops, French Men, and others not owing 
Allegiance to the King of Great Britain’ to fill in his corps, which later was renamed 
The Free and Independent Chasseurs, consisting of 14 officers and 438 men.51  
 Washington still disagreed with the idea of enlisting deserters and prisoners, 
but he could not do anything at this moment. It was the time that Congress had a new 
Board of War led by Gates, the hero of Saratoga. Washington’s leadership was being 
challenged, and his opinion sounded bitterly valueless. However, Armand’s approach 
actually benefited the army. He proved that his force was capable with irregular 
warfare and hit-and-run tactics. He also trained them with cavalry techniques and how 
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48 Lyons, p. 128. 
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to form an effective unit of dragoons.52 His skills showed in the raid against the Six 
Nations to secure the Hudson Valley, and transport of supplies.  
 Armand’s commanding skill and tactics were impressive, so the commander-
in-chief appointed him to control the cavalry corps after Casimir Pulaski, the previous 
commander, died from wounds during a charge on British positions at Savanah 
Georgia. Now Pulaski’s Legion became Armand’s Legion. A month later he was 
promoted by Congress to be a brigadier general.53 This also made him a chief of the 
Continental Cavalry. Armand’s Legion participated in the Battle of Camden. His 
corps suffered from heavy loss from the battle outcome, so he decided to return to 
France to acquire more war supplies for his corps.  
 Before departure Armand insisted that Congress must grant him a promotion 
for his credibility because that would help with his journey to France to get enough 
support for the troops. Congress first rejected the request, so he sent his complaint and 
plea to Washington:  
I presented this, that should I be granted with the commission of brigadier, I 
would immediately in order to quiet the jealousy it might give in the army go 
to france and feach from there the equipement for the legion. I mantioned that 
this voyage considered as a service payed to america, together with four 
compeignes would justify my promotion to the eyes of the army—this request 
was rejected’.54 
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Washington then promised that he would secure the position of the infantry 
commander for Armand, and Armand would receive his requested commission by the 
time of his return to France, ‘you will always maintain the same place in my esteem 
which you now possess, when you determine finally to return home, I shall take the 
liberty to recommend to Congress the promotion you desire’.55 In France, Armand 
achieved a successful mission. He returned to Boston on August 16, 1781, with two 
French ships containing war supplies. He reported to Washington, ‘I have been so 
lucky as to answer the purpose of my journey there—having with me the cloathing 
and equipment for the legion firelock and shoes for the foots men exepted’.56 Armand 
found that his troops were sent to Virginia to encounter the attack from Benedict 
Arnold, so he rejoined his men there.  
 Another talented tactician was a young powerful French officer, Marquis de 
Lafayette. At the age of nineteen Lafayette was much enthusiastic to receive his own 
command—he came to America for field distinction and prove that his decision to 
leave France was right. Lafayette was trained in conventional European warfare, but 
when leading the troops in America Lafayette was able to adjust the plan and not 
afraid to apply unconventional tactics. His genius military talent got him slip away 
from British captures for many times. The Battle of Brandywine was the first one that 
proved his skill. He followed Washington to the field where he road into the centre of 
the battle at the spot precisely where the British troops were concentrating their 
heaviest fire. The continentals were destroyed and in disorder due to the panic and 
trying to run away from death. At that moment Lafayette actually threw himself into 
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the fight and tried to rally those American troops whom he could hardly communicate, 
but he stood his ground. Finally he got off his horse to rally them, and these men 
rallied round Lafayette. He finally got them regrouped so that they could retreat. In 
this struggle Lafayette was shot in his leg, and Washington insisted the doctor that, 
‘treat him as if he were my son’.57 
His military ability was first tested when Washington was pushed to take 
Philadelphia back from the British. On May 18, 1778 Washington assigned Lafayette 
and his light troops of 2,200 men to observe the British—covering the area between 
the Delaware and Schuylkill, ‘to interrupt the communication with Philadelphia, 
obstruct the incursions of the enemy’s parties, and obtain intelligence of their motions 
and designs’.58 Washington instructed his young general not to camp out to prevent 
being targeted. But the negligent Lafayette gave up his commander’s warning and set 
up position at Barren Hill—eleven miles from Philadelphia. He thought that this 
highland would be a defensible position, and his men could watch over the British 
from the top. But British spies were everywhere, and Sir William Howe soon knew 
his position. If Lafayette was captured, it would lessen the Americans’ hope for the 
French assistance as they lost their main supporter. It would also decrease the 
American morale to fight. So, Sir William Howe sent more than 5,000 men to hunt 
this young Frenchman. 
 As planned Lafayette found himself and his men surrounded by a huge force. 
The Americans started to panic, but Lafayette did not. This was one of his distinct 
characteristics—being calm and ready to fight—being young was advantageous in 
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this case. Lafayette knew that he would never let the British catch him. He sent some 
squads—two to three snipers down to the edge of the wood to fire at the British and 
hide themselves behind the trees and keep repeating the same steps. The British 
regulars were confused with this tactic and started to believe that there was a large 
force under Lafayette. Howe was deceived by this illusion, so he ordered his troops 
to step back and cross the river to watch over the Americans. Lafayette took this 
chance to get down from the hill and pull all his men back and slip away on May 20. 
His ability to cope with this situation seemed to confirm Washington’s confidence in 
this young general.  
 As the alliance between France and America became stronger, the British 
planned to evacuate from Philadelphia to New York. The British government feared 
that their army might be trapped by the French Navy, so they ordered the commanders 
to withdraw. Washington heard this news and saw this a great opportunity to make a 
crucial attack during the British evacuation. He called all his generals to discuss the 
action. Some of them including Lafayette and Greene supported the attacking idea, 
but some like Lee and Steuben thought that the troops they had now were not yet 
ready and they should wait. So, Washington compromised by following the British 
convoy at a safe distance and waiting to see what they could do. 
 Washington now trusted his young French officer to take another important 
command. Washington had chosen Lafayette’s services to command 6,000 men to 
harass Sir Henry Clinton’s rear echelons when the British convoy made a halt near 
Monmouth Courthouse, New Jersey. But, Lee insisted in his seniority that 
Washington should give this important command to him, and Washington finally 
agreed. However, when Lee conducted the operations against the British, and the 
British started to turn around instead of going ahead, he ordered some units to retreat. 
- 197 - 
 
And when seeing other men retreat, other units started to retreat as well. Washington 
arrived at the battle field and got so furious. He took over Lee’s command and got the 
men regrouped and stood firm against the British attack. However, the British troops 
quietly slipped away during the night. Washington was upset that he replaced 
Lafayette with Lee in this sharp attack. Lee’s decision made the Americans miss the 
chance to diminish the British force.  
 After the heavy American loss in the Battle of Camden, South Carolina under 
Gates’ command on August 16, 1780, the British commander Lord Cornwallis moved 
his troops to Virginia. At this moment most people thought that the war would be over 
after the majority of the battles in the Southern Campaign were lost. Fortunately the 
victory of the smaller battle at Kings Mountain on October 7, 1780 made a sense of 
relief to the Americans. After winter encampment of 1780, the war started with the 
Battle of Cowpens on January 17 with the American victory, followed by the Battle 
of Guildford Courthouse on March 15, 1781 led by Major General Nathanael Greene. 
The British claimed the victory but suffered from more casualties because Greene 
decided to make a retreat to save his men.  
 Washington saw an opportunity to attack the weakened British troops. He sent 
Lafayette with his light troops from New York to Virginia to defend against the British 
raiders. And on April 30, 1781 Lafayette faced with the British force at Richmond 
Virginia. And as he did at Barren Hill Lafayette spread his troops very wide to create 
an illusion of a larger force but refused to engage in a battle to protect his troops. 
Lafayette managed to retreat again. This left Cornwallis furious. He became obsessed 
with catching this young Frenchman. Each retreat he made, Lafayette left his a squad 
of snipers behind to assault the British troops. This tactic was effective and able to kill 
the British regular without them knowing who was doing that. It definitely frightened 
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the British soldiers to some degree, ‘Lafayette really has mastered this ability to run 
and hide’.59  
The drillmaster  
 During the time of being confronted with heavy criticism, at Valley Forge 
encampment in winter 1777 Washington realized that he needed to get his army in 
shape to fight. In eighteenth century warfare winter was the time to rest, to train, and 
to resupply. It was the time for the alleged commander-in-chief to fix his army and 
his prestige before spring came. The troops encamped in Valley Forge, north of 
Philadelphia, which was considered a good location to observe British movements. 
Washington exerted himself to improve his army. He designed the camp, issued strict 
rules and harsh punishments, and kept his men in good hygiene.  
 To win a spring campaign in 1778, one of the most significant challenges that 
Washington faced was to train his men to be capable of competing in the coming 
battles. In February 1778, Congress sent a new recruit to Valley Forge to aid 
Washington in keeping the men in line. This man was Frederick William Augustus 
Heinrich Ferdinand Baron von Steuben from Prussia. Paul Lockhart an author of The 
Drillmaster of Valley Forge reasoned that, ‘the greatest fighting force in Europe was 
the Prussian army under Frederick the Great. Its greatness came from its 
professionalism, its hardness, and the machinelike precision’60 This practice showed 
its effective manoeuvres which made the army won the War of the Austrian 
Succession and the Seven Years’ War. Washington might share the same idea. He put 
Steuben right to work as he was desperate to find officers who could help train his 
troops.  
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 But before Steuben made it to this point, his appointment to the position was 
not easily won. He had to jump through several hoops and wait for the approval of 
Congress. He went to Paris to ask for a commission from Deane and Franklin, but the 
two American ambassadors were not in the mood to enlist anymore European officers. 
They had been rebuked by Congress for their overwhelming acceptance of all those 
European officers who were seeking military commission and higher ranks without 
meeting the necessary qualifications. Lockhart commented on this matter that it was 
not actually Deane or Franklin’s fault, since neither of them knew enough about the 
art of war.61 Congress was not even any better—they also could not see any actual 
ability of men through those neat uniforms and their disdainful manner. 
 Therefore, Steuben’s application was turned down by Deane. But Steuben was 
a friend of the influential Beaumarchais and St. Germain who would be willing to 
recommend him to the American representatives.62 The help was also hidden with 
deception. Beaumarchais and St. Germain knew that the Baron was capable to help 
the American situation with army organization and training. The French foreign 
minister Vergennes agreed with this idea, so he pushed Franklin to pursue this plan. 
Then the misled recommendation was sent to Washington with some true and false 
information. Steuben was none of aristocracy. He was no one and had nothing special 
to offer Congress except his experience and talent. But that was not enough to interest 
Congress, so his story needed to be made up. In the letter he was made a quartermaster 
general, but the truth was that he was a captain—not a lieutenant general in the 
Prussian army, and he had been the King’s aid-de-camp: 
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The Gentleman who will have the Honour of waiting upon you with this Letter 
is the Baron de Steuben, lately a Lieutenant General in the King of Prussia’s 
Service, whom he attended in all his Campaigns, being his Aide Camp, 
Quartermaster General, &c.8 He goes to America with a true Zeal for our 
Cause, and a View of engaging in it and rendring it all the Service in his Power. 
He is recommended to us by two of the best Judges of military Merit in this 
Country, M. de Vergennes and M. de St. Germain who have long been 
personally acquainted with him, and interest themselves in promoting his 
Voyage, from a full Persuasion that the Knowledge and Experience he has 
acquir’d by 20 Years  Study and Practice in the Prussian School may be of 
great Use in our Armies.63 
These exaggerated letters gave him a stroke of luck. Steuben and his men were given 
a warm welcome from congressmen. Congress granted Steuben a captaincy at first. 
Henry Lauren, the President of Congress sent Washington another recommendation 
of Steuben and his expecting task which was to plan and to construct discipline—in 
the hopes that would help the army: 
The Baron Steuben who was a Lieutenant General and Aide de Camp to the 
King of Prussia—desires no rank—is willing to attend General Washington, 
and be subject to his orders—does not require or desire any command of a 
particular Corps or Division, but will serve occasionally as directed by the 
General—expects to be of use in planning Encampments &c. and promoting 
the discipline of the Army—he heard before he left France, of the 
dissatisfaction of the Americans with the promotion of foreign officers, 
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therefore makes no terms, nor will accept any thing but the general 
approbation and particularly that of General  Washington.64  
Steuben came to Valley Forge to informally hold Thomas Conway’s position—an 
inspector general. The inspector general was an incredibly challenging position due 
to the variety of tasks it required: the inspector general had to be a teacher, a trainer, 
and a manager all together. He was responsible for keeping the men well trained and 
disciplined. The camp had to be cleaned and kept hygienic. The officer was also 
required to work on supply matters such as food and clothes, so he needed to have a 
good working relationship with the quartermaster. Lastly, it was his job to keep track 
of records and account for all his men and officers in each regiment. This position was 
new to the Continental Army, and Conway was the first one to be appointed. And if 
Conway had not been pressed to resign because of his conspiracy, Steuben might not 
have been able to take this position. 
 The fact that the position was new shows how the American army lacked any 
sort of joint cohesive training and joint discipline. Each regiment was trained by their 
own officer, who used whatever exercise book they could find. There was no 
consistency between the regiments, and when all the men from different groups 
assembled to fight together, they could not do it effectively due to having trained 
under different methods. Conway was confident that he could perform these duties 
and become a legend as America’s first drillmaster. However, his offence against the 
commanding general was exposed, garnering him trouble from Washington’s allies; 
they were ready to attack him both in Congress and in the army. Congress had an eye 
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on the Baron to replace Conway. However, Congress did not grant Steuben this 
position at first since he was still a captain, and Conway did not formally resign.  
 The reason that Steuben was such an important factor in the success of the 
Continental Army is that he transformed the men in the army into soldiers. Before he 
arrived at Valley Forge, men in the army lacked military discipline. Washington had 
been focusing on creating this attribute ever since Congress initially created the 
Continental Army to be a national army, but he was largely unsuccessful. The army 
was meant to consist of men from all the different colonies but who would be able to 
work together harmoniously. However, because Congress could not enact any law to 
force any colony—or later state—to do anything, there had not been any common 
training that at least gave the men a sense of solidarity.   
 Steuben was formally assigned as an inspector general on March 28, 1778, but 
he started working since he arrived in Valley Forge in February and training for first 
time on March 19. His instruction differed from any other—not even like an English 
one that the American had used. He started with basic training of positioning and 
marching in slow and quick steps. His teaching was observed: 
We have a Prussian Lieutenant-General (arrived in Camp) and Knight of the 
Black Eagle &c […] he is taken great notice of and is appointed Inspector 
General of the Army he is now Teaching the Most Simple Parts of the Exercise 
such as Positition and Marching of a Soldier in a Manner Quite different from 
that, they have been heretofore used to, In my oppinion more agreable to the 
Dictates of Reason & Common Sence than any Mode I have before seen […] 
we are first Taught to March without Musick but the Time of March is given 
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us Slow Time is a Medium between what was in our service Slow and Quick 
Time Quick Time about as Quick as a Common Country Dance.65 
It was an impossible task to train all 20,000 men in the army, and Steuben was 
expected to do whatever he could to solve this problem. His best suggestion was to 
have ‘a model company’ that would act as an example and instruct the rest of their 
unit. In Steuben’s method, he would teach each unit’s teacher and that teacher would 
then go on to teach the entire unit. He started small—spending hours each day—
working directly with a model unit that will be used to train the rest of the army: 
The Baron advised that there should be a select corps of this number to receive 
the manœuvres in the first instance and to act as a model to the Army; and 
proposed that it should be formed of the old guard company and drafts from 
the line. I presume, if it should be Congress’s pleasure, a Majority would be 
highly agreable to the Captain, and that it is as much as he expects.66 
Steuben saw the problems of the Continental Army—the Americans could not be 
trained to be like European soldiers because of their own ideology, republicanism. 
They called themselves free men, and this caused obedience issues. Therefore, the 
army needed be drilled differently. In their mind the British army was so great and 
could not withstand, and this also made them panic and lose their will to fight. Men 
were not sure if they could really take action when they engaged in confrontation with 
their opponents because they did not know how to perform and how to deal with their 
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fear in the battle field. Steuben, knew clearly that it would be such a tough and almost 
impossible job to get the men trained properly in such a short time.  
 Soldiers in eighteenth century warfare needed to fight in a linear tactic which 
contained two important parts: firepower and movement—the American needed to 
know how to do this well. Drill was the first thing that came to the Baron’s mind. It 
was the basic component that soldiers knew a series of movements and repeated them 
as a group. ‘Drill instills disciplines’, and it mentally persuaded men to leave their 
individuality behind and accumulated a sense of obedience.67 With a proper practice 
of repetitive movement, men would react what they were supposed to do in the field 
automatically without thinking. When soldiers could clear up their individuality and 
handle their emotion of stress, they would be able to hold their loaded gun and wait 
for order without being in a frenzy and fire their gun or just simply run away.   
 He also employed tactics which he had learned during his Prussian service that 
were new to the Continental Army. But he made some important adjustment to teach 
them. Major John Hall, a military historian at West Point, acknowledged Steuben’s 
awareness of his duty that he was not instructing usual regulars but actually the 
citizen-soldiers who would be trained to be something close to that, so the approach 
must be different: 
The Von Steuben recognised that he was not dealing with Prussian and 
conscripts. He recognized the individuality and the republican notions of the 
population of troops that he dealt with, and he was able to take principles and 
tactics and give them to this force in such a manner that they were willing to 
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receive it. They were able to transform themselves from virtuous republicans 
into soldiers in a professional army.68 
With Steuben’s instructions, the American army learn how to form columns, how to 
properly use, load, and fire a weapon. Caroline Cox also agreed that the soldiers who 
stood up to this compelling exercise at Valley Forge became more professional, ‘The 
army that comes out of Valley Forge is in many ways much more sophisticated one 
than one that goes in there, Von Steuben brings a new level of professionalism to the 
army. That set creates its own sense of belonging—to something larger than 
themselves’.69   
 Steuben’s main duty was to instil discipline in the army as a whole. He 
performed this duty well, as he had trained the leaders of each regiment so thoroughly 
that he was no longer necessary to act as the trainer. At this time his task was to write 
a new manual that could be distributed to all the Continental units. He had a team of 
young officers who knew military practice and could do translation. Steuben wrote in 
French and translated into English by his aide Pierre-Etienne De Ponceau.70 His first 
writing was named Military Instructions 1778, and a revised and expanded version 
was completed in March. The draft were sent out to Major General Sterling and 
Washington for revision and then was submitted to President John Jay for final 
approve. After a few adjustments were made on March, 29 1779 the manuscript was 
published, titled Regulations for the Order and Discipline of the Troops of the United 
States. Washington complimented Steuben’s work:  
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As the fine Season is advancing, you will I flatter myself shortly have the 
satisfaction, so rarely enjoyed by Authors, of seeing your precepts reduced to 
practice—and I hope your Success will be equal to the merit of your work’.71 
Foreign patriots and personal devotion 
Even if many foreign officers came to join the Continental Army mainly for their own 
fame and adventure, there were some who also genuinely devoted themselves to the 
American cause. Kosciuszko was one of those who dedicated his skill and hard work 
to American patriotism. The other outstanding foreigner who devoted his personal 
life, connections, and money to the love of American independence was one of the 
French volunteers, Lafayette, Gilbert du Motier, Marquis de Lafayette, or as the 
Americans call him, ‘Our Marquis’. People know that he fought with the Americans 
during the Revolutionary War and became one of George Washington lifetime 
friends. Lafayette had a very close bond with America and his commanding general 
as he named his only son George Washington Lafayette and one of his daughters 
Verginie after the oldest colony. Lafayette considered himself both French and 
American as he wrote to Benjamin Franklin in 1779, ‘When I say ours, I mean the 
Americans, and under that same denomination I us’d in America to mean the French, 
so that whatever of Both Countries I am in, I am at once Both speaking as a foreigner, 
and spoken of as a citizen’.72  
Lafayette’s participation in and sacrifice for the American cause was 
outstanding. Throughout the War Lafayette never accepted payment. Not only did he 
stay in the army until the end of the War, but he also spent his own money on the 
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Revolution starting with his first journey to America by purchasing his own ship for 
his journey named ‘Victoire’. In eight years of the War Lafayette spent 165,952 livres 
or about 1.66 million US dollar in today’s currency.73  
 Lafayette is an example of a foreign patriotic officer who sacrificed his own 
wealth, time, and family for a cause that was not his own nation’s. To be fair, he did 
all these good things because he was able and unencumbered. He did not have any 
familial bonds, as he lost his parents at a young age. His father died when he was two 
and his mother died when he was twelve, leaving him with prosperous assets that 
provided him about 150,000 livres of annual income. 74 He was willing and financially 
solvent. But even if they had the same assets and opportunity, there were few others 
who would do as the Marquis did. 
 Lafayette was a nobleman born in a knight family—one of the wealthiest 
families in France. His father died in the Battle of Minden in Prussia by the British 
cannon, and his mother’s grandfather was general comte de La Riviere, commander 
of the king’s personal horse guard or ‘the Black Musketeers’. He was also well 
educated in military matters. At the age of eleven Lafayette enrolled at the College de 
Plessie, a private school for young knights and entered ‘the Back Musketeers’at the 
Palace of Versailles as a second lieutenant. When he turned thirteen Lafayette was 
being trained at the royal riding school with the kings’ grandsons. When he was 
fifteen, he married Adrienne, the daughter of a powerful brigadier general, Jean-Paul-
Francois de Noailles, the Duc d’Ayen in the King of France’s Army. Because of his 
own ancestry and his wife’s family background, Layette had an intimate relationship 
with the royal family. The Noailles were one of the oldest and wealthiest families of 
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nobility. Harlow Unger the author of Lafayette considered them more powerful than 
the House of Bourbon.75 This connection gave the man an honourable reputation and 
meant that he was acknowledged by those in power.  
 After marrying Adrienne, Lafayette became a family man. His decision to join 
the American army was not approved by his father-in-law. Duc d’Ayen rushed to King 
Louis XVI to stop Lafayette’s voyage. The king ordered Lafayette to return home 
promptly, ‘notably Monsieur le marquis de la Fayette, to leave immediately and return 
to France’.76 The king actually did not agree with the idea of sending French officers 
to fight the British in America because he saw that it could provoke the war between 
France and Britain. He also issued a statement to cancel all the French officers who 
were about to travel to America to join the American army. But the fact is that this 
demonstrated how powerful the Noailles and how famed Lafayette was. 
Unfortunately, the king’s words did not reach the expedition, but Lafayette decided 
to return his ship back to Paris after he felt much guilty for his father-in-law and his 
young wife. But he changed his mind again and left for America. On April 20, 1777 
he and his team sailed to America and arrived in George Town Bay, South Carolina 
on June 12.  
 Lafayette hoped for glory for America, but this caused chaos in Paris. The 
news that Lafayette had abandoned the king’s order made the French Foreign Minister 
Vergennes furious; the British stopped every French ship to find Lafayette, making 
trouble for the French merchants. The people of France saw the situation differently, 
though—they talked about the young gentleman who had made sacrifice to help the 
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American cause. The message of fighting for independence and liberty spread 
everywhere as Benjamin Franklin and Silas Deane observed, ‘All Europe is for us. 
Our Articles of Confederation being by our means translated and published here have 
given an Appearance of Consistence and Firmness to the American States and 
Government, that begins to make them considerable’.77  
 Lafayette’s action and sacrifice also encouraged a lot of young men to take the 
same adventure. Deane and Franklin wrote to the American Commissioners reporting 
that they got many applications from European officers to be enlisted in the American 
army:  
The Desire military Officers here of all Ranks have of going into the Service 
of the United States, is so general and so strong as to be quite amazing. We 
are hourly fatigu’d with their Applications and Offers which we are obliged to 
refuse; and with hundreds of Letters which we cannot possibly answer to 
Satisfaction, having had no Orders to engage any but Engineers, who are 
accordingly gone. If the Congress think fit to encourage some of distinguished 
Merit to enter their Service, they will please to signify it’.78  
But when he arrived in America, Lafayette had faced with rejection when he report 
himself to congress who passed this matter on to the commander-in-chief to make a 
decision. So Lafayette went to see Washington at Valley Forge, Philadelphia. 
Washington had received Deane’s reaffirmation, and when he met Lafayette in 
person, the young man made a very positive impression. Washington immediately 
changed his mind. The boy look so young in his eye but so loving and passionate. 
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Washington made a compliment of his ‘zeal and sacrifices in coming to America’. 
And Lafayette ‘was paid a thousand compliments and persuaded to establish his 
quarters in his (Washington’s) household and dine at his table for the whole 
campaign’.79 Washington accepted Lafayette’s commission as a major general, the 
youngest general in the Continental Army.  
 When Lafayette arrived at the camp in Philadelphia the appearance of the 
soldiers and their site were much worse than he had imagined. Washington caught 
that disappointment and said, ‘I suppose we ought to be embarrassed to show 
ourselves to an officer who has just left the French forces’. Lafayette smartly 
responded, ‘I have come here to learn, mon général, not to teach’. This sentence 
showed Lafayette humility that was contrast with any other French or foreign officers 
who asked for benefit and looked down on Washington’s new born army and men. 
Washington was impressed. The two men developed their relationship and soon 
became ‘father and son’.   
 Not only did he have good relationships with American leaders, Lafayette was 
also loved by his men. As a generous man he spent his own money on American 
soldiers since the very first days he arrived in America to outfit and equip them. Robert 
Crout, editor of Lafayette Papers Project explained that, ‘The difference with 
Lafayette was that they [Congress] became convinced of the genuineness of his 
commitment to the American cause,’80 Unger also added that, ‘Unlike everyone who 
fought in the war at that point he was the only one who have stood to gain nothing 
economically or politically’.81  
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80 Robert Crout, Interview with M Military History Channel. 
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The politics of enlisting foreign officers 
Foreign officers’ participation went far beyond military use, such as in Lafayette’s 
case. Congress realized that some of them were better used for different tasks, even if 
in the very first years of the war the excessive commissioning of foreign officers 
caused the issue of receiving unqualified foreign officers and jealousy among the 
officers. Congress had warned the American ambassadors in Paris not to easily 
promise commissions with the French officers. Deane might have recruited some 
French officers who irritated the American officers, he was so sure that Lafayette 
would give America a great advantage. It indicates that there was a political angle to 
the enlistment of foreign officers—the American cause in Europe, not just a military 
need like engineers and artillery officers. He wrote back to the commanding general:  
I lately recommended to your particular notice the Marquis de La Fayette, a 
young Nobleman of the first rank, family, and fortune, and who adds to all 
these the most ardent zeal to distinguish himself in a cause which is justly 
considered as the most noble and generous […] I am directed to inform your 
Excellency that his going, being without the approbation or knowledge of the 
King, is disagreeable, and that his Majesty expects that you will not permit 
him to take any command under you; but that he should be directed 
immediately to return. However disagreeable this may be to Monsr La Fayette, 
I am confident that the respect he will pay to the requisition, which I have the 
honor to enclose, will induce him to comply therewith in the most ready and 
agreeable manner, and that you will effect it so as to give satisfaction to his 
Majesty, and without occasioning public observations or reports disagreeable 
to the Marquis, who, I am sure, will comply with the orders sent without giving 
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you or any one in power in the United States the disagreeable task of 
interposing.82 
After being commissioned in the Continental Army, Lafayette in fact started his 
personal mission as a politician by writing back to France, not only to his family, but 
also to French government officials, while he was hospitalized from a gunshot wound 
from the Battle of Brandywine. He persuaded French ministers that this was a cause 
that France should make a contribution to its own interest because this was an 
opportunity to lessen the British power, and the American cause was certainly the 
matter that France should support. Lafayette was not only an officer, but he was an 
influence at the French foreign policy. He had acted as both French and American 
officer and representative. Throughout the Revolutionary time he always spurred 
French court to support the American cause by writing to Foreign Minister Vergennes 
and Prime Minister Maurepas. He also wrote to his father-in-law pleading him to urge 
the support for American cause from the French court. The letter directly explained 
his pure heart and intention for liberty:   
America waits with impatience for us [French] to declare for her. I hope France 
will one day decide to humble England. This consideration, and the measures 
America appears willing to pursue, give me great hope for the glorious 
establishment of her independence. I no longer see us [Americans] as strong 
as I believed to be the case, but we are able to fight and we shall do so, I hope 
with some success. With the help of France we shall win, at some expense, the 
cause that I cherish because it is just, because of honours humanity, because it 
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concerns my country, and because my friends and I are deeply committed to 
it’.83   
Lafayette obviously gained credibility which made his requests for French support 
sound credible. He also mentioned his close relationship with American leaders and 
presidents, and especially his commanding general: 
I am closer to him than anyone else, and I find him worthy of his country’s 
veneration. His warm friendship and his complete confidence on me regarding 
all military and political matters, great and small, put me in a position to know 
all that he has to do, to reconcile and to overcome’.84  
During the War Lafayette participated in commanding situations, proving himself 
influential and effective. Because of this, he became a symbol of the French in the 
eyes of the rest of Europe. After performing his duty in the American army for over a 
year, in winter 1778 Washington suggested Lafayette make a return to France to visit 
his family and the French Court to strengthen the support on America. On October 
21, 1778 Congress authorized leave and voted to present a sword to Lafayette. 
Previously the Americans had received money, arms and supplies, and foreign officers 
from the French, but to make a decisive fighting the American needed more troops 
and fleet—as they had no fleet themselves to cope with the British Navy in the seas. 
This time Lafayette would fully act as an American representative. He took his leave 
for over a year to France making attempts to gain support from Versailles.  
 Lafayette was indeed a very powerful man. The event that proved his social 
status best was the fact that disobeyed the king’s command but did not receive an 
actual punishment. His ship arrived at Brest on February 6, 1779. He received a warm 
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welcome from French aristocrats. He went to Versailles on February 12 and received 
the king’s punishment to be put under house arrest for a week in order to maintain the 
king’s dignity, which Lafayette had greatly offended by his disobedience. The king at 
first refused to let him have an audience and punished him by ‘imprisoning’ him in 
Hôtel de Noailles, one of his wife’s family assets. This was considered staying 
comfortably at home and spending time with his wife and children. Lafayette knew 
that the king meant no harm to him, but he wanted to impose a nominal penalty. 
Lafayette wrote, ‘I was questioned, complimented, and exiled; but it was to Paris I 
was sent, and the confines of Hôtel de Noailles were thought preferable to the honors 
of the Bastille, which was first proposed’.85  
 Lafayette wrote to the king to admit his error and clarify his reason for the 
departure to America, ‘Love of my country, the desire to witness the humiliation of 
her enemies, a political instinct that the last treaty would seem to justify: these, Sire, 
are the reasons that governed the part I took in the American cause’.86 And a week 
after being put in ‘prison’ the king granted him an audience.87 Louis gave him a mild 
reprimand and restored good relation, and a month later Lafayette was hunting with 
him as usual.88    
 Then Lafayette was appointed as a lieutenant-commander of the King’s 
Dragoons with the rank of mestre de camp.89 He visited and wrote to many French 
leaders such as the minister of foreign affair, Vergennes, the minister of state, 
Maurepas, and the minister of the marine, Gabriel de Sartine in order to acquire as 
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- 215 - 
 
much as support for the Continental Army. He was also working closely with 
Benjamin Franklin and John Adams who were at that time in Paris.  
 Lafayette spent most of his time working as an American diplomat. He 
discussed plans for a raid on Irish and English coasts, but the expedition was 
abandoned.90 He tried to help the Americans procure loans from Holland and from 
France and Spain.91 He also submitted memoir to French minister on sending an 
expeditionary force to America.92 During January-February 1780 he opened 
negotiations for arms and munitions for Americans and presented his 
recommendations concerning an expeditionary force. Hard work eventually paid off, 
and Lafayette reaped great benefits from his efforts. On March 6, 1780 Versailles 
proposed to send the help to the United Sates comprising of the Naval force and guns, 
9,000 men, officers, soldiers and sailors, six months provisions, clothes, and 
transports. Gabriel de Sartine wrote to Lafayette before his departure to America: 
 The succours which the king proposes to send to the United States of North 
 America to facilitate the means of consolidating their independence and 
 throwing of the yoke of English tyranny. 
1st. The Naval force destined for North America actually consists of Six Ships 
of line, one of which is of 80 Guns, Two of 74, and Three of 64, equipped for 
war; of another Ship of 64, armed en flute, Three Frigates and one Corvette. 
2nd. The number of Transports cannot be determined at present, but they wil 
carry about nine Thousand men, officers, soldiers & [Sailors] with Six months 
provision sea or land. 
                                                 
90 Ibid., pp. xxxviii-xxxix. 
91 Ibid., p. 236. 
92 Ibid., pp. xxxviii-xxxix. 
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 [3.] The fleet will be provided with Six months provisions  complete…and 
 additional quantity of drinks and salted meats […] 
 8. All the Cloaths, Arms & other Effects which shall be delivered by Mr. 
 Franklyn or the Commissioners of Congress to be transported to America. 
 9. The Transports shall carry as great a number of flat bottom boats as 
 possible, and the Ships of war shall be provided with all the Shallops & 
 Canoes.93     
Lafayette sailed back to America in March 1780 to hold an important conference on 
September 21-22 at Hartford Connecticut between Washington and the supreme 
French Lieutenant General Jean-Baptiste comte de Rochambeau and Chevalier de 
Ternay, a French naval officer. Lafayette served as an interpreter and secretary at the 
meeting. This duty means more than translation work as Lafayette could speak both 
French and English, but it implies that he was in a high position to know such 
important and secret matters about the overall battle plan and agreements. Lafayette 
was the only person present at the meeting aside from the two French officers and 
Washington.94 The three commanders agreed that offensive operations could not be 
undertaken until more aid arrived from France, so they called on the French 
government to provide more troops, ships, and supplies.95   
Foreign officers’ integration into the decisive battle at Yorktown 
The successful fortifications designed by the Polish engineer Tadeusz Kosciuszko at 
West Point aided significantly in the defence of the Hudson River. This not only 
helped prevent the British from dividing the colonies, but it also allowed no British 
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vessels to cross ‘the Great Chain’. Even if the strength of the fort was never actually 
tested by the British threat, its durability made an impact on the British decision to 
move their troops southwards, because it successfully obstructed their lines of 
communication and transportation. This led to potentially the worst betrayal of the 
American Revolution, which occurred when Benedict Arnold tried to sell the fort’s 
plans to the British. Fortunately, he was exposed before the plan reached British 
hands. Otherwise, the Americans would have likely lost the ‘most important post in 
America’.  
 The British switched the focus of their operations to the Southern theatre in 
1780. After Kosciuszko completed the fortifications at West Point, he was moved to 
serve in the Southern campaign under Major General Nathanael Greene, the Southern 
Department Commander who held that title after Horatio Gates. At that time, the 
Americans had lost every major battle in the South. Lord Cornwallis’s army captured 
Charleston, South Carolina, which was followed by a defeat at Camden under the 
Gates’s command. Greene was shouldering a difficult task. After several defeats in 
the South, he now had a very small amount of 2,307 men who were all extremely 
weak and exhausted. 96 The Americans had suffered from severe loss and humiliation. 
 The matter that makes these foreign gentlemen special is that they all, aside 
from Kalb, played a part in the Siege of Yorktown, which subsequently led to the 
decisive victory of the American War of Independence. Even if the Battle of Camden 
in 1780 took his life, Kalb had performed his duties with distinction. After the 
Canadian Expedition with Lafayette was abolished, he was transferred to Valley 
Forge and maintained serving Washington’s headquarters with the task of guarding 
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from the British line and making a report of the enemy’s action. His mission and his 
life ended in the disastrous defeat at Camden under Gates’ command.  
 Kalb as a second commander of the Southern Department at that time actually 
warned Gates to stay defensive because they needed more information on the enemy’s 
plan and men, and the American troops comprised majorly with the militia and 
Continentals from different brigades, and these men had never manoeuvred together. 
But Gates after all made an attack with his troops of 1,500 Maryland and Delaware 
Continentals and 2,200 militiamen of North Carolina and Virginia. Cornwallis had 
1,500 British regulars and 600 British legions, Irish volunteers and North Carolina 
Provincials. As Kalb had predicted, the inexperienced militia men were not prepared 
for what was coming. When they could not handle—at least mentally with a well-
drilled and undaunted enemy. Charles Baxley, Chairman of Preservation of the Battle 
of Camden Advisory Group, explained that, ‘when you shoot at a British Infantry 
Regiment, they don’t run. You do hit some of them, but every time somebody falls, 
someone else stands. They march in order with bayonets coming in your direction. 
That was enough for the militiamen. Many of them put down their weapons and took 
off and run without firing a shot’.97  
 But the Battle of Camden was another turning point of the Revolution, 
partially due to Washington’s confidence as a leader. At this moment in time, he 
firmly believed in his plan and in the abilities of his own men, especially training his 
troops to be a professional force because of Steuben’s insistence that ‘drill instills 
discipline’. Gates was replaced by Greene to command the South, seconded by 
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Lafayette. He began with finding a new position for an encampment in a defensible 
and safe enough location for his small force. The force was presently stationed at 
Charlotte, North Carolina, where provisions were not sufficient. Greene needed a 
winter camp and enough time to nourish and reenergize his ill troops. He entrusted 
Kosciuszko, his engineer, with the task of finding a new position for encampment: 
Examine the Mount of Little River twenty Miles down the Peedee and search 
for a good position for the army. You will report the make of Country, the 
nature of the soil, the quality of water, the quantity of Produce, number of 
mills, and the water transportation that maybe had up and down the River. You 
will also enquire respecting the creeks in the Rear the fords and the difficulty 
of passing them, and which you will report as soon as possible.98  
Kosciuszko then went down the river and found a site on the east bank of the Pee Dee, 
nearly opposite Cheraw Hill. Greene accepted Kosciuszko’s advice of moving the 
men to this new location, and on December 26, 1780, he moved the force to the 
suggested position. Greene reported to Washington, ‘Upon a little further enquiry I 
was fully convinced, and immediately dispatched Col. Kosciuszko to look out a 
position on the Pee Dee, that would afford a healthy camp and provisions in plenty. 
His report was favourable, and I immediately put the Army under marching’.99 
 Greene knew that he could not follow Gates’s strategy of using his entire force 
to attack Cornwallis, because this time he knew that there would not be a second 
chance if they failed. If he lost, the Americans would undoubtedly lose the War. 
Greene took a risk in dividing up his already small number of troops for his first 
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mission, sending approximately 1,000 men—under the command of Brigadier 
General Daniel Morgan, who had made his name in the Battle of Saratoga under 
Gates—to harass the British in western South Carolina, which was at that time under 
the command of Lieutenant Banastre Tarleton, with a force of 1,500 regulars and 
volunteers.  
 Morgan picked his men carefully. He knew that the militia could attack the 
British regulars from a distance, but up-close battle must be conducted by well-trained 
soldiers—the same ones who had been instructed by Steuben’s regulations to not be 
afraid and run away in the heat of battle. He chose militia veterans as well as well-
trained Continentals. This time, they could not retreat or lose. He planned the lines of 
the troops in an effort to deceive the British by making a retreat to the woods in an 
effort to lure Tarleton closer to the trap, and then come back out of hiding to attack 
the British. This plan worked effectively, and subsequently forced the British to 
surrender. Morgan’s troops also succeeded in defeating the ‘Bloody Ban,’ a much-
feared British officer. This brought much courage to the people and to the army. 
 Greene now was confident with his tactics, while Lord Cornwallis was furious 
with the outcome of the battle. He was determined to hunt down Greene’s army, but 
Greene’s army was not ready for such a confrontation. Greene began a game of ‘cat-
and-mouse’ in an effort to diminish Cornwallis’s supplies and buy time while waiting 
for support from the French. Cornwallis finally found out where the Americans were 
hiding, and Greene was forced to escape by crossing the Dan River. He appointed 
Kosciuszko with the task of building flatboats for the men, and then in February of 
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1781, the Americans made it across the river before the British could catch them. 
Kosciuszko also built breastworks with snipers to protect the troops. 100      
 After the battle at Guildford Courthouse, Cornwallis did not follow Greene 
and waited to join the main British force. This allowed Benedict Arnold to attack 
Virginia, while Washington sent Lafayette and his light division to join Steuben’s 
militia in Virginia in an effort to capture the traitorous Arnold. At the meeting at 
Richmond, Virginia, Steuben told Lafayette about his plan to capture Cornwallis in 
North Carolina by moving his militiamen to the west, Lafayette’s division from the 
north, and Greene’s from the south, in an effort to trap the British.101 
 Lafayette agreed with this plan, and Steuben submitted the plan to 
Washington. But before Washington could make any response, Cornwallis received 
the news that other British troops under Phillips and Arnold were being sent to 
Virginia, so he decided to march his troops to join with these.  He arrived at Yorktown, 
Virginia, on August 3, and began to build fortifications. His army was now stranded 
on a narrow isthmus between the James River and Chesapeake Bay. Lafayette was 
watching him closely and would oppose him if he tried to send out patrols or forging 
parties. Cornwallis was now confident, with his back to the sea, that the British Navy 
would be able to rescue him. But this all became hopeless after Washington enacted 
a secret plan.  
 Washington probably got his idea from Steuben, but he made his plan simpler 
and more effective, by engaging the American troops with the French force and the 
Navy.  Washington and Rochambeau had the idea of luring the British into launching 
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an attack in New York, but instead they made the decision to take on Cornwallis in 
Virginia. And while Washington and Rochambeau moved their armies south to 
Yorktown, a French fleet sailed into Chesapeake Bay. When a British fleet arrived to 
rescue Cornwallis, they were instead faced with the French war ships lying in wait. 
The battle lasted for four days, ending with the British troops escaping to New York, 
and 3,000 marines joined Lafayette’s troops. Washington and Rochambeau 
approached Yorktown in late September with 8,000 American troops and 5,000 
Frenchmen. On October 9, Washington ordered his artillery to bombard Cornwallis’s 
encampment. Lafayette, with his French reinforcements, was appointed to assault the 
British readouts. Charles Armand’s Legion participated in the assault on Redoubt 
number 10, and the siege of Yorktown. The siege continued until October 17, 1781, 
and then finally came to an end. Cornwallis then finally sent Washington his articles 
of surrender. 
Conclusion 
Foreign officers had an important role in the American Revolution and the 
performance of the Continental Army. They had made a contribution since before the 
war had begun, as observers for the French government, which helped Versailles to 
decide if the Americans were worth the cost of waging the war with the British. The 
decision to get involved in this conflict led to various kinds of French assistance, such 
as money, arms, war supplies, fleet, and, especially, officers. Some of those officers 
were rejected by Congress because they were not qualified, but some were talented 
and pragmatic. Not only did American emissaries work to obtain foreign aid, but some 
foreign officers did this too.  
 This group of foreign officers was trusted with vital tasks. Many of them 
performed special jobs such as engineering and construction. The strongest and 
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strategic fort that could prevent the British from sailing from the north was designed 
and produced by the Polish engineer Kosciusko. Many French engineers such as du 
Coudray and Duportail came to take care of the artillery and engineering. Some 
foreign officers also commanded significant special infantry units such as Armand’s 
Legion. Moreover, one of the Prussians, Baron Von Steuben, became a legendary 
drillmaster who significantly turned the American troops into a more professionalized 
force in months. In addition, a lot of them were Washington’s most trustworthy and 
credible officers in the army, strengthening the commander-in-chief’s leadership. 
Some even represented themselves as politicians to acquire French support—Marquis 
de Lafayette was an example of these virtues. Best of all, many of them became 
American heroes and did momentous work.    
  But we cannot deny that the American Revolutionary War and the Continental 
Army were appealing places for many European officers—coming to America meant 
hope for better opportunities and higher ranks than those in their motherland. 
However, they were not as skilful as they claimed as Congress refused several of those 
who were not qualified. This problem annoyed Congress and Washington throughout 
the war. The arrival of many foreign officers was, in fact, motivated by professional 
development. The arrival of foreign officers also proved to be the flaw in patriotism, 
as it fostered jealousy and mistrust among Congress members and the army, between 
the American officers and the foreigners, and among the American officers 
themselves.  
 But, among those foreigners, there were some who actually enjoyed serving 
under the American command and devoted themselves to the war’s cause. The fort at 
West Point built by the Polish engineer was evidence of the worst treason in the 
American Revolution. An attempt to oust Washington from his command was stopped 
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by a French officer. Some of them also used their personal money to support their 
men and operations, as well as used their connections to gain foreign assistance. 
 The roles of foreign officers in the Continental Army were abundant and 
memorable. Their contributions were something to be taken into consideration when 
looking at how the Continental Army was organized and developed over war time. 
The Americans lacked war funds, supplies, and experts in military strategies and 
performance, and this problem was soothed by those foreign officers who participated 
in most aspects of the army, if not all. This led to the idea that the Americans thought 
of this was as a war for all of mankind’s liberty and equal protection, an important 
right that most of the world supported. As Benjamin Franklin wrote in 1777, ‘Tis a 
Common Observation here that our Cause is the Cause of all Mankind; and that we 
are fighting for their Liberty in defending our own’.102 
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Chapter 6 Military Academy 
 
Introduction  
During the Revolutionary War, the Americans relied heavily on European officers and 
their military skills and specialties, but once the war was over, they realized they could 
no longer count solely on European experts if they wanted to maintain their 
independence. Even then, it took America almost 30 years to create the first military 
academy in 1802. West Point, however, had its roots in the Revolutionary War, and 
this idea of establishing a military academy was motivated by the military schools 
instituted in Europe, which served as an inspiration. Besides that, it was not only the 
American officers who wished to have their own training school, but the foreign 
officers who joined the war also supported this thought. 
Accounts of West Point during the Revolutionary War time are scarce. Some 
historians, like Joseph Ellis and Robert Moore in School for Soldiers West Point and 
the Profession of Arms describe and analyze the operations of West Point, illustrating 
how it prepared the way for future military leaders.1 However, the book does not say 
anything about the background of the military school establishment. Stephen E. 
Ambrose’s Duty, Honor, Country: A history of West Point2 touches on the founding 
of the institute, putting forth the idea that military schools in Europe inspired the 
concept of creating one in America. He also speaks to the struggle Americans faced 
in forming their military school, which ended in several failures before West Point 
was formally established. More interestingly, the official website of the United States 
Military Academy remarks on the role of West Point in the Revolutionary War as the 
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most important strategic area on the Hudson River for both the American and British 
armies. There was some small detail which reveals why some American leaders may 
have supported the idea of forming a school for the arts and sciences of warfare.3  
 Foreign officers participated in both building the fort at West Point where the 
academy is located, and in helping to organize the corps of artillerists and engineers, 
the two main technical subjects that were most necessary. The fort West Point was 
designed and constructed by the Polish engineer Tadeusz Kosciuszko to ‘protract the 
defences of the [Hudson] River’.4 Washington himself requested Kosciusko to accept 
this job since he deemed that nobody was better fitted for the task.5 The fort performed 
its duty, preventing the British from travelling across the river from the north during 
the war. After the conflict was over, it was suggested that West Point become the first 
American official military academy, with many leading American and foreign officers 
giving their consent that one should be created.  
 This chapter aims to compile some analyses on the original concepts for the 
creation of the first military academy in America, which occurred before the 
Revolutionary War began and the Continental Army was created. It also considers 
both American and foreign participation in forming the corps of artillery and 
engineers, which were the first two main subjects to be taught. Today, West Point is 
known as one of the most famous military academies. However, the history of West 
Point needs to be traced back to before America developed its national army. 
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The idea of establishing a military academy to meet the need for specially trained 
experts began when the Americans realized that they had only a few capable men to 
fill these roles in the Revolutionary war. In the eighteenth century, new technology 
produced new types of military weapons. Small arms were improved, such as the 
newer flintlock muskets that replaced the older matchlock muskets, and cannons 
continued to improve in range and hitting power. Fortifications, entrenching, building 
camps, and roads as well as siege craft knowledge could both provide better protection 
to troops and increase the chances of winning the war. These new developments 
proved their effectiveness by field fortifications built during the war time, and when 
the Americans laid siege at York Town in 1781 and forced the British troops to 
surrender. However, managing these new weapons and defensive operations required 
technical skills. The war was no longer limited to cavalry and infantry troops; it 
demanded other capabilities such as engineering and artillery.  
 The military academy grew out of eighteenth-century military culture and 
aimed to help young gentlemen achieve proficiency in the specialized military 
subjects of artillery and engineering that required technical skill. These two fields 
were considered superior to infantry and cavalry, and the artillerymen and engineers 
were considered the intellectuals of the troops. The artillery piece was a powerful 
weapon with a longer range than that of muskets, and it could be used in multiple 
ways: destroying fortifications, preventing an enemy navy from landing, and 
frightening and killing opponents at a short range. Men who were able to use this 
weapon were assumed to be good at mathematic and geometric calculation, and for 
the new-born army in their first war, it was rare to find such men. 
 The military academy in fact was not a new idea in the Revolutionary era. In 
Europe, it was France that was very good at training its officers. The École Royale 
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Militaire, an outstanding school that produced the best officers in artillery, 
mathematics, and engineering, was founded in 1750; Louis XV gave the founding 
decree ‘It is necessary that the ancient prejudice which has instilled the belief that 
bravery alone makes the man of war would give place imperceptibly to a taste for the 
military studies which have introduced’.6 England also acknowledged this new trend 
in military practice. In 1741, nine years before the École Militaire was founded, King 
George II established the Royal Military Academy at Woolwich to prepare ‘gentlemen 
cadets’ for their service in artillery and engineering. At Woolwich, the English 
focused on mathematics, geometry, fortification, mining, gunnery, and bridge 
building.7  
 Because the American colonists had had contact with European troops in the 
French and Indian War, they also saw the necessity of instructing officers. As early as 
August 1774, and prior to the establishment of the Continental Army, the concept of 
creating a company made up of the finest officers was formed. Named for the five 
Virginia counties where it was stationed, the corps was known as the ‘Independent 
Companies of Fairfax—Prince William—Fauquier—Spotsylvania & Richmond’.8 
The propose of creating these companies was to improve and more firmly establish 
the militia of the colonies with ‘not exceeding one hundred men,’ and to serve as an 
example for other colonies, ‘ the Expediency of putting the Militia of this Colony 
upon a more respectable Footing, & hoping to excite others by our Example’.9 The 
officers were chosen by members of the corps and met to ‘learn and practice “military 
                                                 
6 Cited in Stephen E. Ambrose, Duty, Honor, Country (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 
1966), p. 4. 
7 Ibid. p. 5. 
8 Chase, ed., ‘From George Washington to the Officers of Five Virginia Independent Companies, 20 
June 1775’, vol. 1, pp. 16–19. 
9 The Papers of George Mason, 1725–1792, vol. 1, ed. by Robert A. Rutland, (Chapel Hill, N.C.: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1970), pp. 210–212. 
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Exercise & Discipline”’ to deal with ‘the Indian Enemy in our Country […] and all 
that is dear to British Subjects & Freemen’.10  
 George Washington was unanimously chosen as commander of these 
companies on March 17, 1775,11 and he initially accepted the nomination.12 In June, 
however, Congress decided to create the Continental Army as a united force and 
elected Washington to be the commander-in-chief. Washington chose the second seat 
and became a commanding general for the entire American army. The day he was 
chosen to command the American forces, Washington presented himself in Congress 
wearing the Fairfax Independent Company uniform, or the ‘blue and buff uniform’13 
which marked him as a Virginian combatant. Washington was proud to be one, seeing 
as the officers of the companies were trained properly and took part in ‘the laudable 
pursuit engaged of training’.14 These Virginia companies provided an ideal example 
of how other new companies should operate, emphasizing, as Washington insisted, 
‘an exertion of your [the Companies’] military skill, by no means to relax in the 
discipline of your Respective companies’.15 
 The Independent Companies eventually influenced Bostonians to create a 
similar military unit in 1776 called the elite ‘Boston’s new silk-stocking’ of the 
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11 ‘To George Washington from Richmond County Independent Company’, 17 March 1775’, The 
Papers of George Washington, Colonial Series, vol. 10, 21 March 1774 – 15 June 1775, ed. by W. W. 
Abbot and Dorothy Twohig (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1995), p. 305. 
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pp. 308–309. 
13 The uniforms of the Company were in blue and described as, ‘turn’d up with Buff; with plain yellow 
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Independent Company.16 The company had 80 members, including John Hancock 
who was promoted as a colonel.17 It was known as ‘a fine company […] consisting of 
young Gentlemen of the first families’.18 This company followed Virginian practice, 
acting as a training unit for officers to obtain military expertise, ‘they are the School 
for forming officers, they take great pains to acquire military Skill and will make a 
fine figure in a Little While’.19 Little detail exists about this corps, since it was not in 
a militia system or under the Continental Army’s control. The members were a small 
number of wealthy men, and the unit was perhaps created to prevent them from being 
recruited into the army.  
 With the creation of the Continental Army, these companies seemed less 
necessary as America now had a united force with colonial quotas and supported by 
the militia. Each colony had stronger and more varied forces to defend themselves. 
The Virginia Independent Companies were replaced with new troops in August 1775 
when the Third Virginia Convention authorized an increase of ‘fourteen Hundred & 
forty five Men’.20 The elite Boston Company lasted longer as they had the means to 
act freely and without control by any institution. Nevertheless, these Independent 
Companies indicated that ideas conceiving of a military school or unit to teach and 
train officers had occurred even before the Continental Army was created. 
 The objective of the military academy was to instruct and prepare officers with 
specific military skills. In the eighteenth century, the military technical services 
                                                 
16 ‘Introduction’, The Adams Papers, Earliest Diary and Autobiography of John Adams, June 1753 –
 April 1754, September 1758 – January 1759, ed. by L. H. Butterfield (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1966), pp. 1–42. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Adams Family Correspondence, vol. 2, ed. by L. H. Butterfield and others (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press Offices, 1963), p. 73.  
19 Ibid.  
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included artillery, military engineering, and logistics.21 The logistics in the 
Continental Army appeared ineffective because supplying the troops proved to be one 
of the main challenges. However, the regiments of artillery and engineers played an 
important role. Washington and his subordinates made several attempts to find a way 
to set up a school, or at least some place to educate their officers so they could develop 
some expertise in these skills. Officers and men were self-taught and trained, using 
their own experience, the input of veterans, and their work with foreign officers. Even 
if there was no official military school in America during this time, the need for one 
clearly existed.  
Artillery 
The impulse to create a military school was derived from political and military 
leaders, and some credit should be given to Washington because he was fond of the 
professional army style in Europe. However, the person who was most instrumental 
in the creation of a military school was Henry Knox. Knox owned the London Book-
Store in Boston, where he liked to converse with British officers and studied military 
science in his spare time. He had joined a local militia company, and, on November 
17, 1775, he was made a chief of artillery by Congress with Washington’s 
recommendation. Washington replaced Colonel Gridley with 26-year-old Knox, as 
Washington’s thought Knox was the most suitable person the army could acquire, ‘the 
Command of the Artillery should no longer continue in Colo. Gridley, & knowing of 
no person better qualified to supply his place, or whose appointment will give more 
general satisfaction, have taken the liberty of recommending Henry Knox Esqr’.22  
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 Knox also had been known for his intelligence by John Adams. The two men 
often discussed a list of military books. Adams requested information on engineers, 
fortification, and gunnery, as well as any military science books available.23 In Knox’s 
letter to John Adams on September 25, 1776, he wrote a ‘Military academy must be 
instituted at any expense. We’re fighting against a people well acquainted with the 
theory and practice of war, brave by discipline and habit’.24  
 Washington’s decision to replace the prior artillery commander, Colonel 
Richard Gridley, with Knox, changed the traditions of the Continental Army forever. 
Gridley was a provincial artillery officer who had gained experience from major 
battles in the French and Indian War. Knox, on the other hand, was still young and 
inexperienced but eager to study military arts and history by himself; he had even 
learned French to read artillery books. This way of practice became one of the 
Continental Army officers’ characteristics—the officers acquired military skills by 
reading and learning from experience. After being appointed, Knox asked where the 
artillery was, and the Commander told him that there was none. Knox suggested 
bringing the captured British artillery at Fort Ticonderoga back to Boston, and 
Washington agreed, assigning Knox to take the guns. This was Knox’s first task as 
the head of an artillery corps.25 
 After the defeat in New York in August 1776, Knox expressed his concern 
about Washington’s heavy workload in a letter to his wife Lucy, wishing he had some 
capable men to help him:  
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24 Taylor, ed., ‘To John Adams from Henry Knox, 25 September 1776,’ vol. 5, pp. 40–42. 
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The enemy since our retreat from Long Island have attempted but little, what 
their next attempt will be is a little uncertain, as I said before we want men 
capable of great Ideas & who are acquainted with military matters. The 
General has such a vast load upon his mind that I wish for some easement to 
him But many promotions have been made with very little judgement some 
Good men we have but we all want experience.26 
He also realized that the British might actually have won the war if they had moved 
to block the American troops at the Hudson River, but they had not, and Knox was 
astonished to learn that the British were less intelligent than he had thought: 
This would have left 15,000 men at least to have made a quest up the north 
River and landed in our rear and fortified - had they have taken this measure 
which in good policy they ought to have done, they might at one stroke have 
reduc’d the whole army to the necessity of surrendering prisoners without 
being  able to fight in the least - But in this & several other capital matters 
they have not acted the great Warriors - indeed I see nothing of the vast about 
them either in their designs or execution.27  
In Knox’s opinion, although the British may have missed their chance at victory 
because of their lack of sharp officers, the American army was even worse, ‘if they 
are little thou knowest full well we are much less, and that nothing less than the 
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infatuation of the enemy and the immediate interposition of thy providence has sav’d 
this rabble army’.28 He openly complained about the Continental officers:  
There is a radical evil in our army – the lack of the officers. We ought to have 
men of merit in most extensive and unlimited sense of the word. On stead of 
which, the bulk of the officers of the army are a parcel of ignorant, stupid men, 
who might make tolerable soldiers, but [are] bad officers; and until Congress 
forms as establishment to induce men proper for the purpose to leave their 
usual employments and enter the service, it is ten to one they will be beat till 
they are heavily tired of it.29 
Knox reported to Congress emphasizing the importance of the officers as war experts 
and also mentioned the British military school that the American should follow: 
 As officers can never get with confidence until they are Master of their 
 profession, an Academy established on a liberal plan would be the utmost 
 service to America, where the whole theory and practice of Fortifications and 
 the same plan as that of Woolwich making allowance, for the differences of 
 circumstances.30 
Knox praised Washington as a great man but believed that he needed good assistants, 
and these were rare to find. Therefore, Knox decided that America needed a school 
that could teach young soldiers to be good officers. He wrote, ‘We ought to have 
academies, in which the whole theory of the art of war shall be taught and every 
encouragement possible be given to draw persons into the army that may give lustre 
to our arms. As the army now stands, it is only a receptacle for ragamuffins’.31 His 
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proposal was accepted by Congress, which appointed a committee to aid in planning 
an academy and ‘to prepare and bring in a Plan of a military Accademy at the Army: 
The Members chosen Mr. Hooper, Mr. Lynch, Mr. Wythe, Mr. Williams and Mr. J. 
Adams’.32 
 On December 18, 1776 Knox drafted A Plan for the establishment of a 
Continental Artillery. He underlined the importance of artillery discipline and 
recommended the unit compositions and suggested that Congress try to entice smart 
men to join the army, ‘In the modern mode of carrying on a war, there is nothing 
which contributes more to make an army victorious than a well-regulated and well-
disciplined Artillery’ together with providing artillery troops with a sufficiency of 
cannon and stores as Europe had done. 33 In his opinion the superiority of artillery was 
vital for American victory.  
 Since Knox always wanted to organize a permanent military academy like the 
Royal Military Academy at Woolwich. In winter 1778 he started his own school at 
Pluckemin, New Jersey as a Formal Officer and Artillery Training Facility. George 
Washington wrote to Henry Lauren on November 27, 1778, specified the places for 
the army in winter-quarters, ‘The disposition for winter-quarters is as follows. Nine 
brigades will be stationed on the west side of Hudson’s River, exclusive of the 
Garrison at West Point […] The Park of Artillery will be at Pluckemin’.34 
 This place was perceived as a military academy for the general public. The 
Independent Ledger for 6 March published a letter ‘from a foreigner to a gentleman 
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in this city Near Middlebrook Camp’, dated 22 February 1779’ which described Henry 
Knox’s ‘preceptor of the park’: 
I had, till now, only seen the outside of the academy. It was raised several feet 
above the other buildings, and capped with a small cupola, which had a very 
good effect. The great room was fifty feet by thirty, arched in an agreeable 
manner, and neatly plaistered within. At the lower end of the room was a small 
enclosure, elevated above the company, where the preceptor to the park gave 
his military lessons. This was converted into an orchestra, where the music of 
the army entertained the company. The stile of the dinner was of that happy 
kind, between the extremes of parade and unmeaning profusion, and a too 
great sparingness and simplicity of dishes. Its luxury could not have displeased 
a republican. The toasts were descriptive of the day, while the joy and 
complacency of the company could have given umbrage to none, except our 
enemies the British.35 
A month later the Pennsylvania Packet also praised the appearance of Knox’s artillery 
school:  
I rode…to a place about eight or nine miles distant, called Pluckemin, where 
the artillery have their winter quarters. The huts of this corps are situated on a 
rising ground, at a small distance from the road, and unfold themselves in a 
very pretty manner as you approach. A range of field-pieces, mortars, 
howitzers, and heavy cannon, make the front line of a parallelogram; the other 
sides are composed of huts for the officers and privates; there is also an 
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academy where lectures are read on tactics and gunnery, and work huts for 
those employed in the laboratory, all very judiciously arranged. This military 
village is superior, in some respects, to most of those I had seen.36  
In fact, the Pluckemin cantonment was intentionally built for three units: the Military 
Stores Department, the Park of Artillery, and the Continental Artillery Brigade staff.37 
Construction started in December 1778 and was finished in February 1779, and one 
of those facilities was an academy building which was used for classes and training 
of specific knowledge. Even if this place was used to train the artillerists for six 
months, and they left in June 1779, it made a significant step towards a permanent 
military school in the future.   
 North Callahan, the author of Henry Knox: General Washington’s General 
considered Knox a revolutionary military academy pioneer. In his interview with the 
New York Times, he said, ‘I'm convinced that Knox was the founder of West Point. 
It started from Knox at Pluckemin. But Washington and Alexander Hamilton always 
get all the credit’.38 This idea was well supported by Alan Aimone, a senior member 
of the staff at the United States Military Academy Library, ‘There is no conflict with 
West Point. Pluckemin was the most formal attempt at training artillery officers during 
the American Revolution. The fact is it didn't go anywhere afterward, and West Point 
did’.39 
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Engineering 
Because Congress was dealing with more important issues during the Revolutionary 
War, such as money and manpower deficiencies, the attempt to create a military 
academy was far from becoming a reality. Considering the idea that it takes time to 
train people to become experts in these building, machine, and weapon skills, other 
options were more attractive when the war was already underway. Congress agreed 
to send its representatives to seek assistance abroad. In December 1775, Congress 
appointed its Committee of Correspondence to search for skilful engineers to ‘engage 
in the service’.40  
  Because it was defeated in the previous French and Indian war, France was 
Congress’ hope for assistance. French people seemed inclined to support America. 
The thoughts of famous French philosophers such as Voltaire, Rousseau, and Turgot 
persuaded people to think of America as a land of humanity and equity, which was 
free from mastering systems and corruptions. The ideas of the Enlightenment greatly 
influenced French people and played an important role in leading France to take part 
in the war and support America. 
 The eighteenth century was the era of modernization and industrialization, and 
at that time, France was the centre of military academy and knowledge. There was a 
need for engineering expertise for industry and infrastructure. It was also the period 
of warfare evolution. In 1748, the French founded  École royale du génie de Mézières 
or ‘the Royal Engineering School at Mézieres’ to produce qualified officers in 
engineering for the engineer corps of the royal army who would have skills in 
offensive and defensive military operations. École royale du Génie de Mézières 
showed and emphasized defence skills and battle preparation. School applicants had 
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to pass a difficult mathematics exam and then spend six years in studies. In the first 
year, students focused on theory; in the second year, students on military training; in 
the third and fourth years, students worked in the regiment; and in the last two years, 
students worked with engineering seniors.41  
 The students of École royale du génie de Mézières were greatly influenced by 
the writings of Sébastien Le Prestre de Vauban, particularly De l’attaque et de la 
défense des places or ‘On Siege and Fortification’.42 Vauban was a seventeenth-
century French skilled engineer and master of siege craft. His theory emphasized the 
idea that the troops who employed a siege could reduce losses by approaching 
systematically through connected trenches, and they could acquire better protection 
by building earthwork if needed. Most engineering volunteers who came to America 
used Vauban’s doctrines. But before the French assisted the American Army, the 
Americans used the French handbook, Count de Clairac’s Field Engineer, and the 
English textbook of John Miller, Treatises on Artillery and Fortifications.  
 The first chief engineer of the Continental Army, however, was not French; it 
was Richard Gridley, and he was also the first American Chief of Artillery. Gridley 
had worked as a surveyor and British engineer assistant in Boston. When the 
Revolutionary War broke out, Gridley was the most capable engineer because of his 
experience. But as commander-in-chief, Washington was not pleased with the 
appointment of Gridley because he knew that experience was not enough, and the 
army required knowledge in the area of fortifications. He wrote to congress, ‘We have 
no one here better Qualified, he has done very little hitherto in that department. But if 
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the Congress chuse to appoint him, I will take care that he pays a proper attention to 
it’.43 
 In 1776, when Congress decided to expand the Continental Army to have 88 
infantry battalions, Colonel Rufus Putnam, who took over the position of chief 
engineer from Gridley, submitted the idea of establishing the Corps of Engineers.44 
His letter to Washington expressed his concern that the army had not had a permanent 
Corps of Engineers yet:  
I have long Wondered that no Corps of Engeneers was yet Established. The 
Number of Works to be Executed; the Nesesity of Dispatch in them; the 
lmposability for Common hands to be made at once to Comprehend what they 
ought to do. With out a Core of Engeneers is Established the Works Never will 
be properly Executed nor don in a Reasonable time’.45  
Putnam realized that he might not be qualified for this position, but this unit should 
be created permanently because it was necessary for fortifications. He wrote to 
Washington: 
True it is that, after my arrival in New York, I had read from books on 
fortification, and knew more than when I began at Roxbury; but I had not the 
vanity to suppose that my knowledge was such as to give me a claim to the 
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first rank in a corps of engineers, yet my experience convinced me that such a 
corps was necessary to be established’.46  
In October 1776, Putnam submitted a plan for a Corps of Engineers establishment to 
Washington and enclosed an undated document titled ‘An Establishment for a Corps 
of Engineer[s] artificer[s] &c. To Consist of 2 Battallions of 8 Companys Each 100 
men In a Company Including officers’.47 Washington quickly forwarded this plan to 
Congress, but the plan was turned down. Putnam then resigned his commission as 
chief engineer. 
 In 1776, Congress sent Silas Deane to Paris as its representative to trade 
American goods for French clothing products and weapons and build a friendship with 
France. Deane was also appointed to resolve the need for engineers. His mission was 
considered Congress’s first attempt to find engineers abroad. Deane’s mission was 
successful in recruiting engineering staff to the Continental Army. He signed a 
contract with Phillippe Charles Tronson du Coudray, a French adjutant general 
artillery specialist and the writer of treatises on gunpowder and metallurgy as applied 
to artillery. Deane was impressed by Coudray’s expertise and personality as he wrote, 
“M’ Coudray has the character of the first Engineer in the Kingdom, and his manners 
and disposition will, I am confident, be highly pleasing to you, as he is a plain, modest, 
active, sensible man, perfectly adverse to Frippery and parade’.48 Deane decided to 
hire Coudray and promised him a higher rank in the artillery corps when he joined the 
American army. Deane’s letter explained Coudray’s characteristics to insist to 
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Congress that, ‘He is an officer of the first eminence, and Adjutant-General in the 
French Service, and his prospects here of rising are exceeding good […] His proposals 
in general have been, that he should be General of the Artillery’.49 However, the 
decision depended on only Congress or their Committee of War, or of their 
commander-in-chief.  
 Deane assigned Coudray an important task of taking two hundred pieces of 
brass cannon, with every necessary article for twenty-five thousand men provided 
with an able and experienced General at the head of it. In addition he was assigned to 
bring with him ‘a number of fine and spirited young officers in his train, and all 
without advancing one shilling’50. At the end of the letter, Deane praised Coudray’s 
sacrifice to leave his country to go to America.51 The Articles of Agreement was made 
between Deane and du Coudray in September 1776 stating that du Coudray would be 
promoted a major general and shall have the direction of artillery and ordnance and 
corps of engineers.52 
 This agreement between Deane and Coudray brought about dissatisfaction and 
disputation when the American officers learned they would be subordinated by a 
French man. When Coudray arrived in America in May 1777, the decision was 
protested by three major American officers, John Sullivan, Nathanael Greene, and 
Henry Knox; these men would not agree to be outranked by a French officer. The 
situation became intense when these three men threatened to resign, especially Knox 
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who was almost succeeded by Coudray. Washington could not allow this to happen, 
so he wrote to Congress: 
There is an Agreement between Mr Dean & him [Monsr Coudré], that he shall 
have the chief command of the Artillery […] if it be true, it may involve the 
most injurious consequences. General Knox who has deservedly acquired the 
character of One of the most valuable Officers in the service, and who 
combating almost innumerable difficulties in the department he fills, has 
placed the Artillery upon a footing, that does him the greatest Honor. He, I am 
persuaded, would consider himself injured by an Appointment superseding his 
command, & would not think himself at liberty to continue in the service. 
Should such an Event take place, in the present state of things, there would be 
too much reason to apprehend a train of ills, and such as might convulse & 
unhinge this Important Department.53 
In December 1776, Benjamin Franklin came to Paris to unite with Deane and to build 
a relationship with France. Franklin mentioned military engineers as a matter of 
urgency to King Louis XVI. The King passed on the request to his ministry of war, 
the Comte de Saint Germain, and Germain appointed Lieutenant Colonel Louis 
Lebègue Duportail to be sent to America with three other engineering subordinates: 
Jean-Baptiste de Gouvion, Jean Baptiste Joseph, chevalier de Laumoy, and Louis de 
Shalx la Radiere. On February 17, 1777, all four officers signed a two-year contract 
with American administrators.  
 Both Duportail and Coudray requested a higher rank and better position when 
serving in America, but they had conflicts over the position of chief of artillery and 
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engineer. Washington noticed this conflict, ‘there is a Jealousy between [Duportail 
and Coudray] and setting them to work together would only create confusion and 
widen the Breach’.54 Thus, Coudray was appointed as inspector general of ordinance 
and military manufactories in August 1777. Unfortunately, Coudray suddenly died in 
September of that year when he fell from his horse into a river and drowned. 
Coudray’s death ended the competition between the two French engineers and secured 
Duportail’s position as chief engineer. In November 1777, he replaced Putnam.  
 The Americans opposed giving promotions and higher ranks to foreign 
officers—even Washington complained about this issue. Tensions started to increase 
in May 1777. In Washington’s opinion these men had ‘no attachment or ties to the 
Country,’ and different languages caused problem of communication and giving 
orders. More importantly being outranked by foreigners would cause dissatisfaction, 
lessen their merit, and make them refuse to join the army.55 However, Washington 
still realized the importance of artillerists and engineers because America could not 
train men to fill these positions in time. His criticism did not extend to artillery officers 
and engineers since the first of these were ‘useful’ and the second were ‘absolutely 
necessary’ when the army did not have any.56 
 Duportail, however, found it difficult to command his men. The Americans 
were rude and disrespected foreign officers, especially the French. He found it 
difficult to command and make the men obey his order since he was a colonel, ‘the 
colonels of the army and even the militia colonels refusing to follow my directions 
about the works. They have been accustomed to Say that they are colonels as much as 
                                                 
54 Elizabeth S. Kite, ‘Washington to Gates, 29 July 1777’, in Brigadier-General Louis Lebegue 
Duportail (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1933), p. 30. 
55 George Washington, ‘George Washington to Richard Henry Lee, May 17, 1777’, in Papers of the 
Lee Family Digital Archive <http://leefamilyarchive.org/papers/letters/transcripts-
gw%20delegates/DIV0042.html> [accessed 28 September 2016]. 
56 Ibid. 
- 245 - 
 
I and had no orders to receive from me’. In a letter to Congress, he complained about 
the situation which drove him to almost quit and return home, ‘I cannot express all 
the difficulty i met with, and i can Say that i had need of the largest, Stock of patience 
and Zeal to be kept from abandoning them entirely’. Duportail described that the 
French were treated really badly. His men were insulted everywhere they went, ‘on 
public Service and in private life we meet with anxieties and mortifications which we 
can bear no longer’. He gave Congress an ultimatum required them to appoint the 
chief engineer to a higher rank, ‘The rank of general officer which i call for witt 
immediately put a Stop to those inconveniences, as it is respected here it witt give our 
corps the becoming weight and regard’.57 
In a quick response, Congress made Duportail brigadier general on November 
17, 1777, as they began to realize that it was not easy for American men to be 
supervised and controlled by foreign officers. This decision was crucial for the growth 
of the corps of engineers—as long as the French stayed in America, the American 
officers would learn from them. This also affected the establishment of the military 
academy since the French officers fully supported this thought. The inherited 
knowledge later on developed was to be the main syllabus of the academy.  
 Even if foreign officers had not been welcomed into the Continental Army, 
Congress still acquired many engineering volunteers, but they never had enough to 
work throughout the duration of the war. Washington tried to make it easier for the 
engineers by requesting that Congress create a geographer department to lighten the 
engineer corps load. This special department was designed to inspect the area of 
                                                 
57 ‘Louis Duportail to the President of Congress, November 13, 1777’, cited in Paul K. Walker, 
Engineers of Independence: A Documentary History of the Army Engineers in the American 
Revolution, 1775-1783, Historical Division, Office of Administrative Services, Office of the Chief of 
Engineers (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1981), pp. 20-21. 
- 246 - 
 
encampment and movement and keep watch over opponents. Congress appointed 
Robert Erskin, who was a Scottish ‘good geographer’, and Washington recommended 
him to work in this unit. Erskin, who had previously been helping the Continental 
Army as its mapmaker, also requested that Congress find assistants for him; he 
specified their qualifications as ‘young gentlemen of Mathematical genius, who are 
acquainted with the principles of Geometry, and who have a taste for drawing, would 
be the most proper assistants for a Geographer. Such, in a few days practice, may be 
made expert surveyors’.58 Erskin also gave the point of the importance of cartography 
as he described it, ‘A great deal may be done towards the formation of an useful Map’. 
The map would help to make accurate some general outlines and some remarkable 
places. It would also point out other places by information and computed distances to 
give a tolerable idea of the country’.59 
 Duportail as Chief Engineer carried on Putnam’s intention to create a 
permanent Corps of Engineers. In January 1778, he wrote his plan and added the 
necessity of fortifications for protection: 
If fortification is necessary in any Armies, it is peculiarly so in those, which 
like ours, from a deficiency in the practice of manoeuvres cannot oppose any 
to those of the enemy-being necessitated therefore to receive him on their own 
ground, they ought always to be protected either by a natural or artificial 
Fortification, if it were only to have (under favor of the resistance of this 
fortification) sufficient time to ascertain the Result of the Enemy's movements 
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where his principal force is directed-anwhere his greatest effort is to be 
made’.60  
He insisted that it was important to choose the soldiers to perform in these companies 
and even more crucial to select the right officers. He emphasized the requirements of 
qualified sappers so that they would continue do the job after the French returned 
home. This message strongly urged Americans to rethink establishing their own 
military school and training their own officers: 
The Companies of Sappers now proposed might serve as a school to them-
they might there acquire at once the practical part of the Construction of 
Works, and if choice be made of young men, well bred, intelligent and fond 
of Instruction,  we shall take pleasure in giving them principles upon the 
choice of Situations, and the methods of adapting works to the ground.61 
Although Congress delayed moving forward with this plan, it eventually authorized 
three engineering companies with some adjustments, ‘in the engineering department 
three companies be established, each to consist of 1 captain, 3 lieutenants, 4 sergeants, 
4 corporals and 60 privates’.62 Congress also approved the idea of providing education 
for its officers in this specific field: 
Three Captains and nine Lieutenants are wanted to officer the Companies of 
Sappers: As this Corps will be a School of Engineering it opens a Prospect to 
such Gentlemen as enter it and will pursue the necessary studies with 
diligence, of becoming Engineers & rising to the Important Employments 
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attached to that Profession as the direction of fortified Places &c. The 
Qualifications required of the Candidates are that they be Natives and have a 
knowledge of the Mathematicks & drawing, or at least be disposed to apply 
themselves to those studies—They will give in their Names at Head-
Quarters.63 
Duportail also made it a priority in seeking qualified officers. He also 
straightforwardly criticized the American engineers and believed that some of them 
were not capable of doing their duties, ‘When we first Came into the Country […] We 
learned that there were not-that all the Gent. who had the title of Engineers’. It was 
impossible for French engineers to follow their direction, ‘we required of the Congress 
that not any of us Should be ever commanded by them’.64  
 In March 1779, Congress officially formed the ‘Corps of Engineers’ which 
took ‘rank and enjoy the same rights, honours, and privileges, with the other troops 
on continental establishment’.65 A few months later, Congress refreshed regulations 
for the Corps of Engineers including directions for the Companies of Sappers and 
Miners to be taught ‘the established manual Exercise and Evolutions on days when 
they are not employed in the particular duties of their department and the same police 
and discipline shall be practiced in their companies as in the other parts of the army’. 
These regulations began the first engineering training in the Continental Army: 
15thly. the Commandant of the Corps of Engineers shall take the most 
effectual and expeditious method to have the Sappers and Miners in structed 
in their duty, and as probably the officers of these companies whose talents 
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and acquirements fit them for the profession, will be appointed Engineers, the 
Commandant of the Corps of Engineers shall form a plan of instructions for 
these officers which being approved by the board of War and commander-in-
chief shall be carried into execution. 
16thly. The Commandant of the Corps of Engineers shall appoint an Engineer 
or Engineers whom he shall judge but best qualified, to read lectures on 
fortification proper for towns or the field; on the manner of adapting 
fortifications to different grounds and positions; to regulate their extent 
according to the number of men intended to be covered; Upon Attack and 
Defence; Upon the use of Mines and their construction; Upon the manner of 
forming plans, reconnoitering a country and choosing, laying out and 
fortifying a Camp’.66  
There was no clear evidence that engineering education was pursued. However, it was 
obvious that the Corps of Engineers of the Continental Army worked effectively when 
it laid siege to the British troops at Yorktown. The engineering soldiers must have 
been trained and gained knowledge and experience during their service. Washington 
was fascinated by the Corps of Engineers’ performance. He wrote to Congress 
praising his French engineers, ‘I am very strongly impressed, and do injustice to very 
conspicuous merit, if I did not upon the present occasion offer my testimony to the 
distinguished abilities and services, both of General Duportail and Colonel Gouvion’. 
Washington was thrilled by their ‘practice of Europe’ and sieges which were 
considered a particular quality of the corps of engineers. He applauded that the 
engineering department made an important role in the success. This was due to ‘these 
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officers [who were] supported by a series of conduct in the line of their department, 
which makes them not depend merely upon the present circumstances’.67 
French recommendations for artillery and engineering reform and 
military school establishment  
After the war ended in 1781, debate ensued over whether to keep the standing army 
during times of peace. Top ranking French engineers, such as Duportail and his 
subordinate Jean-Batiste de Gouvion, suggested America maintain an engineering 
department and establish a way to train its own officers. In Gouvion’s letter to 
Washington, he proposed a valuable plan for establishing a military academy and 
combining the corps of engineering and artillery.68 Gouvion explained how to 
combine the two corps and how to prepare future officers to continue the practice and 
performance. He stressed the importance of these two corps which required different 
methods and instruction for their officers to follow and regulation to be established to 
achieve it. The officers needed fully learned the theories and practice of it. Gouvion 
asserted that it was absolutely necessary that the officers of the corps should be 
‘intelligent, attentive, and industrious’.69 
 The military operations of artillery and engineer have a connection and a good 
artillery officer should have vast knowledge of engineer service and vice versa. 
Gouvion suggested uniting these two corps, and artillery and engineering students 
should share some fundamental subjects in order to know and perform in both units if 
necessary. This similar practice had been carried out in France in which the officers 
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of the two corps were sent to help the other in wartime. However, sometimes because 
they had only general knowledge of a service they did not belong to, so when they 
had spare time the officers should find out what knowledge they needed to acquire 
from the other corps.  
 Gouvion then insisted that the basis to raise an effective corps was to have ‘a 
well-established military academy and Kept up With great care’. He laid the essential 
courses of the artillery and engineering. The institution required officers who obtained 
knowledge and experience from important operations as well as a good professor of 
mathematics and another of drawing to give instructions. The young gentlemen who 
would be admitted in the academy must have a liberal education and knowledge of 
arithmetic, geometry and trigonometry, and they needed to acquire the knowledge of 
mathematics to perfection. They were also required to study the different machines 
employed by artillerists and engineers, their construction, how to put the forces in 
motion, and what the effect to expect. A cadet would be taught to survey to draw 
exactly the ground surveyed by him to be able to ‘make plans and [profils] of works 
and buildings in the greatest detail’. All these instruction parts were a responsibility 
of the professors, and what followed would be taught by the commanding officers.   
 Gouvion also elucidated how the cadets and the subalterns should be taught 
and trained. He firmly believed that the young gentlemen should be instructed to make 
an effective plan to operate. They must be able to choose positions for an army to be 
covered and for the communications to be kept open. They would learn to fortify 
depending on the nature of the ground, the number of troops to be employed for 
defending, and the strength of the enemy. They should be able to determine the most 
advantageous batteries on a field of battle, fortify towns including maritime places 
and estimate the quantity of work and expenses and the parts that could not be 
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attended. They should know how to reconnoitre an enemy’s fortification and 
determine the distance from it. The subalterns should have theoretical class twice a 
week with captain present to keep them in order and watch over the instructions; and 
the students would be tested on what they had learned. The regiments should be 
exercised to fire cannon and mortars twice a week, and the officers must be presented 
and make a report of any absence. The captains and field officers should confer twice 
a week for the care of all matters concerning artillery, fortifications, manufactures of 
arms, power mills, castings of canons, shells, balls, and carriages. 
By the end of 1783, Duportail requested to go home with his men after his 
five-year service in America. Before leaving, he expressed his concern about the 
army’s artillery and engineering units. In his letter to Washington, he proposed his 
plan for a corps of engineers and artillery and insisted on uniting the two corps because 
they were related to each other and it would save money. He also gave advice about 
military establishment and composition.  
 He asserted that the military academy was necessary as ‘the nursery of the 
corps [which] must be commanded (under the Director General) by a field Officer, 
assisted by a Captain’. He recommended to acquire its teachers who were a master of 
mathematics, natural philosophy, chemistry, and drawing. Military matters it should 
be a responsibility of the officers to design and give the instructions. The students 
should spend at least three years for studying, and ten or twelve students should be 
enough to complete the corps. But, the America should find ‘Men of Theory and 
Knowledge’ to teach in school since Duportail and his men were leaving, and he 
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hoped ‘to fill those Vacancies with the first Students which will receive their 
instruction at the Academy’.70 
American thought on military school   
Besides Knox, other officers outside the corps of artillery and engineering also raised 
thoughts on the establishment of a military academy at West Point. Timothy 
Pickering, a quartermaster general in the army, saw that if the United States did not 
have a standing army, it would be pointless to create a military academy because none 
would ‘find and interest in studying the military art as a profession’. And if there was 
any who could afford studying military might find it better to acquire military 
knowledge in ‘Europe schools’ which ‘already established on the most perfect 
plans…with the greatest facility all that knowledge of the military art of which they 
are capable’. Pickering in fact was against the idea of the standing army as he saw that 
it would ‘endanger our liberties’. He, however, was the one who suggested to locate 
the academy at West Point if Congress decided to create one, ‘if any thing like a 
military academy in America be practicable at this time, it must be grounded on the 
permanent military establishment for our frontier posts and arsenals’. 
  Pickering also thought that all the subjects related to military arts and sciences 
should be taught in American universities, and the states should support it. He gave 
some basic guidance that the students of the academy should be instructed in ‘military 
discipline, tactics, and the theory and practice of fortifications and gunnery’. The 
commandant and one or two other officers of the standing regiment, and the engineers, 
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making West Point their general residence, would be the masters of the academy; and 
the inspector general superintend the whole.71 
 Washington had always supported the idea of America instructing its own 
officers, and he agreed with Duportail that Americans could not rely on foreign aid 
forever. America needed a school for training its own military students. After the War 
was over and a treaty of peace was approaching, Washington suggested that Congress 
‘form Military Academies & Manufactories, as a part of this Establishment; should 
this Idea be adopted, and the Plan carried into execution’. He insisted that the French 
engineers should stay in America to teach after the school was built, ‘it is doubtless, 
be necessary for us to retain some of the French Engineers now in America, for the 
first beginning of the Institution’. In his sentiments on a Peace Establishment, 
Washington repeated his intention to form one or more ‘Accademies’ for the 
Instruction of military arts and sciences ‘particularly those Branches of it which 
respect Engineering and Artillery, which are highly essential, and the knowledge of 
which, is most difficult to obtain’.72 
Throughout the eight years of the Revolutionary War many plans for creating 
military academy were written by those respectable officers, but Congress ignored 
nearly all of them. The reasons that prevented Congress from approving the proposals 
were the lack of money and the fear of having a standing army. Washington and his 
men had tried many times to get this plan accepted. Thomas Jefferson, George 
Washington, John Adams, and other leaders did their best to eliminate the fear of an 
uprising at the military academy. They came up with the idea of a civilian-controlled 
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institution at which students would be selected by civilians and graduates would go 
back home to train their local militia. They were not supposed to stay in the army but 
were instead expected to return to civil life and participate in their local militias.73 
This plan sounded ideal, but because Congress kept neglecting it, nobody knew if it 
would work. 
Conclusion 
At the beginning of the Revolutionary War, America had many tasks to complete. 
One of those was to create its own army to fight in the war. Its officers were British 
veterans in the colonial wars, and its soldiers were provincial people. The officers 
gained military skills through experience and readings; soldiers were trained by their 
local sergeants. The colonists never had official schools for their officers to become 
properly educated, and their troops did not know how to fight professionally in 
European style.  
 Because the American officers and soldiers had fought alongside the British 
troops in the colonial wars, they had learned and absorbed the military profession, 
tradition, and training from the army of their motherland. They also developed the 
idea of military preparatory school from the British and wanted to pursue the idea. 
However, creating a school during a time of war was almost impossible because the 
Americans already had issues with a lack of money, and it always caused payment 
problems with their own personnel. They did not have skilled specialists who were 
well educated; the officers learned from reading and from experience in the field, but 
they were not proficient enough in this more modern war. This urged Congress to 
immediately find a solution by seeking help from Europe, especially France because 
it had always been the enemy of the British. Further, because France lost in the 
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previous French and Indian War, they would do anything they could to get revenge 
on the Redcoats. Fortunately, the French were willing to aid the American troops with 
money, ammunition, uniforms, and personnel.  
 But when the French officers arrived in America, they were not welcomed. 
The French faced jealousy and bad manners from the American soldiers who would 
not obey foreign officers. This almost made the French team return home; however, 
Congress eventually resolved the problem by upgrading French officers’ ranks and 
positions. This was a good beginning for the Continental Army in the long run because 
many French officers had made good contributions to the American army. Some 
officers, such as Duportail and Gouvion, generated and supported the idea of creating 
a military technical school by emphasizing the need for the Americans to have their 
own skilled specialists because the French officers could not stay forever. The 
Americans needed to be able to rely on themselves when the war ended.  
 Even if the first American military academy was not officially established until 
1802, the intention to create a permanent military school started as early as the 
Revolutionary War began. And this original idea, field practice and experience 
definitely based the creation of the American first military school in the future. It was 
not clear that there was actual education during the war, but all these attempts to build 
a military school was the foundation for the idea of creating the first American military 
academy at West Point. Undoubtedly, the French were a large part of this idea.
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Conclusion 
 
  The American Revolutionary War is a very popular topic that has been 
meticulously studied, but in-depth research on the actual fighting force in the war is 
scattered. Two years ago in 2015, I gave a presentation, at the Conference: War, 
Society, and Culture, c.1688-1830, at University of Leeds, on American military 
literature which was influenced by the British and French armies’ reading lists. I was 
surprised that many people did not really recognize how close the American and 
European armies were during that time. Some interesting questions were raised as to 
why the Americans followed the British. The truth is that the Americans were once 
the British and had worked alongside each other in the previous war. The American 
officers respected and admired the British army and wanted to be like their 
professional British counterparts. Moreover, during the war, the Continental Army 
was intervened and then supervised by European personnel. It is clear that the first 
American military force was highly influenced by European practices. The questions 
that still need answers are: What European approaches did the Americans use? What 
European techniques were not used? How were these methods actually applied? If 
they could not be applied, then what was done instead? 
 The European influences on the Continental Army led to a discussion about 
the nature of this first American army—whether it was regulars or militia, if it 
represented an American fighting style, or if it carried traits of eighteenth century 
military warfare. The debates go on, but the European influences that had an effect on 
the creation of the Continental Army have not yet been examined. These influences 
played an important role in how the army was developed and finally became the 
Continental Army. Thus, my thesis is an additional study of the characteristics of the 
Continental Army with European military involvement as a theme and framework.  
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 The Continental Army, the first national fighting force of America, was the 
result of many factors based on deficient resources. These factors pushed Congress to 
seek foreign assistance and the army to adhere to eighteenth-century military tradition, 
which shaped how the army became Europeanized in some degree. This new army of 
a soon-to-be-nation was distinctive in nature due to the objective of the war—fighting 
for independence from its motherland—together with the condition of unpreparedness 
and the struggle to keep the army afloat shaped the army’s future. At first, the war 
was not expected to last long; several petitions and negotiations were sent to King 
George III in order to cease the Coercive Acts, but an agreement could not be 
achieved. In July 1775, the Second Congress thus decided to wage war with Britain 
by creating the Continental Army, headed by Massachusetts, the most radical colony 
of the thirteen colonies.  
 Before Congress decided to establish a national army, the colonies had 
mustered their own force, called a ‘militia’ to defend themselves from British soldiers 
and their Native American allies. All the conflicts surrounding taxing and unfair 
treatment culminated into an actual war at the breaking point, the battle of Lexington 
and Concord. Americans realized that their militia alone could not handle the 
situation. Congress required a capable and credible army to ensure the American 
potential to fight honourably. Congress, at that time, acted as a simulated authority 
that had no power to tax or enforce the rule—America was still comprised of British 
colonies without their own effective governmental system. Because of a shortage of 
essential military resources, Congress was obligated to seek other choices to support 
the army, acquiring foreign assistance to wage war. 
 Congress was primarily responsible for war matters. The resolutions were 
made by the delegates, who were elected in each colony. The delegates then carried 
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on Congressional decisions such as filling military quotas and providing war supplies 
and payment, as well as appointing military commanders and staff officers. This 
practice was ambiguous and ineffective without direct command. The Army never 
acquired enough troops, and the shortage of arms, money, clothes, food, and other 
necessities was a serious issue. The Continental Army was expected to rely on 
provincial support, but, in reality, the public’s help was insufficient. However, in the 
first year of the war the Americans still hoped the conflicts would end quickly and 
they could compromise with the British king. Congress, therefore, was not inclined to 
establish a full-scale army, so the troops were formed by those volunteers who 
gathered around Boston while the feeling of patriotism was robust.  
 A year passed, but still an agreement between the British parliament and the 
American colonists remained distant. The situation of the war then changed in 1776 
when the king decided to hire a large number of German mercenaries to fight for 
Britain. The news hit the colonists hard; the war was becoming serious. Congress 
swiftly decided to declare American Independence and expand their army, with many 
more regiments and additional units to confront the coming force. American envoys 
were sent to Paris to plead assistance in the way of funds, supplies, ships, troops, and 
military technicians. While in North America, the army commander and his officers 
were attempting to prepare and improve their troops.  
 The ideal goal of the commander-in-chief and some of his senior officers was 
to make the American army as similar to European armies as possible. For the 
Americans, the British army had been a model since the American veterans fought 
alongside them in the French and Indian War. The Americans witnessed Britain’s 
military capabilities, which caused Congress to hesitate to thoroughly wage war with 
this powerful army. However, the war was irresistible, and it was hoped that the army 
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would perform at its best. Congress and the army leaders looked up to the European 
pattern and practice to create their force.  
European armies, especially the British army, became influential prototypes 
that the Americans wanted to follow. All these influences were demonstrated in many 
features of the Continental Army. First of all, the lack of money made Congress expect 
the army to be populated with patriotic troops. In reality, however, the patriotic feeling 
did fade, and men wanted to go home. Before the end of 1775, the army was left with 
a small number of men. Washington had known that this would happen; the spirit of 
sacrificing for the war cause could not last forever when men needed to take care of 
their families and personal lives. Congress did not have legitimate power to collect 
money to fund the army and pay the men. It sought other ways to fill the quotas; in 
addition to the army enlistees, a high percentage of militia service was used. This 
practice of substituting the main force with militiamen was argued against by 
Washington, as he saw the flaws of this citizen force. The militia was raised and paid 
by the states, which all had different training methods depending upon each provincial 
commander. The lack of standardization created disunity when men from different 
colonies attempted to fight together. Moreover, the militiamen considered themselves 
ordinary people, not professional soldiers, and this caused them to be insubordinate 
and undisciplined. Even if many times they had to cooperate with the Continentals, in 
practice the militia often accepted only their local commander. Even Washington felt 
uncomfortable giving them commands, but the shortage of enlistees forced him to 
combine regular forces with militia forces throughout the war.  
 The Continental Army was reorganized and reshaped several times during the 
American Revolutionary War due to the resources the Americans had on hand, as well 
as the attempt to mimic the British army’s structure. Congress still remained in self-
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defence in the first year of the war, so the army employed volunteers as their main 
troops under 20,000 men, who enlisted for one year. The Continental Army adopted 
the British staff officer system, but the Americans’ system was less complicated. The 
troops were new to war, a weakness that was soon revealed. The Continental Army 
could not form some technically necessary units because they lacked experts. In 
addition, after the one-year contract ended, men refused to reenlist; this was the first 
critical problem Congress had to face. 
 Congress and the military leaders knew that they had to adjust and improve 
the troops, starting with recruitment. As the commander-in-chief, Washington took 
part in reorganizing the army for the coming campaign. He suggested three-year 
enlistment and protested the method of filling the Continental quotas with the militia, 
as well as promoted curbing the size of the army to make infantry regiments more 
equal and effective. However, the news of additional enemy troops (the British 
regulars and the German mercenaries) reached America in 1776 and reinvigorated the 
spirit of patriotism. This time, the army obtained significantly more men for the next 
campaign than they had previously.  
 The enlisted men led Congress to reorganize the army by following 
Washington’s recommendation of a three-year service term, as well as expanding the 
regiments to be 88 battalions in 1777. Congress also used the British approach of 
offering a bounty and land to persuade men to join the army. Men also were not only 
conscripted from New England but all of the thirteen colonies. Washington was 
granted direct command of 16 infantry battalions. Special units such as light cavalry, 
artillery corps, engineering corps, and companies of invalids were added to strengthen 
and fulfil the army function. Washington started to provide military uniforms for the 
men. It was in these ways that the Continental Army began to mature.  
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 There were significant changes in the army between 1777 and 1778 in terms 
of leadership and complexity. Washington’s capabilities were questioned because he 
had lost more battles than had Gates. Gates gained enough credibility to be appointed 
as a head of the Board of War, which was responsible for many significant tasks, some 
of which had previously belonged to Washington. The Board of War also generated 
an important position, an inspector general, which held many responsibilities 
including advocating for troop discipline. The army shrunk again because men refused 
to reenlist in the winter, and Georgia and South Carolina were taken over by the 
British.  
 Perhaps one of the most impactful changes in the functioning of the 
Continental Army involved foreign participation and integration. Many foreign 
officers from Europe sailed to join and assist the army, which led to the emergence of 
special supporting units such as a topographical section, the corps of Light Dragoons, 
a corps of provosts, and the engineering department. All this resulted from the 
Continental Army receiving European technicians to fill in vacancies. The army 
acquired talented engineers, highly powerful French officers, skilled field 
commanders and the first Prussian inspector general, who became a Continental 
drillmaster when the main troops camped at Valley Forge in the winter of 1777–1778.  
 The army earnestly became more sophisticated after foreign officers took part 
in most military units. However, enlistment was still an unfixed problem that became 
worse—the army had gotten smaller each year since 1778, so Congress decided to 
reduce the regiments. The army that fought in the southern campaign in 1781 was the 
smallest; however, the American troops were reinforced with French allies in the 
battle at Yorktown. After the decisive battle, the British regulars still remained in New 
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York, so the men were kept for defensive operations. The army formally disbanded 
after the Treaty of Peace was signed in 1783.    
 Besides pushing Congress to seek foreign assistance, the struggle of the army 
to survive generated connections between the people in Congress, the army, and 
provincial governments. Congressmen worked with the commander-in-chief and state 
governors, and Washington talked directly to some influential Congressional 
members and state politicians. He also formed his military team with some significant 
senior officers as his backup. All these private contacts helped the army to survive. 
Electing Washington as the commander-in-chief was the best decision Congress could 
have made. Washington was more than a commanding general; he was the centre, 
playing the roles of both civilian and military leader—a revolutionary symbol.  
 At first, the Americans were afraid to adopt a large army, as they saw it could 
possibly harm liberty, but Washington attempted to soothe this fear. The delegates 
knew he would not betray or overthrow them because he used to be a Congressional 
man who sacrificed his personal life for the war cause. They knew him well: Congress 
and the army worked as a highly collaborative, effective team. This reflects the nature 
of eighteenth-century American society—ruled and led by a small group of wealthy 
and influential men. Washington’s hard work and effort to build a strong connection 
with American and foreign leaders paid off. He was empowered to take full control 
over the army, which made it function better and faster due to valuable assistance 
from France and its allies. He also was the one who preferred military professionalism 
and insisted in using a united army instead of militias from separate colonies.   
 The lack of central government created these networks, which worked as the 
base of the existing of the army. This means that the Continental Army relied on 
civilians and the public for financial support of the troops. The army, in the American 
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mind, was a public servant that provided national security and protected liberty. The 
men were fighting for their own future, not for any monarch; this distinctive 
characteristic made the army different and unique. Even with a different foundation, 
still Congress needed to create a professional, European-style army to fight in this 
war. They aimed to build a well-trained army as well as remain consistent with the 
military tradition of the eighteenth-century in order to be acknowledged as honourable 
fighting force.   
 America did not lack only military technicians and experts but also the rank 
and file to fight in the war. Congress’ initial intention was to form the army of white 
American men. This plan was achieved at the first year of the war when the patriotism 
was still strong. However, after the war passed, the sensitivity faded. Congress used 
every possible way to encourage recruitments, such as payment and bounty as the 
British army did, but this did not solve the problem. Congress eventually found out 
that it could not persuade enough American men to enlist in the army, so they looked 
elsewhere for troops. Congress decided to follow the British practice of recruiting 
other ethnicities and races to fill in the army. Both the British and American armies 
were actually competing with each other to recruit the same groups of men to reinforce 
their troops. Those who were available for service were Native Americans, black 
slaves, and Germans.  
 The decision to employ these groups of men was discussed, and there were 
those who agreed and disagreed. Congress initially wanted to remain neutral with the 
Native Americans, but some of them were willing to aid the cause, as they had had 
good relationships with the American citizens nearby and their representatives. 
However, a majority of the Native Americans sided with the British because they had 
been relying on trading European products and weapons with the British even before 
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the war occurred. Other than that, the British openly employed these indigenous 
people, so Congress made a decision to follow this approach. Throughout the war the 
Native Americans’ offered their services to both armies as guides, information 
carriers, traders, and warriors.  
 The British again started using black slaves to fill in their troops by offering 
freedom if they left their American masters to enlist in the king’s regiments. The 
Americans at first protested this idea, as many of them possessed slaves. Congress 
was also reluctant to follow the British and use this group of men because the slaves 
were not trusted to hold weapons—they could harm the Americans themselves. 
However, some American leaders and people in the northern part of the country 
supported the idea of emancipation and saw that this approach was perfect: the army 
would acquire more men, and the slaves would become free. The British released Lord 
Dunmore’s proclamation to persuade those black men to join the king’s army in 1775. 
In 1779, the British launched another proclamation to encourage these men to leave 
their masters by offering them freedom, protection, and land in exchange. This made 
Congress changed its mind, and it adopted the same approach to employ slaves, 
forming a corps of 1,000 Negroes for the first time (in South Carolina and Georgia at 
the end of 1780). 
 The idea to use German service originated from the King George III. The 
contracts for hiring soldiers were made in 1776, and the soldiers were sent across the 
Atlantic to fight for the Royal Army. The news soon reached America and made a 
great impact on the colonists’ morale, which influenced Congress’ hasty decision to 
declare America’s independence. In response to the king’s decision, Washington 
suggested raising a group of soldiers from the German immigrants in America. 
Congress immediately ordered Pennsylvania and Maryland to raise a German 
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battalion in June 1776. An attempt to recruit German deserters was made in 1778, as 
well as persuasion to abandon the British army. The battalion was inactive until 
January 1781, and all foreign troops were transferred to Colonel Moses Hazen’s 
regiment until 1783.  
 Creating an effective army required proficient officers to make campaign 
plans and effective strategies, technical experts for special-skill tasks, and disciplined 
men to fight. When Congress established the Continental Army, they knew that they 
did not have enough professionals. And, before America was assisted by foreign 
military experts, American officers had to read military textbooks to acquire 
knowledge and field exercise. There was no military school or training in place for 
officers or their subordinates. Military literature that the American officers could find 
was written by European intellectuals, especially British, French, and Prussian. When 
military school was not available, reading military literature from Europe became an 
alternative. If the expertise could not be achieved in America, they searched in 
Europe. 
 At first, Washington and the American military leaders followed the British 
reading list not only theoretical and strategic books such as The Treatise and The Art 
of War for commanding generals, but also some guidance and instructional books for 
young officers. There were also some books for specific tasks, such as those for 
artillerists and engineers. In addition, Americans used British field manuals to train 
the troops. Throughout the war, the British and the American armies shared a 
significant number of military books, some of which were popular and reprinted in 
America several times. However, the problem was that because the American officers 
had to plan to fight and educate themselves at the same time, it was impractical for 
them to read and follow all the guidance and instruction in the books. An intensive 
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selection of military reference books was required. Therefore, the Americans became 
selective and chose only the information they saw fit and uncomplicated. Later on, 
the army possessed its own first regulation book, The Blue Book written by the 
Prussian inspector general, which adapted some European techniques to fit the 
American way of fighting.  
 Army recruitments in America was not effective enough to acquire enough 
men, so Congress sought troop reinforcement from the French. American 
ambassadors were present in Paris to plead with the King of France for military 
support. Formal assistance came in 1778 with the promise to offer money, troops, 
fleets, and other war supplies. However, as early as 1776, France covertly helped the 
Continental Army by providing some of their officers to aid special tasks in the war. 
Congress at first aimed to employ technicians such as artillerists and engineers, but as 
the war progressed, foreign enlistment went far beyond that. Some foreign officers 
performed in every part of military units in the battlefield and special operations; some 
took part in American politics and leadership, which greatly affected how the army 
was shaped over time.  
 France was the main source of military funds and foreign officers. The group 
of French officers sent to America was a mix of unqualified soldiers and truly talented 
ones. This practice, in fact, caused American troops to be jealous of foreigners who 
outranked them as well as jealousy among the American officers themselves. 
However, some of those with genuine will and talent proved themselves with their 
momentous works, such as fortifications, military schools of thought, French 
assistance, army development, and, clearly, the war outcome. This group of foreign 
officers became true friends of America—legends who devoted their personal lives, 
skills, and power to the American Revolutionary War.    
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 The last European influence to investigate was the legacy of the need to train 
the officers and the idea of creating a military school during the Revolutionary War. 
It was a shared thought between American and French officers. Henry Knox, the Chief 
of Artillery, led this attempt. He was an influential man who supported military 
education even though he taught himself to read. Inspired by the Royal Military 
Academy at Woolwich, in 1778 Knox developed his own school at Pluckemin in New 
Jersey for artillery training. Some refer to this place as the first American military 
academy.  
 The other military technical branch that offered valuable service to the army 
was the engineering corps, which later became a military course taught to students. 
This unit was commanded and mostly run by foreign officers, especially the French; 
therefore, it made the American and French officers concerned about the corps’s 
future when the French left for home after the war. Louis Duportail, a commanding 
engineer and senior officer, suggested Washington unite the two corps of artillery and 
engineering because they shared a lot of knowledge and practice, and this would save 
money and time. He also insisted on the importance of creating a military school 
because the Americans could not rely on foreign service forever, especially after the 
war ended and America secured their place as an independent nation. Duportail and 
his men also gave thorough guidance for academy establishment and composition that 
the Americans could follow. 
 Washington and many of his senior officers fully supported the idea of 
creating a military academy. Many attempts to convince Congress to establish a 
school were made, but the proposals were postponed and eventually rejected. This is 
understandable, as the first important reason is the Americans’ fear of a standing army, 
as they witnessed it themselves when they were threatened to pay taxes by the British 
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regulars stationed in the colonies. But this problem gradually disappeared as the war 
went on, firstly by the characteristics of the commander-in-chief. Instead of being 
afraid of becoming a military dictator, Washington took responsibility and was the 
symbol of an ideal patriot who genuinely sacrificed for the war’s cause. The other 
reason was that the Americans realized that the army was quite unfit—it was unable 
to fill in the rank and file and usually lacked money and other essentials. More 
importantly, the army was raised and funded by American taxes; without public 
support, it could not survive. Thus, it was challenging if the commander-in-chief and 
the army turned the gun on their own people.  
 However, the same reason prevented the Continental Army to become a full-
scale army and create a military academy. America at that time lacked all necessary 
components to build a strong standing army like those European ones, and a military 
school was something that could wait. The debates on how to shape and adjust the 
army never stopped because the war had not begun and the army had not been created 
until after the end of the war. The idea of creating a professional army was generated 
and accepted by Congress and military leaders, but the practice did not go along. The 
issue of money shortage and weak management of the related institutions responsible 
for the army’s subsistence, as well as other obstacles such as limitation of time and 
war experts, hindered the Continental Army’s development into a complete 
professional army. 
 European military tradition and practice thus had an influence on the genesis 
of the first American army. This could be described as that the army was fighting 
against the British regulars, with whom they had fought in a previous war. When the 
long conflicts could not be solved, the Americans formed their first national army, 
which lacked most war essentials and personnel, so they looked for help from the 
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British opponent, the French. The request was met, even if it took time and much 
effort to make it official. However, French help came loosely, in terms of military 
experts and officers who would guide some special tasks, even before the king of 
France ratified the choice of waging war against Britain. American officers and 
soldiers then learned from French and other European officers who came to join the 
army, hearing each other’s advice and gaining experience from working together.  
 Throughout the war, the Americans mainly followed the two armies’ (the 
British and the American) procedures. The British military had long been a model for 
American officers, so at the first phase of the war the Americans observed and 
imitated British methods and practices. They adopted the British reading list, British 
military organization, and British policy of recruiting their own men and other races 
and ethnicities. But, when the French took part in the war, it gradually changed the 
Continental Army’s way of practice, which the Americans learned from daily 
operations. Many foreign officers, especially the French, were appointed to command 
positions, so they were authorized to command American troops. This had a 
significant effect on how the army was shaped.  
The Continental Army was like other American institutions in which they 
were inherited from the European pattern but later adjusted to fit the new nation.1 The 
army character represented a unique and different one mainly because of their 
struggles. In fact it could not be like other armies since the training time was so limited 
and the men in arms considered themselves people. It was a tough job to secure 
independence with independent mind. But the only way they could do in this war was 
                                                 
1 Wright, p. 3. 
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to fight like regulars if they wanted to win the war and make their independence to be 
recognized by other nations. 
 Even if American commanders and officers tried their best to follow these 
European armies’ practices, they could not reach the same level of professionalism 
because of many deficiencies. So, the Americans solved their problems with whatever 
they had on hand and made their own style of army—just because they could not 
afford to run a complete army in the eighteenth-century warfare style. Any military 
goal they set they could not fully achieve, so taking the middle ground became their 
only choice. The Continental Army thus was a mix of European-style of fighting and 
their American martial way, and this study has shown that the army was almost always 
evolving and subject to differing influences at different moments. In other words, the 
army emerged from American intention, was ideologically dominated by the British, 
and was shaped and improved by the French and other French allies’ officers.  The 
American way of fighting during the Revolutionary War and the peculiar 
characteristics of the Continental Army shine with the influences and effects of 
European involvement. 
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